Kingsley v. Florida Rock Industries, Inc., A02A1952.

Decision Date23 December 2002
Docket NumberNo. A02A1952.,A02A1952.
Citation259 Ga. App. 207,576 S.E.2d 569
PartiesKINGSLEY et al. v. FLORIDA ROCK INDUSTRIES, INC.
CourtGeorgia Court of Appeals

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Lindsey & Jacobs, Tamara Jacobs, Barnesville, Smith, Galloway, Lyndall & Fuchs, Newton M. Galloway, Dean R. Fuchs, Griffin, for appellants.

Schreeder, Wheeler & Flint, David H. Flint, Mark W. Forsling, Atlanta, Scott D. McAlpine, for appellee.

POPE, Senior Appellate Judge.

Lamar County and the members of its board of commissioners appeal summary judgment granted in favor of Florida Rock Industries, Inc. in a case that raises questions regarding the relationship between the procedural requirements of the county's zoning process and of the development of the county's "comprehensive plan." In this case, Lamar County denied Florida Rock's application for rezoning in part because the zoning did not comply with Lamar County's plan. Florida Rock sued and argued on summary judgment that the county's plan was invalid because it was implemented without proper notice. The trial court agreed, invalidated the plan, overturned the zoning denial, and remanded the case. This appeal followed.

The facts are largely undisputed. During the fall of 1995, Lamar County adopted a comprehensive plan covering the unincorporated areas of the county. Prior to adopting the plan, Lamar County gave notice of a public hearing to be held on August 1, 1995, by placing advertisements in the Barnesville Herald-Gazette on Tuesday, July 18, 1995, and on Tuesday, July 25, 1995. Accordingly, the first notice was published 14 days prior to the public hearing.

On October 5, 2000, almost five years later, Florida Rock filed the two required applications—one to rezone and one for a special use permit—necessary to rezone certain property located in the county for use as a rock quarry. On November 20, 2000, the Lamar County Board of Commissioners adopted a resolution denying Florida Rock's applications "based on the Lamar County 1995 Comprehensive Plan, the 1991 Land Use Plan and the Lamar County Zoning Ordinance."

Florida Rock contends there were no administrative remedies available to it to appeal that decision, so, ten days later, it sued the county and the members of the board of commissioners, raising five counts.1 In Count 2, Florida Rock alleged that the Lamar County comprehensive plan was invalid because the county did not follow proper procedures enacting the plan. 2

Florida Rock then sought partial summary judgment on Count 2 only. It argued that the only Lamar County procedure for announcing and conducting public hearings "in matters related to zoning and land use" is set forth in the Lamar County Zoning Ordinance and the Zoning Procedures Act, and that those enactments require notice "at least fifteen (15) days but not more than forty-five (45) days before the hearing." Therefore, because notice was only given 14 days before the August 1, 1995 planning meeting, the Lamar County comprehensive plan is invalid.

The county offered an affidavit from the county administrator, the person responsible for the processes by which the county conducts public hearings on the various matters coming before the board. She testified that Lamar County neither has nor has had a written or formal policy regarding that process. However, on nonzoning matters, such as grants, the county's normal procedure is to publish notices in the local weekly newspaper in the two editions that immediately precede the board's public hearing, which is what she did in connection with the Lamar County comprehensive plan. She also testified that in matters, such as zoning, where a statute or rule requires some other notice, she complies with the specific notice applicable to that procedure.

The superior court held that because the county zoning ordinance is the only written procedure establishing a time for notices for public hearings in Lamar County, and because the zoning ordinance is inextricably connected to the comprehensive plan and vice versa, Lamar County's "normal procedure" for notification of public hearings in connection with the comprehensive plan requires a minimum of 15 days notice. The court concluded that, therefore, the Lamar County comprehensive plan was invalid, and, because the comprehensive plan was the only reason given for the denial of the zoning applications, that denial was also invalid. In a separate order, the court found that its initial decision resolved all issues in the case, and therefore it "remanded [the case] to the Lamar County Board of Commissioners to rezone the subject property in a constitutional manner."

1. Lamar County contends that the trial court erred because the undisputed evidence shows that the county adopted its comprehensive plan in compliance with all applicable notice requirements. We agree and reverse.

