King County v. City of Seattle
| Decision Date | 31 March 1967 |
| Docket Number | No. 38645,38645 |
| Citation | 425 P.2d 887,70 Wn.2d 988 |
| Court | Washington Supreme Court |
| Parties | KING COUNTY, a legal subdivision of the State of Washington, Appellant, v. CITY OF SEATTLE, a municipal corporation, Respondent. |
Charles O. Carroll, Pros. Atty., Seattle, James E. Kennedy, Russell R. Pearson, Deputy Pros. Attys., for appellant.
A. L. Newbould, Corporation Counsel, Seattle, John A. Hackett, Asst. Corporation Counsel, for respondent.
This appeal presents a single issue: Do the provisions of RCW 36.62 require that the city of Seattle pay for the medical treatment furnished in the King County Harborview Hospital to city prisoners who have been found to be unable to pay for their own care and who do not qualify for public assistance under the welfare standards of the Department of Public Assistance of the State of Washington.
The Facts are not in dispute. King County's Harborview Hospital in Seattle is a county hospital, operated under the provisions of RCW 36.62. King County, for more than 16 years, has furnished hospital services for Seattle Police Department prisoners without charge to the city of Seattle.
February 5, 1965, King County commenced this action against the city of Seattle contending that the defendant city was indebted to the county in the reasonable total sum of $4,037 for the hospital care of its prisoners who had been found to be unable to pay therefor, and who did not qualify for public assistance. The defendant answered the complaint alleging that there was no statutory duty on the part of the city of Seattle to pay for the medical servides furnished such persons and denied liability. From a judgment sustaining the city's defense, the county has appealed.
The legislature by the enactment of RCW 36.62, which authorizes the establishment of county hospitals, provided in RCW 36.62.100 as follows:
Patients shall be admitted to such hospitals in accordance with rules to be established by the board of county commissioners, but such rules shall provide that preference in the admission of patients shall be given to those unable to pay for their care in private institutions. Whenever a patient has been admitted to the hospital from the county in which the hospital is situated, the superintendent shall cause inquiry to be made as to his circumstances, and of the relatives legally liable for his support. If he finds that the patient or the relatives legally liable for his support, are able to pay for his treatment in whole or in part, an order shall be made directing the patient, or his relatives, to pay to the county treasurer for his support, a specified sum per week, in proportion to their financial ability, but such sum shall not exceed that charged by private hospitals of similar size in the county for service of like character. The county commissioners may collect such sum from the patient or his estate, or from his relatives legally liable for his support. If the superintendent finds that the patient, or his relatives, are not able to pay, either in whole or in part, for his care and treatment in such hospital, he shall be admitted free of charge. (Italics ours.)
The cited section provides that patients shall be admitted to such hospitals in accordance with rules established by the board of county commissioners and that 'such rules shall provide that preference in the admission of patients shall be given to those unable to pay for their care in private institutions.' (Italics ours.)
The record on appeal does not indicate that the King County Board of County Commissioners has adopted any rules relating to the admission of prisoner patients to the hospital. On inquiry made at the time of argument before this court, the court was informed that it was believed no such rules of admission have been adopted.
The legislature in the enactment of RCW 36.62.100 provided that preference in admission of patients shall be given to those unable to pay for their care in private institutions. By the enactment of such a legislative policy, the legislature expressly provided that persons of poor financial risk be admitted to the hopsital and be given preference over those having financial ability to pay.
The legislature has placed upon the superintendent of the hospital the duty to make inquiry as to the patient's financial circumstances or the financial ability to pay 'of the relatives legally liable for his support.' As to those unable to pay and who do not qualify for relief within the purview of RCW Title 74 and the rules of the Department of Public Assistance, the legislature has mandated that the necessary hospital services be furnished and 'If the superintendent finds that the patient, or his relatives, are not able to pay, either in whole or in part, for his care and treatment in such hospital, he shall be admitted Free of charge.' (Italics ours.)
In construing the meaning of a statute, we are committed to the following rules of statutory construction: (1) A statute which is plain needs no construction. In re Baker's Est., 49 Wash.2d 609, 304 P.2d 1051 (1956); Parkhurst v. City of Everett, 51 Wash.2d 292, 318 P.2d 327 (1957); City of Seattle v. Ross, 54 Wash.2d 655, 344 P.2d 216 (1959). (2) The court will not read into a statute matters which are not there nor modify a statute by construction. State v. Rinkes, 49 Wash.2d 664, 306 P.2d 205 (1957); State v. Spino, 61 Wash.2d 246, 377 P.2d 868 (1963). (3) In construing a statute, words must be given their usual and ordinary meaning. State ex rel. Longview Fire Fighters Union v. City of Longview, 65 Wash.2d 568, 399 P.2d 1 (1965); Chelan County v. Fellers, 65 Wash.2d 943, 400 P.2d 609 (1965).
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