King v. King
| Decision Date | 28 February 2019 |
| Docket Number | No. 18AP-84,18AP-84 |
| Citation | 2019 Ohio 722 |
| Parties | Denise F. King, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. George R. King, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | Ohio Court of Appeals |
(REGULAR CALENDAR)
DECISION
On brief: Jon M. Cope, Attorney at Law, and Jon M. Cope, for appellee. Argued: Jon M. Cope.
On brief: Grossman Law Offices, John H. Cousins, IV, and Anthony R. Auten, for appellant. Argued: John H. Cousins, IV.
APPEAL from the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas, Division of Domestic Relations
{¶ 1} George R. King ("Roger"), defendant-appellant, appeals from the judgment entry of the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas, Division of Domestic Relations, in which the court denied appellant's objections to a magistrate's order and granted the objections of Denise F. King ("Denise"), plaintiff-appellee.
{¶ 2} In May 2006, Roger and Denise divorced pursuant to an agreed divorce decree. Pursuant to a decision from an arbitration panel, Roger was required to pay Denise $150,000 per year in spousal support, payable in installments of $4,200 per month and $24,900 per quarter. The court retained jurisdiction to modify the amount and duration of spousal support.
{¶ 3} In September 2009, via e-mail, Roger requested from Denise, and Denise agreed to, a four-month, 10 percent temporary reduction in the monthly and September 2009 quarterly spousal support payments, as well as a deferral of the September 2009 quarterly support payment until December 16, 2009, subject to Roger providing proof of a 10 percent drop in income for 2009. Roger confirmed her acceptance via e-mail and added that if the downward trend in his income continued, he would ask for a permanent reduction in his support payments. He acknowledged the terms were temporary in nature.
{¶ 4} In March 2010, Roger asked Denise for a 15 percent reduction in support for the remainder of 2010 and a delay of the September quarterly payment until December 15, 2010. The parties exchanged e-mails for several months on the issue. In a July 2010 e-mail, Roger indicated he was seeking a support reduction for the rest of 2010 through April 2011 and was not requesting a deferral. In a July 29, 2010 e-mail, Denise indicated she would agree to reduce spousal support payments by 10 percent for the remainder of 2010. Toward the end of 2010, Denise sought from Roger, via e-mails, the outstanding past due funds from their first agreement and stated in a January 2011 e-mail the original court order specified amounts he was to pay.
{¶ 5} In a November 26, 2011 letter, Roger indicated that his income had decreased and asked for a decrease in the support payment to $90,000 for 2012.
{¶ 6} In a January 6, 2012 e-mail, Denise proposed Roger pay spousal support of $102,242 per year. After Denise declined to accept Roger's counterproposal that he pay $84,000 per year, in a January 24, 2012 e-mail, Denise agreed to his proposal of payments of $3,500 on the 15th and $3,500 on the 30th of each month. Thereafter, Roger paid Denise according to those terms.
{¶ 7} In a January 11, 2013 letter, Roger asked Denise for another modification of spousal support to $75,000 per year. In a January 20, 2013 e-mail, Denise denied Roger's request and indicated her desire to keep the current payment.
{¶ 8} In a January 2, 2014 letter, Roger told Denise he would be retiring on or before June 30, 2014 and his annual compensation had been further reduced. On January 12, 2014, Denise responded that she really needed the same payments for another year. Subsequently, Denise asked Roger for his tax filings back to 2005 and explained he was not meeting his obligations and not paying the court-ordered amount, but if they shared financial information, they may be able to work out a solution.
{¶ 9} In an April 13, 2014 letter, Roger informed Denise that he was retiring on June 30, 2014. Denise responded in a May 1, 2014 e-mail that there existed a court order, and if he wanted to change that amount, they could exchange tax information as previously suggested.
{¶ 10} On May 28, 2014, Roger filed a motion to modify spousal support. On June 13, 2014, Denise filed a motion for contempt and request for sanctions, asserting that Roger had not paid the amounts ordered.
{¶ 11} On January 28 and 29, 2015, the magistrate held a hearing. The parties stipulated to the amounts Roger had paid from 2009 to 2014. Denise claimed Roger owed her $185,201 through June 30, 2014.
{¶ 12} On May 11, 2016, the magistrate issued a decision, in which the magistrate recommended the court terminate Roger's spousal support as of July 1, 2014, and the court deny Denise's motion for contempt. The magistrate noted any spousal support ordered prior to June 1, 2014 was still due and owing. The trial court adopted the magistrate's decision the same day. Neither party filed objections or an appeal.
