King County v. Taxpayers of King County

Decision Date06 June 1985
Docket NumberNo. 51043-1,51043-1
Citation700 P.2d 1143,104 Wn.2d 1
CourtWashington Supreme Court
PartiesKING COUNTY, Respondent, v. The TAXPAYERS OF KING COUNTY, Appellants.

Schweppe, Krug & Tausend, P.S., David G. Knibb, James Thayer, Seattle, for appellants.

Norman K. Maleng, King County Pros. Stephen A. Sewell, Sr., Deputy County Pros., Seattle, for respondent.

UTTER, Justice.

Appellants, Taxpayers of King County, appeal a summary judgment in favor of King County holding valid a bond sale authorized by King County ordinances 4341 and 6808. We affirm the summary judgment as to all issues presented.

In 1979, the citizens of King County approved ordinance 4341, a measure authorizing issuance of $50 million of King County unlimited tax levy general obligation bonds to provide funds to purchase development rights to protect and preserve farm and open space lands. An initial attempt to sell 20-year obligation bonds at a net effective interest rate of 8.4436 percent was blocked by a lawsuit. A second suit challenged the constitutionality of the preservation program itself. Both issues were resolved in Louthan v. King Cy., 94 Wash.2d 422, 617 P.2d 977 (1980) wherein this court held the ordinance constitutional, but further held that sale of bonds bearing a maximum effective interest rate greater than the 8 percent limit in effect when the voters originally approved the bonds required new voter approval. After yet another suit, the King County Council sold $15 million of limited tax levy "councilmanic" bonds to provide cash to purchase development rights in prime "Priority 1" farmland.

Subsequently, the King County Council enacted ordinance 6808, authorizing the issuance and sale of $35 million in general obligation bonds. These bonds are to be sold under the authority of the voters' 1979 approval of ordinance 4341, requiring the sale to be completed by November 1985. To ensure its ability to sell the bonds, the County filed this declaratory judgment action pursuant to RCW 7.24 and 7.25. A taxpayer representative was appointed, discovery was done, and based on agreed facts and exhibits, cross motions for summary judgment were filed.

The trial court held that the County "has full right to issue and sell" the bonds. It based this ruling on four conclusions. First, it held that preelection representations made by proponents of the ballot measure which do not coincide with the clear and unambiguous language of the ordinance are not binding. Second, it held that King County did not unconstitutionally delegate legislative powers to bond bidders by presenting a choice of 11 maturity schedules while retaining the right to select or reject any or all bids. Third, it held that the bonds do not violate the 8 percent interest rate set by former RCW 36.67.040, where the maximum effective rate of interest to be paid referenced in RCW 39.44.030, repealed Laws of 1984, ch. 186, § 70, will not exceed 8 percent, although some individual bond coupons may exceed 8 percent. Finally, it held that King County may impose a "lowest debt service" requirement on the sale of bonds in the absence of statutory authorization or prohibition. The Taxpayers appeal each holding.

I

During the course of the campaign to pass ordinance 4341, numerous proponents of the measure made statements about the effects of the proposed ordinance on the taxpayers. Some said that the cost of the bonds would be less than $10 annually for a taxpayer who owned a home assessed at $50,000. These figures were based on the sale of 30-year bonds at about 5.9 percent. Taxpayers received personal appeal letters from Charles Royer, Mayor of Seattle, and John Spellman, King County Executive. Bernice Stern, King County Council, wrote an article about the ordinance published in View of Puget Sound magazine. Those communications furthered the estimated cost to taxpayers of less than $10 a year for $50,000 appraised value.

Taxpayers contend that the widely disseminated representations by public persons are determinative of the voters' intent and should be used as extrinsic aids to construe ambiguous legislation. They argue that the voters relied on those statements and now the County is bound to sell 30-year bonds as promised. The County contends that, based on the plain language of the ordinance which the voters approved, there is no ambiguity.

Ordinance 4341, section 13, provides in pertinent part:

The Bonds ... shall mature serially commencing in from two to five years from the date of issue of each series and maturing in a period which may be less than but shall not exceed thirty years from the date of issue of each series, all as hereafter authorized by the Council and as provided by law.

(Italics ours.) The ballot measure presented the issue to the voters as follows:

Shall King County, for the purpose of acquiring and preserving voluntarily offered farm and open space lands in the county, issue its general obligation bonds in the principal amount not to exceed $50,000,000 in one or more series over a period of up to six years, to mature serially commencing in from two to five years and maturing in not to exceed 30 years from date of issue of each series (Italics ours.)

