Kinzer v. Harris, 00-CV-20.

• Decision Date: 31 May 2001
• Docket Number: No. 00-CV-20.,00-CV-20.
• Citation: 146 F.Supp.2d 194
• Parties: David KINZER, Plaintiff, v. David HARRIS, Individually, and as an Investigator for the New York State Department of Motor Vehicles, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of New York

146 F.Supp.2d 194

David KINZER, Plaintiff, v. David HARRIS, Individually, and as an Investigator for the New York State Department of Motor Vehicles, Defendant.

No. 00-CV-20.

United States District Court, N.D. New York.

May 31, 2001.

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Linnan & Fallon (James D. Linnan, of counsel), Albany, NY, for Plaintiff.

Eliot Spitzer, Attorney General of the State of New York, (Gerald W. Connolly, Asst. Attorney General, of counsel), Albany, NY, for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM-DECISION AND ORDER

HURD, District Judge.

I. INTRODUCTION

On January 6, 2000, plaintiff David Kinzer ("Kinzer" or "plaintiff") commenced the instant action against defendant David Harris ("Harris" or "defendant")¹ pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and asserting causes of action for false arrest and malicious prosecution in violation of his rights under the First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, and state law.

Harris now moves for summary judgment on all claims pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56. Plaintiff opposes. Oral argument was heard on April 27, 2001, in Albany, New York. Decision was reserved.

II. FACTS

This action arises from the arrest and prosecution of Kinzer following an attempt to exchange his valid U.S. Virgin Islands ("U.S.V.I.") driver's license for a New York State driver's license. Plaintiff was arrested because Harris allegedly believed his valid license was a forgery. The following are the pertinent facts as stated in the light most favorable to the non-moving plaintiff.

On or about April 12, 1999, Kinzer entered the New York State Department of Motor Vehicles ("DMV") branch office in Albany, New York. He attempted to exchange his valid U.S.V.I. driver's license for a New York State driver's license. In accordance with DMV procedures, DMV employees compared the license presented by Kinzer with the information contained in the U.S. Identification Manual (the "I.D. manual"). The I.D. manual contains samples and detailed descriptions of driver's licenses issued by each U.S. state and territory. Because the license presented by plaintiff differed substantially from the information contained in the I.D. manual,² DMV employees suspected that his license was a forgery. He was told to return on another day to complete the license exchange. The employees' suspicions were reported to DMV Investigative Aide Stanley Bronakowski ("Bronakowski") the next day. (Bronakowski Aff. ¶ 2.)

Because of the concerns about the validity of plaintiff's license, Bronakowski called the U.S.V.I. Department of Motor Vehicles ("U.S.V.I.DMV") on April 13, 1999, to inquire about the validity of Kinzer's license. (Bronakowski Aff. ¶ 5.) He was told by a representative of the U.S.V.I. DMV that they had no record of Kinzer's license in their computers.³

On April 15, 1999, Bronakowski was notified that Kinzer had returned to the DMV office to again attempt to exchange his license. (Id. at ¶ 9.) Bronakowski reported this fact to Harris and to DMV Supervising Investigator Brad Schwartz ("Schwartz"). (Id.) Harris, accompanied by DMV Investigator Joseph Cardero ("Cardero"), then traveled to the Albany DMV office to inspect the license proffered for exchange by Kinzer. (Cardero Aff. ¶ 3.) After inspecting the license, and speaking with Schwartz, Harris introduced himself to Kinzer and confirmed that he had attempted to exchange the license in question. (Id. at ¶ 6.) Harris then personally called the U.S.V.I. DMV to again confirm that there was no record of a valid driver's license issued to Kinzer by that agency. (Harris Aff. ¶ 19; Cardero Aff. ¶ 7.)⁴

After completing the call to the U.S.V.I. DMV, Harris called Schwartz to discuss the case. Both Harris and Schwartz determined that probable cause existed for the arrest of Kinzer. (Harris Aff. ¶ 24; Schwartz Aff. ¶ 27.) Harris requested the assistance of a City of Albany police officer to effect the arrest of plaintiff. (Harris Aff. ¶¶ 24, 25; Cardero Aff. ¶ 9.) When the Albany Police officer arrived, he informed Kinzer that he was being arrested for possession of a forged driver's license because the U.S.V.I. DMV had indicated that it did not have a record of his license. (Cardero Aff. ¶ 12.)⁵ Plaintiff was taken to the Albany Police Department station and booked. Later that afternoon, he was arraigned before a judge of the Albany City Court on charges of Criminal Possession of a Forged Instrument in the Second Degree in violation of N.Y. Penal Law § 170.25.⁶ At the arraignment, Harris spoke with Albany County Assistant District Attorney Francisco Calderone ("ADA Calderone") regarding the facts of the case as Harris then knew them to be. (Harris Aff. ¶ 27.)

