Kinkaid v. Board of Review of the City, No. 24100 (HI 11/10/2004)
| Decision Date | 10 November 2004 |
| Docket Number | No. 24100,24100 |
| Parties | THOMAS R. KINKAID, WILLIAM KOWALSKI, HENRI P. KOSTERMANS, RYOKO KOSTERMANS, WALTER S. LEONG, TERRI LEONG, RICHARD A. MOODY, ERNEST W. TUTTLE, PAMELA TUTTLE, GERTRUD EBERWEIN, BRUCE F. CONNELL, ERNESTO V. CASTRO, ET AL., PEARL R. GROVES, GLENN H. MEYER, LEO A. YOUNG, JEANETTE M. YOUNG, GLENN R. OAKES, CYNTHIA R. OAKES, DAVID J. NOVICK, CAROL L. NOVICK, PETER L. CHAN, TERRY T. CHAN, ALFONSO J. BAEZA, FUJIKO BAEZA, ALMA BROSIO, KAREN K. SCHUMANN, AMERICAN TRUST CO. OF HAWAII, HARRIETTE W. RHODES, ESTATE OF B.T. KANBARA, JAMES W. WITT, ROBET R. BERGIS, BLACK PEARL VENTURES, INC., BETTY JUNE CAULO, FRANK M. NOWDESHA, MARSHA E. LEWIS, BERNARD J. GAINEY, FRANK J. HATA, RUSSELL ANDERSON MAXINE ANDERSON, YOUNG FAMILY TRUST, RICHARD BROSSELMANN, KRISTINE BROSSELMANN, KENDRICK WONG, KENNETH ALFORD, SOPHIA ALFORD SURVIVOR'S TRUST, JERALD V. DUNLAP, SEVERN STARZYNSKI, NOBUYUKI ISHIMA, MCPROUD FAMILY TRUST, HHBW FAMILY LIMITED PARTNERSHIP, RICHARD C. ELLIOTT, JOAN ELLIOTT, VELMA JEAN BRIXON, TED SIMON, KAREN L. SIMON, THOMAS KHOY FONG WONG, WESLEY N. CALLAHAN, JANICE M. CALLAHAN, JEFFREY J. RUMMEL, ELISA V. RUMMEL, ADOLPH LAEPPLE, ERICA LAEPPLE, WAYLAND S. DUDLEY, GRACE KAE, CAROL A. LAECHELT, HUGH C. PAPE, BARBARA J. PAPE, OLIVER BENEDIKTSON TRUST, JOHN H. COLEMAN, BERNARD NEALE, SANG TEA BOBAY, YANG JA WANG, WILLIAM F. THOMPSON, JR., LEWIS G. WALDO, JAMES J. SULLIVAN, LELAND M. GARRISON, RONALD J. SMERLING, FRANK REES, VIRGINIA REES, ANNE-MARIE VOLK, DANIEL W. MOORMAN, SANDRA R. MOORMAN, MATTHEW H. WITTEMAN, MARY F. WITTEMAN, MARSHA E. LEWIS, FRANKLIN M. TOKIOKA, H. HARRY MUEGGENBURG, BARRY D. BERQUIST, WILLIS E. HOWARD III, PATRICIA RUDY, JAMES R. JOHNSTON II, SANDRA R. JOHNSTON, HERBERT Y.K. WONG, PAUL N. BEST, LOUIS W. CROMPTON, ALICIA Y. CROMPTON, DONALD S. ROBERTSON, ROY D. GUSTAFSON, MARILYN A GUSTAFSON, CARL OLSON, DOROTHY G. HOWARD, EDWARD P. PRINDLE, EVERETT S. MAYHOOD, ELLEN F. MAYHOOD, JAMES H. KAMO, DORA M. KAMO, AUGUSTUS TAGLIAFERRI, JACK M. FELIZ, MARIE A. FELIZ, YOLO TRUST, JUDY L. MOORE, PAUL R. OLSON, HELEN C. OLSON, WILLIAM C. WARREN, GEORGE K. IGI, SHARON D. IGI, MARY P. BERG, BRUCE HOLLIDAY, HAROLD L. PREEMAN, ALBERT W. FINK, BEVERLY A. FINK, PETER CHOI, MYUNG CHOI, and SALISBURY RESTAURANT ENTERPRISES, Appellants-Appellants v. BOARD OF REVIEW OF THE CITY AND COUNTY OF HONOLULU, Appellee-Appellee. |
| Court | Hawaii Supreme Court |
APPEAL FROM THE FIRST CIRCUIT COURT (CIV. NO. 00-1-3024)
Roger S. Mosely, Nancy J. Youngren and Nathan C. Lampard of Case Bigelow & Lombardi for appellants-appellants.
Chris A. Diebling, Deputy Corporation Counsel, for appellee-appellee.
Appellants-appellants Thomas R. Kinkaid, et al. (Appellants), appeal from the January 23, 2001 order of the circuit court of the first circuit, the Honorable Gary W.B. Chang presiding, dismissing Appellants' appeal from the Board of Review of the City and County of Honolulu's (the Board) decision affirming Appellants' real property tax assessments. On appeal, Appellants contend that the circuit court erred in dismissing their appeal because: (1) the Hawai`i Administrative Procedures Act (HAPA) entitles Appellants to seek review of the Board's decision in circuit court, inasmuch as the Board's affirmance of Appellants' tax assessments was the "final decision" in a "contested case" before an administrative "agency;" (2) the procedure for obtaining judicial review of the Board's decision prescribed in the tax code is not exclusive; and (3) judicial review under HAPA is necessary to prevent the Board from acting arbitrarily and abusing its discretion. For the following reasons, we affirm.