The primary objective in interpreting a statute " 'is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the legislature.' " Janovich v. Herron, 91 Wash.2d 767, 771, 592 P.2d 1096 (1979). In judicial interpretation of statutes, the first rule is "the court should assume that the legislature means exactly what it says. Plain words do not require construction." Snohomish v. Joslin, 9 Wash.App. 495, 498, 513 P.2d 293 (1973). This court will not construe unambiguous language. Vita Food Prods. Inc. v. State, 91 Wash.2d 132, 134, 587 P.2d 535 (1978). The intent of the legislative body was not some vocal proponents of the program but the language of the legislation itself. Department of Transp. v. State Employees' Ins. Bd., 97 Wash.2d 454, 458, 645 P.2d 1076 (1982).

Although not required to do so since no statute so provided, the King County Council nevertheless set maturity dates for voter approval. Redondo Beach v. Taxpayers, 54 Cal.2d 126, 352 P.2d 170, 176, 5 Cal.Rptr. 10 (1960); Solomon v. North Shore Sanitary Dist., 48 Ill.2d 309, 269 N.E.2d 457 (1971). Ordinance 4341 is unambiguous, setting an upper limit of 30 years and a lower limit of 2 years for maturity of the bonds sold. The ordinance further provides "[t]he exact date, form, terms, redemption options and maturities of each series of the Bonds shall be as hereafter fixed by ordinance of the Council." Passage of ordinance 6808 fulfilled that promise. Where there is no ambiguity there is no need for extrinsic evidence to interpret it.

Taxpayers urge that the statements of certain persons, although not fraudulent, were misleading to the public. Yet, misleading campaign statements by proponents of ballot measures cannot be used to void elections. Sooner State Water, Inc. v. Allen, 396 P.2d 654, 656 (Okla.1964).

Neither is it sufficient that such misrepresentations be made by some city official speaking or acting in his individual capacity, and when such misrepresentations constitute no part of the official proceedings. It is beyond the realm of reason that the validity of bond issues, regularly adopted by a vote of the people, should depend upon the character of campaign speech or advertisement initiated by some individual or group acting in an unofficial capacity.

Allen, at 656. We find this reasoning persuasive.

Taxpayers cite several cases for the proposition that a governmental entity cannot depart substantially from programs set out in an ordinance approved by voters. O'Byrne v. Spokane, 67 Wash.2d 132, 406 P.2d 595 (1965); George v. Anacortes, 147 Wash. 242, 265 P. 477 (1928). However, ordinance 6808 does not depart radically or even minimally from ordinance 4341. Rather, it implements the sale of bonds to mature in no more than 30 years, as approved by the voters upon adoption of ordinance 4341.

Finally, Taxpayers cite several cases which hold that when voters approve a resolution which reserves some issues for later decision, campaign representations known and likely relied on by the voters may amount to a binding exercise of that reserved discretion before the election. Black v. Strength, 112 Tex. 188, 246 S.W. 79 (1922); Moore v. Coffman, 109 Tex. 93, 200 S.W. 374 (1918). Reliance on those cases is misplaced in this instance because they involved official statements by governmental officials or bodies acting in their official capacities. Here, the statements challenged were made by officials in their personal capacities during a highly publicized campaign where voters had an opportunity to hear both sides of the issue debated. Those representations were not official statements of a governmental agency.

Voters had unambiguous language before them when they voted. A majority approved ordinance 4341, giving the King County Council the authority to sell bonds which would mature in no more than 30 years from date of issue. Ordinance 6808 implements precisely the language of ordinance 4341 by authorizing the sale of the bonds in maturity terms ranging from 5 to 19 years. Nonofficial representations made by proponents are neither binding on the Council nor are they, even if misleading, sufficient to overturn the election.

II

Taxpayers challenge ordinance 6808 as an impermissible delegation of legislative power because it permits bidders to choose from among 11 enumerated maturity schedules. They contend that choosing maturity dates is a legislative function since it determines which generation will most benefit from the expenditure and therefore which should pay. The County claims there is no delegation.

Both RCW 39.44.030 and ordinance 4341, section 13 require the bonds be sold at a public sale, where the public is invited and given an opportunity to bid. Such requirements should be construed with the primary purpose of best...

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