On April 20, 1999, Harris received a letter from the U.S.V.I. DMV indicating that Kinzer did, in fact, have a valid U.S.V.I. driver's license, and that the license which Kinzer had attempted to exchange at the DMV was not a forgery. Harris alleges that he unsuccessfully attempted to forward this information to ADA Calderone on several occasions, including hand delivering the information to the Albany County District Attorney's office on or about April 24, 1999. Harris alleges that he assumed that ADA Calderone received this information and dismissed the charges against Kinzer because Harris never heard otherwise. Plaintiff denies the validity of these assertions. He argues that, given the small size of the Albany County District Attorney's office, it is incredible to believe that Harris was unable to deliver the exonerating information to ADA Calderone, and that the evidence indicates that Harris affirmatively misled the prosecutor through omission and inaction concerning the information that he received from the U.S.V.I. DMV. (Pl. Mem. at 18.)⁷

ADA Calderone continued to prosecute Kinzer. Plaintiff was forced to appear in court on seven occasions. (Kinzer Aff. ¶ 37.) In June of 1999, Kinzer attempted to obtain a New York State driver's license by taking the driver's test at the DMV office in Troy, New York. (Id. ¶ 42.) After passing the examination, he was informed that there was a hold placed on him in the computer as of April 15, 1999. (Id. ¶ 43.) The DMV representative at the Troy office called the DMV main office in Albany. Kinzer was placed on the telephone with Harris, who indicated that he was attempting to help him clear up the matter. (Id. ¶ 44.) The charges against plaintiff were finally dismissed on August 24, 1999. This was 126 days after Harris first received confirmation that completely exonerated the plaintiff. The instant action followed.

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

A. Summary Judgment

A moving party is entitled to summary judgment "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). The ultimate inquiry is whether a reasonable jury could find for the nonmoving party based on the evidence presented, the legitimate inferences that could be drawn from that evidence in favor of the nonmoving party, and the applicable burden of proof. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). In determining a motion for summary judgment, all inferences to be drawn from the facts contained in the exhibits and depositions "must be viewed in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion." United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655, 82 S.Ct. 993, 8 L.Ed.2d 176 (1962); Hawkins v. Steingut, 829 F.2d 317, 319 (2d Cir.1987). Nevertheless, "the nonmoving party may not rely on conclusory allegations or unsubstantiated speculation." Scotto v. Almenas, 143 F.3d 105, 114 (2d Cir.1998).

B. 42 U.S.C. § 1983

To recover damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, plaintiff must show that: (1) "the conduct complained of was committed by a person acting under color of state law"; and (2) such "conduct deprived [plaintiff] of rights, privileges or immunities secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States." Greenwich Citizens Comm., Inc. v. Counties of Warren and Washington Indus. Dev. Agency, 77 F.3d 26, 29-30 (2d Cir.1996) (quoting Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 535, 101 S.Ct. 1908, 68 L.Ed.2d 420 (1981)).

IV. DISCUSSION

The dispositive issues in this case are whether or not Harris had probable cause to arrest Kinzer, and whether the failure of Harris to turn over the exonerating information received from the U.S.V.I. Department of Motor Vehicles to prosecutors was sufficient as a matter of law to give rise to a cause of action for malicious prosecution. Plaintiff's claims for false arrest and malicious prosecution are discussed in turn below.⁸

A. False Arrest

The elements of a cause of action for false arrest are (1) the defendant intended to confine the plaintiff; (2) the plaintiff was conscious of the confinement; (3) the plaintiff did not consent to the confinement; and (4) the confinement was not otherwise privileged. See Kirk v. Metropolitan Transportation Auth., 2001 WL 258605, *9 (S.D.N.Y.2001) (citing Weyant v. Okst, 101 F.3d 845, 853 (2d Cir.1996); Broughton v. State, 37 N.Y.2d 451, 456, 373 N.Y.S.2d 87, 335 N.E.2d 310 (1975)).⁹ The only element at issue in this case is the fourth element.

The existence of probable cause to arrest the plaintiff is a complete defense to a claim for false arrest. Okst, 101 F.3d at 852. Probable cause exists when officers "have knowledge or reasonably trustworthy information of facts and circumstances that are sufficient to warrant a person of reasonable caution in the belief that the person to be arrested has committed or is committing a crime." Posr v. Court Officer Shield # 207, 180 F.3d 409, 414 (2d Cir.1999) (quoting Weyant, 101 F.3d at 852). The inquiry into the existence of probable cause is an objective one; the subjective beliefs of the arresting officer are...