Appellants number over one hundred fee owners of units in the "Waikiki Shore" building, located at 2161 Kalia Road in Honolulu. Prior to the 2000-2001 tax year, the City and County of Honolulu (the City) classified Appellants' units as "Apartments" for purposes of calculating Appellants' real property tax assessments. In October 1999, the City's Real Property Assessment Division (Assessment Division) reclassified the majority of the Waikiki Shore's units as "Hotel and Resort." As a consequence of the reclassification, Appellants' real property tax liability allegedly doubled in the 2000-2001 tax year.
Appellants appealed the Assessment Division's reclassification and property tax assessments to the Board. During the Board hearing, Appellants presented evidence that the Assessment Division's reclassification was unlawful.1 Following the hearing, the Board affirmed the Assessment Division's assessments. No written findings of fact or conclusions of law accompanied the Board's decision.
Appellants timely appealed from the Board's decision to the tax appeal court pursuant to Hawai`i Revised Statutes (HRS) § 232-17 (2001).2 They thereafter filed a second notice of appeal, this time in the circuit court of the first circuit pursuant to HRS § 91-14(a) (1993). After the circuit court ordered the latter appeal dismissed for lack of jurisdiction,3 Appellants timely appealed to this court.
"Whether a court possesses subject matter jurisdiction is a question of law reviewable de novo." In re Doe Children, 105 Hawai`i 38, 52, 93 P.3d 1145, 1159 (2004) (quoting In re Doe Children, 96 Hawai`i 272, 283, 30 P.3d 878, 889 (2001)).
"The interpretation of a statute is a question of law reviewable de novo." Lindinha v. Hilo Coast Processing Co., 104 Hawai`i 164, 171, 86 P.3d 973, 980 (2004) (quoting Franks v. City & County of Honolulu, 74 Haw. 328, 334, 843 P.2d 668, 671 (1993)).
Appellants argue that the circuit court erred in dismissing their appeal because: (1) Appellants satisfied the jurisdictional prerequisites for obtaining judicial review of the Board's decision under HAPA; (2) the appellate review of Board decisions provided for under the tax code is a non-exclusive remedy; and (3) the Board's arbitrary conduct and abuse of discretion during Appellants' administrative proceeding can only be addressed effectively through judicial review under HAPA.4 The Board counters that a plain reading of the relevant statutes and their accompanying legislative history demonstrates that the legislature intended the tax appeal court to exercise exclusive jurisdiction over appeals from the Board.
Upon review of the record, we conclude that (1) reasonably interpreted, the tax code vests the tax appeal court with exclusive jurisdiction over Appellants' appeal, and (2) the tax appeal court's required de novo review of Appellants' contested tax liability adequately safeguards Appellants from arbitrary and unreasonable assessments. The order of the circuit court dismissing Appellants' appeal is therefore affirmed.
Appellants base their right to judicial review in circuit court on HRS § 91-14(a), which provides, in pertinent part: "Any person aggrieved by a final decision and order in a contested case . . . is entitled to judicial review thereof under this chapter[.]" HRS § 91-14(a) (1993).
To fall within the purview of HRS § 91-14(a), a party must establish at the outset that the decision or order sought to be reviewed originates with an "agency" as defined under HAPA. See Sandy Beach Defense Fund v. City Council of the City & County of Honolulu, 70 Haw. 361, 368-369, 773 P.2d 250, 255-256 (1989); Town v. Land Use Comm'n, 55 Haw. 538, 545, 524 P.2d 84, 89 (1974). The appellant must accordingly demonstrate that the challenged government entity is a "state or county board, commission, department, or officer authorized by law to make rules or to adjudicate contested cases," and is not "in the legislative or judicial branches." See HRS § 91-1(1) (1993) (defining "agency").
Only after confirming that HAPA applies to the targeted government actor may the appellant endeavor to satisfy the substantive requirements of HRS § 91-14(a):
[F]irst, the proceeding that resulted in the unfavorable agency action must have been a "contested case" hearing — i.e., a hearing that was 1) "required by law" and 2) determined the "rights, duties, and privileges of specific parties"; second, the agency's action must represent "a final decision and order," or "a preliminary ruling" such that deferral of review would deprive the claimant of adequate relief; third, the claimant must have followed the applicable agency rules and, therefore, have been involved "in" the contested case; and finally, the claimant's legal interests must have been injured — i.e., the claimant must have standing to appeal.
Appellants correctly assert that the Board is an "agency" under HRS § 91-1(1). Established by city ordinance, the Board is a municipal entity detached from the legislative and judicial branches. See Revised Ordinances of Honolulu (ROH) § 8-12.7 (1998). The Board's members — all of whom are appointed by the mayor and confirmed by the city council — are moreover empowered to "hear disputes between the director [of finance] and any taxpayer in all cases in which appeals have been duly taken." See Revised Charter of Honolulu § 13-103(b) (2000); ROH § 8-12.7(a) (1998). As HAPA's definition of "agency" encompasses those "county board[s]" "authorized by law" "to adjudicate contested cases," the Board falls decidedly within the statute's definitional ambit. See HRS § 91-1(1) (1993).5
Appellants additionally comply with HRS § 91-14(a)'s jurisdictional requirements as outlined in PASH. The Board's proceedings below constituted a "`contested case' hearing," inasmuch as the proceedings were "required" by applicable city ordinances,6 and ultimately yielded an affirmance of Appellants' tax assessments that affected Appellants' ...
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