Lamar County v. ET Carlyle Co.

• Citation: 277 Ga. 690,594 S.E.2d 335
• Decision Date: 22 March 2004
• Docket Number: No. S03A1740.,S03A1740.
• Parties: LAMAR COUNTY et al. v. E.T. CARLYLE COMPANY.
• Court: Georgia Supreme Court

594 S.E.2d 335

277 Ga. 690

LAMAR COUNTY et al. v. E.T. CARLYLE COMPANY.

No. S03A1740.

Supreme Court of Georgia.

March 22, 2004.

Smith, Galloway, Lyndall & Fuchs, Newton M. Galloway, Dean R. Fuchs, Griffin, Lindsey & Jacobs, Tamara Jacobs, Barnesville, for appellant.

George E. Butler, II, Dahlonega, Vaughn, Wright & Stearns, LLP, James A. Vaughn, Forsyth, for appellee.

BENHAM, Justice.

E.T. Carlyle Company ("Carlyle") sought to locate a construction and demolition ("C&D") landfill in Lamar County on land zoned Agricultural-Residential. When Lamar County denied Carlyle's request for rezoning, Carlyle filed an action for declaratory judgment and mandamus. In an order ruling on four of the fourteen counts in Carlyle's complaint, the trial court found that Lamar County did not have a landfill designated as a C&D landfill, that the county's Solid Waste Management Plan ("SWMP") prohibited the disposal of C&D waste in the county's current landfill, and that the SWMP was, therefore, in violation of OCGA § 12-8-31.1. Concluding that the SWMP was invalid because it did not allow for the disposal of C&D waste, the trial court ruled that the county could not legislate on the subject. The trial court then reasoned that since there was no valid ordinance addressing C&D landfills, this Court's decision in Tilley Properties v. Bartow County, 261 Ga. 153, 401 S.E.2d 527 (1991), required the issuance of the writ of mandamus to Carlyle. In a subsequent order denying Lamar County's motion for reconsideration, the trial court declared the remaining issues raised in the complaint moot in light of the award of mandamus and entered a final judgment in the case. This Court granted Lamar County's application for discretionary review and requested the parties to address whether the trial court was correct in determining that Lamar County's SWMP violates the requirements of OCGA § 12-8-20 et seq., and whether the trial court's order is contrary to the decision in Kingsley v. Florida Rock Indus., 259 Ga. App. 207, 576 S.E.2d 569 (2002).

1. "This Court has a duty to raise the question of its jurisdiction in all cases in which there may be any doubt regarding the existence of such jurisdiction. [Cit.]" Canoeside Properties v. Livsey, 277 Ga. 425, 426(1), 589 S.E.2d 116 (2003). Because the question of our jurisdiction has been raised in the dissent in this case, we must consider it.

A direct appeal and a cross appeal were also instituted in this case, but were dismissed because this is a zoning case which must come to this Court by means of the discretionary appeal process. See Roberts v. Pearce, 232 Ga.App. 417, 501 S.E.2d 555 (1998). In the same order which dismissed the direct appeals, this Court unanimously denied a motion to transfer the appeals to the Court of Appeals, noting that "these appeals fall within this Court's mandamus jurisdiction." Nevertheless, the dissent now asserts that this appeal should be transferred to the Court of Appeals because "the trial court's grant of mandamus relief was merely ancillary to its determination of the legal issues ...; in this circumstance, mandamus is not an extraordinary remedy within the meaning of our Constitution." That statement appears to be based on a confusion of extraordinary remedies with equity cases.

Both types of jurisdiction involved here are bestowed on this Court by the same paragraph of our Constitution: "Unless otherwise provided by law, the Supreme Court shall have appellate jurisdiction of the following classes of cases: ... (2) All equity cases;... (5) All cases involving extraordinary remedies...." Ga. Const.1983, Art. VI, Sec. VI, Par. III. For purposes of this Court's subject matter jurisdiction, "`equity cases' are those in which a substantive issue on appeal involves the legality or propriety of equitable relief sought in the superior court...." Beauchamp v. Knight, 261 Ga. 608, 409 S.E.2d 208 (1991). Where equitable relief must routinely follow upon the determination of legal issues, there is no question of "the legality or propriety of equitable relief" and the case is not one in equity. Thus, it is apparent from the holding in Beauchamp that our jurisdiction in equity cases is based not on the relief sought or awarded, but on the nature of the process leading to the grant or denial of relief. By contrast, the very language of the constitutional grant of our jurisdiction over cases "involving extraordinary remedies" shows that the question of jurisdiction is controlled not by the process of adjudication, as it is in equity cases, but by the nature of the relief awarded. The dissent's failure to observe that distinction led to its erroneous conclusion that this appeal from the grant of an extraordinary remedy should be transferred.

