Kinworthy v. Soo Line R.R. Co.
Decision Date | 30 December 2013 |
Docket Number | A13-0915 |
Parties | Dennis E. Kinworthy, Appellant, v. Soo Line Railroad Company d/b/a CP Rail System, Respondent. |
Court | Minnesota Court of Appeals |
Affirmed
Hennepin County District Court
Randal W. LeNeave, Richard L. Carlson, Hunegs, LeNeave & Kvas, P.A., Wayzata, Minnesota (for appellant)
Jeffrey A. Abrahamson, Sweeney & Masterson, PA, St. Paul, Minnesota (for respondent)
Considered and decided by Peterson, Presiding Judge; Stoneburner, Judge; and Ross, Judge.
Postverdict, prejudgment interest is not available in a Minnesota state-court action brought under the Federal Employers' Liability Act (FELA), 45 U.S.C. § 51 (2006).
A jury awarded appellant damages in an action brought under FELA in Minnesota state court, and the district court denied appellant's motion seeking interest on the jury award under Minn. Stat. § 549.09 (2012) from the date of the verdict to the date judgmentwas entered. Because federal substantive law governs FELA actions brought in state court, and, under federal law, prejudgment interest is not recoverable in a FELA case, we affirm.
Appellant Dennis Kinworthy was injured in January 2009 in the scope of his employment as a conductor with respondent Soo Line Railroad Company, d/b/a CP Rail System. Appellant filed an action in Minnesota state court seeking recovery under federal statutory law. A jury found that CP violated the Locomotive Inspection Act (LIA), 49 U.S.C. §§ 20701-20703 (2006), which caused appellant's injury, and awarded appellant damages of $340,000.1 The parties stipulated that the award should be reduced by collateral sources of $6,000, based on appellant's receipt of wage advancements from CP, and $15,457, based on his receipt of sickness benefits from the United States Railroad Retirement Board. The district court ordered judgment in the amount of $318,543, which was entered after the automatic 30-day stay of judgment under Minn. R. Gen. Pract. 125 expired.
Appellant moved for costs and disbursements, which were awarded by the district court administrator. He then moved to amend the judgment, under Minn. Stat. § 549.09, subd. 1(a), (c), to include interest from the date of the special verdict until the entry ofjudgment. CP objected, arguing that, under Monessen Sw. Ry. v. Morgan, 486 U. S. 330, 335, 108 S. Ct. 1837, 1842 (1988), and Melin v. Burlington N. R.R., 401 N.W.2d 418, 420 (Minn. App. 1987), the issue of prejudgment interest in FELA actions is governed by federal law, and federal and state courts have held that prejudgment interest is not available under FELA. After a hearing, the district court denied appellant's motion based on its determination that binding precedent did not allow the recovery of postverdict, prejudgment interest in a FELA action. Appellant sought reconsideration under Minn. R. Gen. Pract. 115.11, which was denied. This appeal followed.
Is a prevailing plaintiff in a FELA action entitled to receive postverdict, prejudgment interest on the amount of recovery, based on the application of federal substantive law?
The availability of postverdict, prejudgment interest in a FELA action brought in Minnesota state court presents a legal issue, which this court reviews de novo. See Trapp v. Hancuh, 587 N.W.2d 61, 62 (Minn. App. 1998) ( ); Melin, 401 N.W.2d at 420 ( ). In Monessen, the United States Supreme Court stated that "[s]tate courts are required to apply federal substantive law in adjudicating FELA claims" and "that the proper measure of damages under . . . FELA is inseparably connected with the right ofaction, and therefore is an issue of substance that must be settled according to general principles of law as administered in the Federal courts." 486 U.S. at 335, 108 S. Ct. at 1842 (quotation omitted). The Monessen court recognized that "federal and state courts have held with virtual unanimity over more than seven decades that prejudgment interest is not available under . . . FELA." Id. at 338, 108 S. Ct. at 1844 (citing Melin, 401 N.W.2d at 420) (other citations omitted). In Melin, which was decided during the year before Monessen, this court acknowledged that federal law governs the application of prejudgment interest under FELA. Melin, 401 N.W.2d at 420; see also Dice v. Akron, Canton & Youngstown R.R., 342 U.S. 359, 361-62, 72 S. Ct. 312, 314 (1952) ( ). "[O]nly if federal law controls can the federal Act be given that uniform application throughout the country essential to effectuate its purposes." Dice, 342 U.W. at 361, 72 S. Ct. at 314.
The United States Supreme Court has also held that, in an action alleging a violation of federal law, interest is calculated from the date of the entry of judgment, not the date of the verdict. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp. v. Bonjorno, 494 U.S. 827, 835, 110 S. Ct. 1570, 1575-76 (1990). In Kaiser Aluminum, the Supreme Court rejected the policy argument that a plaintiff should be compensated for the loss of the use of funds during the period between the verdict and the judgment, reasoning that the plain language of the federal interest statute requires the calculation of interest "from the date of the entry of the judgment," which is a date certain. 494 U.S. at 835, 110 S. Ct. at 1575; see 28 U.S.C. § 1961 (2006) (federal interest statute). The Court observed that, "[b]y linkingall post-judgment activity to the entry of a judgment, the courts have been provided a uniform time from which to determine post-judgment issues." Kaiser Aluminum, 494 U.S. at 835, 110 S. Ct. at 1575 (quotation omitted).
Following Monessen, a number of state courts have recognized the rule that federal, not state, law governs the availability of prejudgment interest in FELA actions. See Lund v. San Joaquin Valley R.R., 71 P.3d 770, 778-79 (Cal. 2003) ( ); Bodenheimer v. New Orleans Pub. Belt, 860 So.2d 534, 534 (La. 2003) ( ); Paniccia v. Long Island R.R., 746 N.Y.S.2d 607, 608 (N.Y. App. Div. 2002) ( ); Eschberger v. Consol. Rail Corp., 583 N.Y.S.2d 65, 65 (N.Y. App. Div. 1992) ( ).
Appellant argues that Monessen and Melin are inapposite because prejudgment interest is not the same as postverdict interest, which he is seeking in this action. Appellant contends that postverdict interest is a procedural matter, not substantive, and that, as a matter of state procedural law under Minn. Stat. § 549.09, he is entitled to interest from the time of the verdict until the entry of judgment. That statute provides, inpart, that, "[w]hen a judgment or award is for the recovery of money, . . . interest from the time of the verdict, award, or report until judgment is finally entered shall be computed by the court administrator or arbitrator . . . and added to the judgment or award." Id., subd. 1(a).
Appellant cites three state court decisions that have interpreted Monessen to allow interest in a FELA action to be calculated from the date of the verdict under state law. But these three decisions applied three different analyses, and we are not bound by their results. See Lockley v. CSX Transp. Inc., 66 A.3d 322, 326 & n.4, 327 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2013) ( ); Jacobs v. Dakota, Minn., & E. R.R., 806 N.W.2d 209, 216 (S.D. 2011) ( );; Weber v. Chicago & Nw. Transp. Co., 530 N.W.2d 25, 31-32 (Wis. Ct. App. 1995) ( ).
"Prejudgment interest" is defined as "[s]tatutorily prescribed interest accrued either from the date of the loss or from the date when the complaint was filed up to the date the final judgment is entered." Black's Law Dictionary 887 (9th ed. 2009); cf. Andrulonis v. United States, 26 F.3d 1224, 1230 (2d Cir. 1994) (...
To continue reading
Request your trial