State v. Roggenkamp
| Decision Date | 10 February 2005 |
| Docket Number | No. 73839-4, No. 74231-6. |
| Citation | 106 P.3d 196,153 Wash.2d 614 |
| Parties | STATE of Washington, Respondent, v. Michael ROGGENKAMP, Petitioner. State of Washington, Respondent, v. Jason Ray Clark, Petitioner. |
| Court | Washington Supreme Court |
Allen Hansen & Maybrown PS, Richard Hansen, Cassandra L. Stamm, Horwitz & Stamm, Seattle, David Schultz, Camas, for Petitioner.
James Morrissey Whisman, Stephen Hobbs, Deputy, King County Prosecutor's Office, Seattle, Richard Alan Melnick, Vancouver, for Respondent.
The primary question presented to us in this consolidated review is whether the term "[i]n a reckless manner," which appears in the vehicular homicide and vehicular assault statutes, is defined by the "willful or wanton disregard for the safety of persons or property" language of the reckless driving statute. We answer "no" to that question, holding to the well-established definition of the term as "driving in a rash or heedless manner, indifferent to the consequences." We, therefore, affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals in each of the cases before us.
Michael Roggenkamp was charged in King County Juvenile Court with one count of vehicular homicide and two counts of vehicular assault. The charges stemmed from an incident that occurred in May 2000 at a road intersection near Enumclaw. Then and there a vehicle driven by 16-year-old Roggenkamp struck a vehicle driven by JoAnn Carpenter. When the collision occurred, Roggenkamp was traveling in the wrong lane of traffic at more than twice the speed limit in an attempt to pass another vehicle. Carpenter and a passenger in her car, Andrew Strand, were both severely injured. Another passenger, Carpenter's son, Michael, died from injuries he received in the accident.
The charges against Roggenkamp were premised on the "in a reckless manner" alternative of the vehicular homicide and vehicular assault statutes.1 In finding Roggenkamp guilty, the trial court determined that driving or operating a vehicle "in a reckless manner" means to "operat[e] a motor vehicle in a rash and heedless manner, indifferent to the consequences." State v. Roggenkamp, 115 Wash.App. 927, 935, 64 P.3d 92 (2003).
Roggenkamp appealed his conviction to the Court of Appeals, Division One, which affirmed. Roggenkamp then sought review by this court, arguing that the trial court erred when it applied the "rash and heedless manner, indifferent to the consequences" language, and did not apply the "willful or wanton disregard for the safety of persons or property" language that appears in the reckless driving statute, RCW 46.61.500(1).2 He contended, alternatively, that a superseding event caused the incident that led to the charges against him and that, therefore, his convictions should be reversed and the charges dismissed. We granted Roggenkamp's petition for review.
Jason Ray Clark was charged in Clark County Superior Court with three counts of vehicular assault. The charges arose out of a June 2001 car crash in Vancouver, Washington in which Clark's speeding vehicle struck a vehicle driven by Deborah Pratt. Pratt and two of Clark's passengers were seriously injured in the incident.
Like the charges against Roggenkamp, the charges against Clark were premised on the "in a reckless manner" alternative of the vehicular assault statute. In jury instruction 10, the trial court indicated that "to operate a vehicle in a reckless manner" means driving in a "rash or heedless manner, indifferent to the consequences." Clerk's Papers at 17. The jury found Clark guilty as charged. Clark appealed his convictions to the Court of Appeals, Division Two, asserting for the first time that the trial court erred in instructing the jury that one operates a vehicle "in a reckless manner" if he or she drives in a "rash or heedless manner, indifferent to the consequences." The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction. State v. Clark, 117 Wash.App. 281, 71 P.3d 224 (2003). Clark subsequently sought review by this court, again raising the question of whether the jury was properly instructed on the definition of "in a reckless manner." We granted Clark's petition for review and consolidated the review with Roggenkamp's.
The State contends here, as it did at the Court of Appeals, that Clark waived his right to challenge the adequacy of jury instruction 10 by failing to object to the instruction at trial. We reject this argument. Failure to properly instruct the jury on an element of a charged crime is an error of constitutional magnitude which may be raised for the first time on appeal. State v. Stein, 144 Wash.2d 236, 241, 27 P.3d 184 (2001); RAP 2.5(a).