The Georgia Constitution gives counties and municipalities the power to adopt plans and to exercise the power of zoning. Ga. Const. of 1983, Art. IX, Sec. II, Par. IV. But the same paragraph also provides that the General Assembly may enact "general laws establishing procedures for the exercise of such power," and the General Assembly has done so in each identified area, planning and zoning.

The General Assembly enacted a procedure in connection with county comprehensive planning when it created the Georgia Department of Community Affairs (the "DCA"), which it authorized to assist local governments with local government planning, including land use planning. OCGA § 50-8-3(a).

The DCA is required to establish minimum standards and procedures for local government planning, including procedures for obtaining input from the public. OCGA § 50-8-7.1(b) and (b)(4). Accordingly, pursuant to OCGA § 50-8-7.1(b) the DCA promulgated Ga. Comp. R. & Regs. r. 110-3-2-.06(4)(a), which requires a public hearing prior to development of the county's plan and provides for notice of that hearing as follows: "Local governments should follow the public hearing notification procedures they normally use in announcing and conducting public hearings." (Emphasis supplied.) Ga. Comp. R. & Regs. r. 110-3-2-.06(4)(a).

The General Assembly has also enacted procedures in connection with zoning. The Zoning Procedures Law, OCGA § 36-66-1 et seq., was designed to establish as state policy "minimum procedures governing the exercise of [zoning] power." OCGA § 36-66-2(a). In that regard, OCGA § 36-66-4(a) provides that local governments must hold a hearing on any action "resulting in a zoning decision" and publish notice of that hearing at least 15 but not more than 45 days prior to the date of the hearing. In addition, local governments are authorized to provide by ordinance or resolution for procedures that supplement those required by the Zoning Procedures Law, OCGA § 36-66-2(b), and Lamar County has done so.3 Section 410 of the Lamar County Zoning Ordinance mimics the state law requirement by providing that any action taken on a request for an amendment to the zoning regulations must be made at a hearing and that notice of the hearing must be published at least 15 but not more than 45 days prior to the date of the hearing.

In short, the cited paragraph of the constitution authorizes two separate local government activities, planning and zoning, and the General Assembly enacted strict and explicit minimum statewide standards regarding notice for zoning decisions. Notice for planning hearings must simply conform to the county's normal procedure, not a uniform statewide procedure; the legislature did not take the time to define specific requirements, as it did with regard to zoning. We find nothing in this legislative scheme to suggest that the notice requirements pertaining to zoning should be applied to planning, nor do we find any requirement that the county's normal procedure must be in writing. Accordingly, this case turns on the simple question of what is the county's normal public hearing notification procedure.

In this case, the only evidence presented regarding the notification procedure normally used by Lamar County for public hearings was presented by the county administrator. No evidence was presented to rebut that evidence. The administrator...

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3 cases
  • Lamar County v. ET Carlyle Co.
    • United States
    • Georgia Supreme Court
    • March 22, 2004
    ...requirements of OCGA § 12-8-20 et seq., and whether the trial court's order is contrary to the decision in Kingsley v. Florida Rock Indus., 259 Ga. App. 207, 576 S.E.2d 569 (2002). 1. "This Court has a duty to raise the question of its jurisdiction in all cases in which there may be any dou......
  • May v. Morgan Cnty., A16A1981
    • United States
    • Georgia Court of Appeals
    • October 20, 2017
    ...S.E.2d 444 (2007) (same).19 Burdette, 278 Ga. at 756, 604 S.E.2d 820 (punctuation omitted); accord Kingsley v. Florida Rock Indus., Inc., 259 Ga. App. 207, 211 (2), 576 S.E.2d 569 (2002).20 See Unite d States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 617 (I), 74 S.Ct. 808, 98 L.Ed. 989 (1954) (holding that......
  • McKee v. City of Geneva
    • United States
    • Georgia Supreme Court
    • March 13, 2006
    ...program or design of the present and future physical development of a total area and services....' [Cit.]." Kingsley v. Florida Rock Ind., 259 Ga.App. 207(2), 576 S.E.2d 569 (2002). Because neither the regional solid waste management plan nor the comprehensive plan is an ordinance or has th......

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