{¶ 13} On June 20, 2016, Denise filed another motion for contempt, claiming Roger had failed to make any payments on the $185,201 arrearage she claimed he owed. Roger filed a motion to dismiss asserting Denise's motion for contempt was precluded by res judicata. On October 20, 2016, the magistrate filed an order denying Roger's motion to dismiss. On October 31, 2016, Roger filed a motion to set aside the magistrate's order.
{¶ 14} On December 8, 2016, Denise filed a motion to liquidate the arrearage.
{¶ 15} After a hearing, the magistrate issued a decision on February 27, 2017 in which the trial court denied Roger's motion to set aside. The trial court rejected Roger's res judicata argument, finding the magistrate's May 11, 2016 decision did not resolve the arrearage accumulated prior to July 1, 2014.
{¶ 16} After a hearing, on June 23, 2017, the magistrate denied Denise's motion for contempt, in part, finding Roger was not in contempt, but ordering Roger to pay $172,710 for past due spousal support. The magistrate also granted Denise's motion to liquidate and ordered Roger to pay $14,392.50 per month until the amount due was paid in full.
{¶ 17} Roger filed objections, claiming res judicata, laches, and law of the case barred Denise's motion for contempt and motion to liquidate arrearage. Denise also filed objections asserting the magistrate should have found Roger in contempt and ordered him to pay the full $172,710 immediately.
{¶ 18} On February 2, 2018, the trial court adopted the magistrate's decision, overruled Roger's objections, and sustained Denise's objections. The court found the magistrate's May 11, 2016 decision included an order for Roger to pay the arrearages. Roger appeals the judgment of the trial court, asserting the following four assignments of error:
{¶ 19} We address Roger's first, second, and third assignments of error together. Roger argues in his first assignment of error the trial court erred and violated the doctrine of res judicata when it granted Denise's motions for contempt, liquidation of arrearages, and attorney fees. Roger argues in his second assignment of error the trial court erred when it refused to adhere to its prior rulings that relief was barred by waiver and laches. Roger argues in his third assignment of error that, even if the trial court could redetermine the issue of laches, the court erred when it found the defense of laches did not apply.
{¶ 20} "The applicability of the doctrine of res judicata presents a question of law," and is therefore reviewed under a de novo standard. Daniel v. Williams, 10th Dist. No. 13AP-155, 2014-Ohio-273, ¶ 18. In State ex rel. Nickoli v. Erie Metroparks, 124 Ohio St.3d 449, 2010-Ohio-606, ¶ 21, the Supreme Court of Ohio summarized the doctrine of res judicata as follows:
In Ohio, "[t]he doctrine of res judicata encompasses the two related concepts of claim preclusion, also known as res judicata or estoppel by judgment, and issue preclusion, also known as collateral estoppel." O'Nesti v. DeBartolo Realty Corp., 113 Ohio St.3d 59, 2007-Ohio-1102, ¶ 6, 862 N.E.2d 803. "Claim preclusion prevents subsequent actions, by the same parties or their privies, based upon any claim arising out of a transaction that was the subject matter of a previous action," whereas issue preclusion, or collateral estoppel, "precludes the relitigation, in a second action, of an issue that had been actually and necessarily litigated and determined in a prior action that was based on a different cause of action." Ft. Frye Teachers Assn., OEA/NEA v. State Emp. Relations Bd. (1998), 81 Ohio St.3d 392, 395, 1998 Ohio 435, 692 N.E.2d 140; see Holzemer v. Urbanski (1999), 86 Ohio St.3d 129, 133, 1999 Ohio 91, 712 N.E.2d 713.
{¶ 21} Res judicata applies where: "(1) there was a prior valid judgment on the merits; (2) the second action involved the same parties as the first action; (3) the present action raises claims that were or could have been litigated in the prior action; and (4) both actions arise out of the same transaction or occurrence." Reasoner v. Columbus, 10th Dist. No. 04AP-800, 2005-Ohio-468, ¶ 5.
{¶ 22} "Laches is 'an omission to assert a right for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, under circumstances prejudicial to the adverse party.' " State ex rel. Eaton Corp. v. Indus. Comm., 80 Ohio St.3d 352, 356 (1997), quoting Connin v. Bailey, 15 Ohio St.3d 34, 35 (1984). Because laches is predominately a...
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