Kinder v. Commonwealth

Decision Date10 March 1936
PartiesKINDER v. COMMONWEALTH.
CourtKentucky Court of Appeals

Appeal from Circuit Court, Whitley County.

Charlie Kinder was convicted of manslaughter, and he appeals.

Affirmed.

Dickinson & Stewart, of Barbourville, for appellant.

B. M Vincent, Atty. Gen., and W. Owen Keller, Asst. Atty. Gen for the Commonwealth.

STANLEY Commissioner.

Charlie Kinder appeals from a judgment of manslaughter with a penalty of twenty-one years in prison.

He and the deceased, Burt Gambrel, with Bill Jackson and Arthur Mayo, returned to Barbourville about 2 o'clock in the afternoon after riding around for some time in Kinder's automobile, a $65 Ford. Some, if not all, of the party had been drinking. There is evidence that Kinder gave Gambrel the ignition key and permission to use the automobile, as he had frequently done before. Kinder, however, denies this. He and Mayo went to get something to eat and later found that his car was missing from the place he had parked it. He informed some of the police officers that his automobile had been stolen, and asked if they had seen it. He indicated with profanity his belief that Gambrel had taken the machine, and said he would kill him if he caught him in the car.

Kinder went with Mayo and a young lady to Corbin looking for the machine and soon discovered it on Main street being driven by Gambrel, with Jackson by his side. Mayo blew his horn several times and according to Kinder, forced the car to the curb where it stopped. However, it appears that Gambrel turned the corner of Sixth street and stopped close by, and that Mayo's car was stopped on Main street near the corner. The proof of the commonwealth is that Kinder went across to his automobile with a pistol drawn and told Gambrel to "get his damned self out of there," and then shot him through the open window of the door while Gambrel had both hands on the steering wheel and without his having said anything or made any demonstration. Kinder then went across the street to a filling station and asked where he could find an undertaker. One sitting there was pointed out, and he said to him: "I have got a fellow over there for you," or "I shot a fellow over there."

The defendant testified that he went over to the car and asked Gambrel what made him steal it, and Gambrel responded: "You ain't got no car," and hit at him with an automobile crank. He jumped back and as Gambrel started to come out the car door with the crank in his hand, he shot him when about four feet away. He shot, so he testified, because "he was fixing to kill me, I reckon, with that crank; I shot him to save my own self." Again he stated that he shot to save his own life. Asked if he had anything against Gambrel or had any trouble with him before, or any reason for wanting to raise a difficulty other than that he wanted to get possession of his car, the defendant answered: "That was all I wanted was my car." He put a different version upon his inquiry for an undertaker, and explained that he was looking for some one with an ambulance to take the wounded boy to the hospital.

The defendant asked for instructions upon the idea that if Gambrel had stolen the car he had the right to use such force as appeared necessary or to him reasonably necessary in order to prevent Gambrel from depriving him of the automobile, even to the taking of his life; also to prevent the commission of a felony, or of the theft of the machine. The facts did not authorize such instructions. The defendant claimed to have shot in self-defense and not either to recover possession of his car or to prevent the commission of a felony. His statement that all he wanted was his car would not seem to modify his positive assertion that he shot in self-defense. The automobile had been stopped on signal and was standing at the curb. The necessity for shooting otherwise than in self-defense was not made manifest in any degree. In any event (on an extreme ...

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9 cases
  • Degro v. State
    • United States
    • Alabama Court of Appeals
    • January 18, 1949
    ...Cal.App. 488, 248 P. 986; Preston v. U. S., 65 App. D. C. 110, 80 F.2d 702; Gibson v. State, 176 Ga. 384, 168 S.E. 47; Kinder v. Commonwealth, 263 Ky. 145, 92 S.W.2d 8; Commonwealth v. Festo, 251 Mass. 275, 146 N.E. Sprinkle v. State, 137 Miss. 731, 102 So. 844; 30 C.J. p. 231 note 28; 40 C......
  • Meadors v. Commonwealth
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court — District of Kentucky
    • February 6, 1940
    ...contradictory statements to be proper where the witness was given an opportunity to examine the transcript and did so. Kinder v. Commonwealth, 263 Ky. 145, 92 S. W. (2d) 8. It is a rule of general acceptation, made mandatory by both Sections 598 and 604 of our Civil Code of Practice, that b......
  • Clinkscale v. State
    • United States
    • Alabama Court of Appeals
    • June 1, 1954
    ...Ala.App. 232, 38 So.2d 354; Sprinkle v. State, 137 Miss. 731, 102 So. 844; People v. Allen, 378 Ill. 164, 37 N.E.2d 854; Kinder v. Commonwealth, 263 Ky, 145, 92 S.W.2d 8; Gibson v. State, 176 Ga. 384, 168 S.E. Under the theory of the defense, as gathered from the defendant's testimony befor......
  • Kinder v. Commonwealth
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court — District of Kentucky
    • March 10, 1936
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