The dissent's attempt to bolster its faulty reasoning with the "oft-stated tenet that it is the underlying subject matter that controls questions of appellate jurisdiction ..." and its citation to Howard v. Lane, 276 Ga. 688, 581 S.E.2d 1 (2003), reflects further confusion, this time between constitutionally-established subject matter jurisdiction and statutory provisions regarding appealability in certain cases. No question was raised in Howard regarding this Court's jurisdiction over cases involving writs of prohibition. Instead, the case turned on whether the State has a right to appeal in criminal cases. Likewise, no question was raised in Ferguson v. Composite State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 275 Ga. 255, 564 S.E.2d 715 (2002), or in Rebich v. Miles 264 Ga. 467, 448 S.E.2d 192 (1994), regarding this Court's jurisdiction over mandamus cases; the appeals were dismissed because no applications for discretionary appeal had been filed.

Finally, the cases cited by the dissent cannot be relied upon for the propositions for which they were cited. The use of the word "discretionary" in the context of mandamus in Schrenko v. DeKalb County School Dist., 276 Ga. 786(3), 582 S.E.2d 109 (2003), was unnecessary to the decision in the case and was, unfortunately, a mistaken usage. That the remedy is not "discretionary" may be seen from the standard formulation of the circumstances under which the writ of mandamus may issue: "Mandamus will issue against a public officer under two circumstances: (1) where there is a clear legal right to the relief sought, [cit.], and (2) where there has been a gross abuse of discretion. [Cit.]" City of Atlanta v. Wansley Moving &c. Co. 245 Ga. 794, 796(2), 267 S.E.2d 234 (1980). See also, Henderson v. McVay, 269 Ga. 7(1), 494 S.E.2d 653 (1998).

Likewise, the citation to two opinions of the Court of Appeals to establish that "this Court has historically transferred mandamus cases to the Court of Appeals" cannot be relied upon. Those cases, Bd. of Trustees, etc. v. Mabry, 221 Ga.App. 762, 763, fn. 3, 472 S.E.2d 542 (1996) (221 Ga.App. 762, 472 S.E.2d 542) (1996), and King v. Bd. of Ed., etc., 214 Ga.App. 325, 326, fn. 1, 447 S.E.2d 657 (1994) (214 Ga.App. 325, 447 S.E.2d 657) (1994), were transferred by error during a period of development of the law of this Court's equity jurisdiction, and relied on this Court's decision in Beauchamp v. Knight, supra. As the Court of Appeals correctly noted in a footnote in King, supra, "Beauchamp appears to rely, at least in part, on the traditional distinction between law and equity. However, that rationale is inapplicable to mandamus cases, since `the writ of mandamus is a common law writ, with which equity has nothing to do.' [Cit.]" Thus, contrary to the dissent's assertion, the principle that when the relief sought is simply ancillary to the determination of the underlying legal issue, the case is not within this Court's equity jurisdiction, does not apply equally to this Court's jurisdiction over cases involving extraordinary remedies. Jurisdiction over this case belongs where the Constitution placed it, in this Court.

2. An essential factual underpinning of the trial court's ruling that the SWMP violates the requirements of OCGA § 12-8-20 et seq. and is, therefore, invalid was the finding that Lamar County does not permit the placement of C&D waste in its existing landfill. That finding was based on the trial court's reading of a provision of the SWMP prohibiting the placement of construction debris in the existing landfill "except in areas and under conditions specifically designated by the authority for those purposes." However, unrefuted evidence presented in support of Lamar County's motion for reconsideration established that the existing landfill does accept C&D waste. Thus, the trial court's finding that Lamar County does not permit the placement of C&D waste in its existing landfill is not supported by the evidence of record. "If the trial court makes a finding of fact which is unsupported by the record, it cannot be upheld; and if the judgment is based upon a fact for which there is no evidence, it should be reversed." Pettus v. Smith, 174 Ga.App. 587, 589(5), 330 S.E.2d 735 (1985). Since the finding on which the trial court based its conclusion that the SWMP was inadequate is without evidentiary support, the conclusion must fall and, with it, the trial court's judgment.

3. Pertinent to the trial court's holding that Lamar County could not enact a zoning ordinance with regard to a matter on which the SWMP was silent, the county contends the trial court's decision is contrary to the holding of the Court of Appeals in Kingsley, supra. The Court of Appeals discussed in that case the differences between zoning and planning and concluded they were so distinct in purpose and effect that the procedural requirements for zoning decisions were not applicable to the planning process. The present case does not involve the procedures employed in zoning decisions or in establishing a comprehensive plan, but the distinctions drawn in Kingsley have applicability to the present case.

As the Court of Appeals noted in Kingsley, the Lamar...