Kimoktoak v. State, 3212
Decision Date | 12 May 1978 |
Docket Number | No. 3212,3212 |
Parties | Edward KIMOKTOAK, Appellant, v. STATE of Alaska, Appellee. |
Court | Alaska Supreme Court |
Eric T. Sanders, Asst. Public Defender, Brian Shortell, Public Defender, Anchorage, for appellant.
Monica Jenicek, John Scukanec, Asst. Dist. Attys., Joseph D. Balfe, Dist. Atty., Anchorage, Avrum M. Gross, Atty. Gen., Juneau, for appellee.
Before BOOCHEVER, Chief Justice, and CONNOR, BURKE, MATTHEWS and DIMOND Pro Tem., Justices.
The main issue in this appeal is whether the defendant was deprived of his right to sequestration of the jury when the trial judge allowed the jurors to separate for three days after they had begun their deliberations.
Edward Kimoktoak was charged with joyriding, operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated, and operating a motor vehicle without a license. After Kimoktoak entered pleas of not guilty to all three charges, the cases were jointly tried to a jury. 1 At trial, the principal witnesses for the State were two officers from the Anchorage Police Department. The defendant called no witnesses on his behalf and the jury began its deliberations on Friday afternoon, July 2, 1976. Shortly before 6:00 p. m., the court received a request from the jury to hear a replay of a portion of one of the police officer's testimony. In the absence of the defendant, and over the objection of defense counsel that the defendant be present, the court listened to the testimony of the bailiff on the nature of the jury's request. After hearing arguments by counsel on whether the tape should be replayed, the court decided to allow the replay but that a replay would not occur until the following Tuesday after the three day Fourth of July weekend. Defense counsel protested the delay but was overruled. After giving the jury an admonition, 2 the court excused the jury until the following Tuesday.
On Tuesday, July 6, the court reconvened and allowed the jury to hear a replay of the officer's testimony. Shortly thereafter, the jury returned a verdict of guilty on the charge of operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated and not guilty on the joyriding charge. The conviction was affirmed by the superior court. This appeal followed.
Criminal Rule 27(e)(2) 3 requires that once a jury has begun its deliberations it must remain under the charge of the court until a verdict is agreed upon, unless the parties agree to allow the jurors to return to their homes for reasonable periods of rest. In this case, the defendant refused to stipulate that the jurors be allowed to separate; sequestration therefore became mandatory until a verdict was reached. The state concedes that the trial court did not follow the language of Criminal Rule 27(e)(2), but argues that the rule does not apply to district court proceedings.
District Court of Criminal Procedure 1 provides, in preamble form:
Whenever practicable the Rules of Criminal Procedure shall apply to criminal actions within the jurisdiction of district courts presided over by district judges and magistrates.
First, the State argues that the court had no capacity to replay the tape on Friday afternoon "in that no clerk was available." The transcript reveals a conversation between the clerk and the judge at the end of that day's proceedings, as well as a transcription of the clerk's conclusion of the proceedings. Further, it is within the power of the court to order a clerk to the courtroom to replay a tape.
Second, the State contends that the court system did not have the logistical capability for sequestration of the jury. The court system in Anchorage has 14 double rooms available in the courthouse basement expressly for this purpose and a trial judge has immediate access to these facilities. If these rooms are utilized by other juries, the judge has authority to seek permission from the trial court administrator to obtain accommodations for jury sequestration in a private hotel. Thus, the State's logistical arguments are unfounded; this is not a situation where the application of the Criminal Rules to a district court trial was impracticable.
We recognize that in jurisdictions where case law, a statute, or a rule of court prohibits jury separation after the commencement of deliberations the general rule is that prejudice to the defendant will be presumed if a jury is allowed to separate during deliberations; the State then has the burden of rebutting the presumption. Stuckey v. State, 213 Ga. 525, 100 S.E.2d 189, 192 (1957); Gibson v. State, 512 P.2d 1399, 1400 (Okl.Cr.1973); Goodall v. State, 501 S.W.2d 342, 343 (Tex.Cr.App.1973); State v. Connors, 59 Wash.2d 879, 371 P.2d 541, 545 (1962). We are disinclined to adopt this view. There is respectable contrary authority holding that where the court allows the jury to separate during deliberations it is per se reversible error. United States v. D'Antonio, 342 F.2d 667 (7th Cir. 1965); People v. Ritzert, 17 Ill.App.3d 791, 308 N.E.2d 636 (1974); Commonwealth v. Della Porta, 324 Mass. 193, 85 N.E.2d 248 (1949). See United States v. Panczko, 353 F.2d 676 (7th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 935, 86 S.Ct. 1066, 15 L.Ed.2d 853. 4 We adopt this view because of the inherent difficulty in obtaining reliable information on whether there has been misconduct. ...
To continue reading
Request your trial-
Davis v. Allen
...trial for several jurors to go around the corner from the other jurors to talk. In support of this argument, Davis cites Kimoktoak v. State, 578 P.2d 594 (Alaska 1978), in which the Alaska Supreme Court held it was per se reversible error for the court to allow the sequestered jury to separ......
-
Hughes v. State
...the case or have not been guilty of other misconduct may be "a mere formality, and not capable of refutation by the accused." Kimoktoak v. State, 578 P.2d at 596. The reasons given by the Trial Judge in this case for not sequestering the jury ("too expensive"; "to inconvenient around here";......
-
Reid v. State
...statute is by no means unique to Texas jurisprudence. See e.g. Reeves v. State, 432 So.2d 543 (Ala.Cr.App.1983); Kimoktoak v. State, 578 P.2d 594 (Alaska 1978) (separation in violation of statute per se reversible error); People v. Werwee, 112 Cal.App.2d 494, 246 P.2d 704 (1952); Taylor v. ......
-
Livingston v. State
...that such a separation, especially in capital cases and where the defendant objects, is prejudicial error. See, e.g., Kimoktoak v. State, 578 P.2d 594 (Alaska 1978); Hughes v. State, 437 A.2d 559 (Del.1981); Mason v. State, 239 Ga. 538, 238 S.E.2d 79 (1977); People v. Ritzert, 17 Ill.App.3d......