Roggenkamp and Clark each assert that the trial court applied an erroneous definition of "in a reckless manner" as that term is used in the vehicular homicide and vehicular assault statutes. They would have us hold that the term is defined by the "willful or wanton disregard for the safety of persons or property" language that appears in the reckless driving statute, RCW 46.61.500(1).
We review a question of statutory construction de novo. State v. Votava, 149 Wash.2d 178, 183, 66 P.3d 1050 (2003). Statutory construction begins by reading the text of the statute or statutes involved. If the language is unambiguous, a reviewing court is to rely solely on the statutory language. State v. Avery, 103 Wash.App. 527, 532, 13 P.3d 226 (2000). Where statutory language is amenable to more than one reasonable interpretation, it is deemed to be ambiguous. State v. Keller, 143 Wash.2d 267, 276, 19 P.3d 1030 (2001). Legislative history, principles of statutory construction, and relevant case law may provide guidance in construing the meaning of an ambiguous statute. Fraternal Order of Eagles, Tenino Aerie No. 564 v. Grand Aerie of Fraternal Order of Eagles, 148 Wash.2d 224, 243, 59 P.3d 655 (2002).
The term "in a reckless manner" is not defined in either the vehicular homicide statute, RCW 46.61.520, or the vehicular assault statute, RCW 46.61.522. Nor is the term defined elsewhere in the Motor Vehicle Code. However, through a series of decisions by this court, a definition of the term "in a reckless manner" for purposes of the vehicular homicide and vehicular assault statutes has evolved and is now well settled. This evolution culminated in our decision in State v. Bowman, 57 Wash.2d 266, 270, 271, 356 P.2d 999 (1960), in which we indicated that driving "in a reckless manner" means "driving in a rash or heedless manner, indifferent to the consequences." (Emphasis omitted.)
Roggenkamp and Clark each assert that the Court of Appeals has wavered in its application of the definition of "in a reckless manner." In support of this assertion, they call to our attention three cases in which divisions of that court have applied the "willful or wanton disregard for the safety of persons or property" language of the reckless driving statute to vehicular assault or vehicular homicide cases. See State v. Hursh, 77 Wash.App. 242, 248, 890 P.2d 1066 (1995)
(Division One) (vehicular assault); State v. Miller, 60 Wash.App. 767, 773, 807 P.2d 893 (1991) (Division Three) (vehicular homicide); and State v. McAllister, 60 Wash.App. 654, 658-59, 806 P.2d 772 (1991) (Division Three) (vehicular homicide).
We view the McAllister, Miller, and Hursh decisions as aberrations in the long string of cases, stretching back to 1938, that have rejected defining the term "in a reckless manner" in vehicular homicide and vehicular assault cases as "willful or wanton disregard for the safety of persons or property." This position finds support in the fact that Division Three of the Court of Appeals implicitly declined to follow its holdings in Miller and McAllister in a later case in which it explicitly rejected a defendant's contention that "the `reckless manner' element of vehicular assault is the same as the `willful or wanton disregard' element of reckless driving." State v. Thompson, 90 Wash.App. 41, 47-48, 950 P.2d 977 (1998). In that case, the court held that driving in a "`reckless manner' ... means to drive in a rash or heedless manner, with indifference to the consequences." Id. at 48, 950 P.2d 977.
The interpretation of driving "in a reckless manner" that petitioners advocate would require us to dismember both the term "in a reckless manner," as used in the vehicular homicide and vehicular assault statutes, and the term "reckless driving," as used in the reckless driving statute. We say that because in order to hold that "reckless" in the term "in a reckless manner" has the same meaning as "reckless" in the term "reckless driving," we would have to sever the word "reckless" in each of these statutes from the surrounding context and read the word as if it stood alone. We are not inclined to do that because in doing so we would violate fundamental principles of statutory construction.
A principle consistent with this view is that of noscitur a sociis, which provides that a single word in a statute should not be read in isolation, and that "`the meaning of words may be indicated or controlled by those with which they are associated.'" State v. Jackson, 137 Wash.2d 712, 729, 976 P.2d 1229 (1999) (quoting Ball v. Stokely Foods, Inc., 37 Wash.2d 79, 87-88, 221 P.2d 832 (1950)). In Jackson, we applied this principle and held that the word "shelter" in the phrase "food, water, shelter, clothing, and medically necessary health care," as used in RCW 9A.42.010(1), should not be isolated and analyzed apart from the words surrounding it. Id. In interpreting statutory...
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