Kimble v. Empire Beauty Sch.
| Decision Date | 03 February 2020 |
| Docket Number | A19-0934 |
| Parties | Marvin Kimble, Relator, v. Empire Beauty School, Respondent, Department of Employment and Economic Development, Respondent. |
| Court | Minnesota Court of Appeals |
This opinion will be unpublished and may not be cited except as provided by Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).
Affirmed
Department of Employment and Economic Development
Marvin Kimble, Elko, Minnesota (pro se relator)
Empire Beauty School, c/o EEG, Inc., Pottsville, Pennsylvania (respondent employer)
Anne Froelich, Minnesota Department of Employment and Economic Development, St. Paul, Minnesota (for respondent department)
Considered and decided by Johnson, Presiding Judge; Florey, Judge; and Jesson, Judge.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
In this appeal of an unemployment-law judge's (ULJ) determination that relator is ineligible for unemployment benefits, relator argues that he is eligible pursuant to Minn. Stat § 268.095, subd. 1(1) (2018), because he quit his job for a good reason caused by his employer. We affirm.
Relator Marvin Kimble worked as an executive director at Empire Beauty School (Empire). When Kimble started at Empire, he worked alongside then-regional-manager of admissions, J.B. Throughout that arrangement, they had a tenuous but manageable working relationship. Approximately six months before Kimble quit, J.B. was promoted to regional-services director—a position to which Kimble reported. Kimble maintains that his relationship with J.B. and her treatment of him eventually became intolerable and compelled him to quit. Kimble alleges that it was the collective effect of a number of instances that made his "life a living nightmare" and amounted to a good reason for quitting caused by his employer.
First, Kimble asserts that J.B. undermined his directions to, and authority over, his subordinates by giving them conflicting information or directives. Kimble also asserts that J.B. made unjustified negative comments about his performance to others, and he points specifically to an instance in which he overheard J.B. say, "Marvin doesn't know what he's doing . . . [so] just do what I tell you," as opposed to what Kimble told the person to do. The final confrontation Kimble identifies took place on his last day. He asserts that hecame into work at 8:40 a.m., and J.B. told him that he was late. Kimble reports that he was "taken back" by this because he is a salaried employee and did not have "a true schedule." Kimble reported his conflicts with J.B. to their mutual supervisor multiple times. He claims that their supervisor advised him to communicate with J.B., asked if the human-resources department needed to get involved, and once told Kimble that she would speak with J.B. herself.
Kimble characterizes all of his conflicts with J.B. as "professional disagreement[s]." He states that while they had arguments, there were no threats of harm, swearing, name-calling, insults, or yelling.1 Nevertheless, Kimble asserts that his relationship with J.B. resulted in him having high blood pressure and anxiety and that his doctor advised him to limit the stressors in his life. He reports having anxiety attacks at work and getting diagnosed with clinical anxiety.
The ULJ determined that Kimble was not subject to a work environment that would cause a reasonable person to quit prior to finding another job. The ULJ noted that the environment Kimble describes "might cause a reasonable person to seek other employment, but he or she would not quit and become unemployed rather than remaining." The ULJ concluded by noting that it is not unusual for those who work together to have difficulty doing so, but this fact alone is insufficient for an employee who quit to takeadvantage of the exception to the general rule that employees who voluntarily quit cannot receive unemployment benefits.
Kimble filed a request for reconsideration. As part of his request, he sought to introduce additional evidence—namely, that J.B. had since been terminated from Empire. Kimble asserts that J.B. was terminated for many of the reasons he mentioned above and that it was his exit remarks relating to J.B.'s behavior that caused Empire's leadership to investigate and eventually terminate her. On reconsideration, the ULJ declined to admit the new evidence, reasoning that Kimble had not shown that such evidence would have been likely to change the outcome. The ULJ affirmed his prior factual findings and decision. Kimble seeks this court's review of that determination.
When reviewing a ULJ's determination, this court may affirm the decision of the ULJ, remand the case for further proceedings, or reverse and modify the decision if the substantial rights of the relator have been prejudiced. Minn. Stat. § 268.105, subd. 7(d) (2018). For reviews of ineligibility determinations, we view "findings of fact in a light most favorable to the decision, and will not disturb the findings so long as there is evidence in the record that substantially supports them." Gonzalez Diaz v. Three Rivers Cmty. Action, Inc., 917 N.W.2d 813, 815-16 (Minn. App. 2018). However, we review de novo the ULJ's interpretation of statute and the ultimate question of whether the relator is eligible to receive unemployment benefits. Id. at 816.
The Minnesota Legislature enacted the unemployment-insurance program to provide to those "who are unemployed[,] through no fault of their own[,] a temporarypartial wage replacement to assist the unemployed worker to become reemployed." Minn. Stat. § 268.03, subd. 1 (2018). Therefore, if the unemployed person quit their employment, they are considered ineligible for unemployment benefits unless a statutory exception applies. Minn. Stat. § 268.095, subd. 1 (2018). A person quits their employment "when the decision to end the employment was, at the time the employment ended, the employee's." Id., subd. 2(a) (2018).
Among the exceptions to ineligibility as a result of quitting is when the employee quits "because of a good reason caused by the employer." Id., subd. 1(1). A good reason caused by the employer is a reason that is directly related to the employment; is adverse to the employee; and would compel an average, reasonable worker to quit and become unemployed rather than remaining in employment. Id., subd. 3(a) (2018). "The standard of what constitutes good cause to quit is whether the reason was compelling, real and not imaginary, substantial and not trifling, reasonable and not whimsical or capricious." Trego v. Hennepin Cty. Family Day Care Ass'n, 409 N.W.2d 23, 26 (Minn. App. 1987) (quotation omitted). Personality conflicts with employers and simple frustration or dissatisfaction with working conditions are not good reasons attributable to the employer for quitting. Id. (citing Portz v. Pipestone Skelgas, 397 N.W.2d 12, 14 (Minn. App. 1986)). In sum, "[t]he standard is reasonableness as applied to the average man or woman, and not to the supersensitive." Hein v. Precision Assocs., 609 N.W.2d 916, 918 (Minn. App. 2000) (quotation omitted). Whether an employee had good reason to quit is a question of law, which this court reviews de novo. Peppi v. Phyllis Wheatley Cmty. Ctr., 614 N.W.2d 750, 752 (Minn. App. 2000).
We agree with the finding that Kimble's working situation was less than ideal and acknowledge the possibility that he may have personally found it intolerable by the end.2 But that is not the standard for the statutory exception. "While an employee may have a good personal reason for quitting, it does not necessarily constitute a good reason caused by the employer for quitting." Werner v. Med. Prof'ls, LLC, 782 N.W.2d 840, 842 (Minn. App. 2010), review denied (Minn. Aug. 10, 2010). While the good-reason analysis should be performed in the unique factual context of each case, those facts must demonstrate an employer-caused reason that would compel "an average, reasonable worker to quit." Minn. Stat. § 268.095, subd. 3(a)(3); We...
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