King v. Beaufort County Bd. of Educ.

• Decision Date: 08 October 2010
• Docket Number: No. 480A09.,480A09.
• Citation: 364 N.C. 368,704 S.E.2d 259,263 Ed. Law Rep. 941
• Parties: Viktoria KING, a minor, by and through her parent, Revondia HARVEY–BARROWv.BEAUFORT COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION and Jeffrey Moss, Superintendent, Beaufort County Schools, in his official capacity.
• Court: North Carolina Supreme Court

364 N.C. 368

704 S.E.2d 259

263 Ed. Law Rep. 941

Viktoria KING, a minor, by and through her parent, Revondia HARVEY–BARROW

v.BEAUFORT COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION and Jeffrey Moss, Superintendent, Beaufort County Schools, in his official capacity.

No. 480A09.

Supreme Court of North Carolina.

Oct. 8, 2010.

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Appeal pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7A–30(2) from the decision of a divided panel of the Court of Appeals, 200 N.C.App. 368, 683 S.E.2d 767 (2009), affirming an order entered 16 May 2008 by Judge William C. Griffin, Jr. in Superior Court, Beaufort County. Heard in the Supreme Court on 22 March 2010.

Children's Law Clinic, Duke Law School, by Jane Wettach; and Advocates for Children's Services, Legal Aid of North Carolina, Inc., by Erwin Byrd and Lewis Pitts, Durham, for plaintiff-appellant.

Tharrington Smith, L.L.P., by Curtis H. Allen III, Raleigh, for defendant-appellee Beaufort County Board of Education.Edelstein and Payne, by M. Travis Payne, Raleigh, for North Carolina Advocates for Justice, amicus curiae.University of North Carolina School of Law Center for Civil Rights, by Mark Dorosin and Benita N. Jones, Chapel Hill, for Advancement Project, Advocates for Basic Legal Equality, Inc., Legal Aid of Western Ohio, Inc., Advocates for Children of New York, Alabama Disabilities Advocacy Program, American Civil Liberties Union, Barton Child Law & Policy Clinic, Center for Civil Rights at UNC School of Law, Charles Hamilton Houston Institute for Race and Justice at Harvard Law School, Children and Family Justice Center; Children's Law Center of Massachusetts, Connecticut Legal Services, Inc., Council of Parent Attorneys and Advocates, Education Law Center, Juvenile Justice Project of Louisiana, Legal Aid Society of Birmingham, Legal Assistance Foundation of Metropolitan Chicago; NAACP Legal Defense & Educational Fund, Inc., National Association of Counsel for Children, National Association of Social Workers, National Children's Law Network, National Economic and Social Rights Initiative, New York Law School Racial Justice Project, Public Counsel, Southern Poverty Law Center, TeamChild, University of Tennessee College of Law Education Law Practicum, Sharon A. Bourne–Clarke, Melissa Kenney Ngaruri, Heather E. Price, Russell Skiba, Anita Wadhwa, and Julie Waterstone, amici curiae.Laurie Gallagher, Charlotte, for Council for Children's Rights, amicus curiae.Jack Holtzman, Raleigh, for North Carolina Justice Center, Concerned Citizens for the Betterment of Beaufort County Schools, Parents Supporting Parents, Tamar Birckhead, American Civil Liberties Union of North Carolina Legal Foundation, Southern Coalition for Social Justice, Center for Death Penalty Litigation, Inc., Office of the Juvenile Defender, North Carolina Black Leadership Caucus, and NC Conference of NAACP Branches, amici curiae.Robert F. Orr, Raleigh, and Charles L. Becton, Durham, amici curiae.Campbell Shatley, PLLC, by Christopher Z. Campbell; and Allison B. Schafer, General Counsel, for North Carolina School Boards Association, amicus curiae.Ann McColl, General Counsel; and William A. Tobin, Social Science Research Institute, Duke University, for North Carolina Association of School Administrators, amicus curiae.

MARTIN, Justice.

This case presents the question of whether the Beaufort County School Board and its superintendent (defendants) violated state law by denying Viktoria King (plaintiff) access to alternative education during her long-term suspension from school. After considering longstanding precedent affording school officials discretion in administering student disciplinary codes and recent cases recognizing a state constitutional right to a sound basic education, we hold that defendants must articulate a reason for denying plaintiff access to alternative education during her long-term suspension.

