King v. State, 35299
| Decision Date | 16 April 1974 |
| Docket Number | No. 35299,35299 |
| Citation | 510 S.W.2d 747 |
| Parties | Michael Rochon KING, Appellant, v. STATE of Missouri, Respondent. . Louis District |
| Court | Missouri Court of Appeals |
Coburn, Croft, Shepherd & Herzog, John S. Sandberg, St. Louis, for appellant.
John C. Danforth, Atty. Gen., G. Michael O'Neal, William F. Arnet, Asst. Attys. Gen., Jefferson City, for respondent.
Appeal from denial of a Rule 27.26, V.A.M.R., motion.
Movant was indicted for first-degree murder on July 6, 1967 and on January 19, 1968 he was charged with second-degree burglary. On January 27, 1968 bail was set at $8,000 but movant was unable to comply. On January 27, 1969 the state amended to charge second-degree murder and movant pleaded guilty. The court assessed punishment at twelve years. On the same date movant pleaded guilty to second-degree burglary. The court assessed punishment at ten years, to run concurrently with the twelve-year murder sentence. No credit for jail time was allowed.
At the time of sentencing, granting credit for time spent in jail before trial was discretionary with the trial court. Section 546.615(2), RSMo.1969, V.A.M.S. As amended in 1971 the statute made such credit mandatory. In Re Turley, 496 S.W.2d 865(3) (Mo.App.1973).
On May 15, 1972 movant filed a motion pursuant to Rule 27.26 alleging: (1) he did not receive credit toward his sentence for the time spent in jail awaiting trial and (2), failure to grant movant such credit violated the equal protection clause.
The parties agreed the motion presented a question of law only and no evidentiary hearing was held. On March 15, 1973 the court denied the motion, finding that denial of credit for jail time was discretionary with the trial court under the statute in force at the time of sentencing and under Missouri law such credit was not constitutionally mandated. This appeal followed.
Movant first argues the amended statute should be applied retroactively. As a general rule statutory provisions are construed prospectively, unless in their terms a contrary legislative intent 'is spelled out in clear, explicit and unequivocal detail so that retrospective application is called for 'beyond (a) reasonable question. " State ex rel. Hall v. Vaughn, 483 S.W.2d 396 (Mo.Banc 1972). The amended statute reveals no such legislative intent and movant has furnished no authority warranting a...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Trilogy Dev. Co. v. BB Syndication Servs., Inc. (In re Trilogy Dev. Co.)
... ... In part, this Court stated that it appears that nearly all of the Missouri state court cases cited by both Debtor and Dunn acknowledge, and in several instances apply, the notion ... ...
-
Valentine v. State
...appeals had adopted opinions that followed the Crockrell ruling. See Meeks v. State, 512 S.W.2d 215 (Mo.App. Springfield, 1974), King v. State, 510 S.W.2d 747 (Mo.App. St. Louis, 1974) and Neighbors v. State, 515 S.W.2d 792 (Mo.App. Kansas City, In 1975 the habeas corpus case of King v. Wyr......
-
King v. Wyrick
...petitioner's claim that credit for jail time was constitutionally mandated. The Missouri Court of Appeals affirmed. King v. State, 510 S.W.2d 747 (Mo.App.1974). Subsequently petitioner instituted this habeas corpus action in federal district court on July 25, 1974. 2 On December 6, 1974, a ......
-
Missouri Land Dev. Spec. v. Concord Exca.
... ... 269 S.W.3d 502 ... meaning." State ex rel. Evans v. Brown Builders Elec. Co., Inc., 254 S.W.3d 31, 35 (Mo. banc 2008). In so doing, ... ...