On 18 January 2008, plaintiff, a sophomore at Southside High School in Beaufort County, participated in a fight involving numerous students. She received a ten-day suspension for her involvement in the fight. The principal at Southside High School also recommended that plaintiff receive a long-term suspension. On 1 February 2008, the Beaufort County Superintendent, Jeffrey Moss, adopted the principal's recommendation and suspended plaintiff for the remainder of the 2007–2008 school year without offering her alternative education. Plaintiff timely appealed the suspension to a panel of central office administrators. On 13 February 2008, the panel conducted a due process hearing and subsequently upheld the decision.

On 20 February 2008, plaintiff filed a complaint in Superior Court seeking injunctive and declaratory relief. Plaintiff alleged that defendants violated her state constitutional right to a sound basic education by failing to provide her access to alternative education. Plaintiff also filed a Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction, requesting that the trial court order defendants to provide educational services to plaintiff during her suspension. The trial court denied this motion and dismissed plaintiff's complaint pursuant to Rules 12(b)(6) and 12(b)(7) of the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure. The Court of Appeals, in a divided opinion, affirmed the trial court's ruling in favor of defendants. King ex rel. Harvey–Barrow v. Beaufort Cty. Bd. of Educ., ––– N.C.App. ––––, 683 S.E.2d 767 (2009).

Plaintiff alleges that defendants' denial of alternative education during her long-term suspension is a violation of the state constitution. Before this Court plaintiff repeatedly emphasized the importance of requiring defendants to articulate a reason for denying her access to alternative education. While the state constitution requires defendants to provide a reason for refusing alternative education to plaintiff, we decline plaintiff's invitation to create a constitutional right to alternative education for students who violate lawful school rules.

The General Assembly has enacted a comprehensive statutory scheme specifying the powers and duties of local school boards and school officials in connection with school discipline and alternative education. The statute vests school officials with the authority to issue long-term suspensions to students “who willfully violate[ ] the policies of conduct established by the local board of education.” N.C.G.S. § 115C–391(c) (2009). Section 115C–47(32a) requires local boards of education to “establish at least one alternative learning program and ... adopt guidelines for assigning students to alternative learning programs.” Id. § 115C–47(32a) (2009). In addition to mandating alternative learning programs, the General Assembly requires local boards of education to create “strategies for providing alternative learning programs, when feasible and appropriate, for students who are subject to long term suspension or expulsion.” Id. The statute encourages school boards to incorporate these strategies into their “safe school plans,” which are “designed to provide that every school ... is safe, secure, and orderly....” Id.; N.C.G.S. § 115C–105.47 (2009). This comprehensive scheme grants long-term suspended students a statutory right to receive alternative education when feasible and appropriate.

In acknowledging a statutory right to alternative education, we stress that a fundamental right to alternative education does not exist under the state constitution. Nevertheless, insofar as the General Assembly has provided a statutory right to alternative education, a suspended student excluded from alternative education has a state constitutional right to know the reason for her exclusion. This right arises from the equal access provisions of Article IX, Section 2(1) of the North Carolina Constitution. See Leandro v. State, 346 N.C. 336, 347, 488 S.E.2d 249, 255 (1997) ( “Article I, Section 15 and Article IX, Section 2 of the North Carolina Constitution combine to guarantee every child of this state an opportunity to receive a sound basic education in our public schools.” (emphasis added)); Sneed v. Greensboro City Bd. of Educ., 299 N.C. 609, 618, 264 S.E.2d 106, 113 (1980) (“[E]qual access to participation in our public school system is a fundamental right, guaranteed by our state constitution and protected by considerations of procedural due process.” (citations omitted)). Because exclusion from alternative education potentially infringes on a student's state constitutional right to equal educational access, school administrators must articulate a reason when they exclude a long-term suspended student from alternative education.

Having observed that our holding does not recognize a state constitutional right to alternative education, we consider the standard of review to be applied when a suspended student is denied access to alternative education. The present case requires us to harmonize the rational basis test employed in school discipline cases with the strict scrutiny analysis that formed a part of this Court's constitutional holding in school funding cases. Compare Hutchins v. [ Sch. Comm. of] Durham, 137 N.C. 68, 70–71, 49 S.E. 46, 47 (1904) (“[T]he constitutional guarantee that tuition shall be free and the schools equally open to all is necessarily subject to reasonable regulations to enforce discipline by expulsion of the disorderly and protection of the morals and health of the pupils.” (citations omitted)), with Leandro, 346 N.C. at 345, 488 S.E.2d at 254 (“[T]he right to education provided in the state constitution is a right to a sound basic education.”). The tension between these differing standards of review must be resolved in a manner that (1) protects student access to educational opportunities, while (2) preserving the discretion of school officials to maintain safe and orderly schools.

North Carolina courts have historically accorded school administrators great deference in the exercise of their disciplinary authority. For instance, in ...