Kirsche v. State

Citation271 Ga. App. 729,611 S.E.2d 64
Decision Date21 February 2005
Docket NumberNo. A04A1949.,A04A1949.
PartiesKIRSCHE v. The STATE.
CourtGeorgia Court of Appeals

George Law III, Whitmer & Law, Gainesville, for Appellant.

Jason Deal, District Attorney, Alison Toller, Assistant District Attorney, for Appellee.

ADAMS, Judge.

An officer lawfully in a place who sees evidence relating to a crime in plain view may seize that evidence. In this case, two of three officers investigating a domestic complaint at night went to the back of William Lester Kirsche's residence as a safety precaution as the third officer knocked on the front door. While in the backyard, one of the officers discovered what appeared to be a large marijuana plant. Based on this evidence, Kirsche was convicted on charges of manufacturing marijuana and possession of marijuana. He now appeals denial of his pre-trial motion to suppress the marijuana discovered by the officers, and the question raised is whether the officers were lawfully in Kirsche's backyard.

A trial judge's findings of fact on a motion to suppress should not be disturbed if there is any evidence to support them; determinations of fact and credibility must be accepted unless clearly erroneous; and the evidence must be construed most favorably to the upholding of the trial court's findings and judgment. Tate v. State, 264 Ga. 53, 54(1), 440 S.E.2d 646 (1994); Jackson v. State, 258 Ga.App. 806, 807-808(2), 575 S.E.2d 713 (2002).

The trial court set forth its findings of facts as follows:

Hall County deputies, responding to a "domestic call" from the defendant's daughter, found her at the home of a neighbor. She told them that she and her father had had a disagreement about school, that he had gotten irate and that she had gotten scared and left the home. She told the deputies also that her father was growing marijuana in the backyard of their residence. The deputies then called agents from the Multi-Agency Narcotics Squad (MANS Unit). Agent Grindle of the MANS Unit arrived in response and talked to the deputies and to the defendant's daughter. Agent Grindle then asked the deputies to accompany him as he went to talk to the defendant. Grindle told the deputies to "secure the rear of the residence" while he talked with the defendant. The deputies went to the back door (which was located on the side of the house). Deputy Burton testified at the suppression hearing that he knew that when they went to the defendant's residence that Grindle was probably going to ask for consent to search. He further testified that he went to the rear of the residence to secure it for safety and not to search for the marijuana the defendant's daughter had reported was growing there. However, in approaching the back door Deputy Burton ran into a marijuana plant, so large it had a "trunk," just off the patio about 10-15 feet from the door of the residence. He recognized it from his nine years of training and experience as a law enforcement officer, having actually seen marijuana 75-100 times. He reported his find to Agent Grindle and stayed with the defendant while Agent Grindle took a look. The defendant was arrested for manufacturing marijuana and then a search warrant was obtained.

The evidence also shows that it was 9:00 p.m. and very dark; that the lot had many trees on it; that the marijuana tree was approximately ten feet tall; that one could not see the marijuana tree from the street; and that there was nothing about the appearance of the front of the house that indicated it was acceptable to walk around the back. Deputy Burton also testified that it was standard policy under the circumstances to go into the backyard for safety or security reasons; but that there were no urgent circumstances requiring him to go into the backyard. He testified that the daughter said that her father was upset with her academic performance. No evidence was presented that the officers contacted any other authorities about the possibility that a child might be in danger; the mother returned home during the subsequent search of the premises.

After reviewing the law regarding search and seizure, the court concluded that the officers had validly entered onto the property because their actions constituted a reasonable officer safety precaution:

Officers attempting to deal with domestic disturbances and investigating alleged felonies face unknown, but constant, danger. They must be alert and take reasonable precautions to protect themselves and others present. Here, it was reasonable for all exits to the defendant's residence to be "secured." The defendant may still have been irate, or become irate again upon seeing the officers. Under such circumstances, with the officers being at the back door, had the defendant been inclined to go out the back door in order to surprise and harm the officers in front, he would have seen the deputies at the back door and may have been deterred from leaving the residence. One cannot say that this would have happened or that there was certain danger. But many law enforcement officers have been injured or killed where danger was not apparent. What is required under circumstances such as these is that the actions of the officers be reasonable. See generally, State v. Schwartz, et al., 261 Ga.App. 742, 583 S.E.2d 573 (2003). This court believes they were and that Deputy Burton had a legally valid reason to be where he was when the marijuana came into plain view.

An officer who is lawfully in a place who sees in plain view evidence relating to a crime, or instrumentalities of a crime, may seize that evidence. Galbreath v. State, 213 Ga.App. 80, 82(2), 443 S.E.2d 664 (1994). See also Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 135-136, 110 S.Ct. 2301, 110 L.Ed.2d 112 (1990) (prior valid justification for intrusion required). It is true that Agent Grindle did not need a warrant to approach Kirsche's front door to make investigative inquiries. Gilreath v. State, 247 Ga. 814, 819-821, 279 S.E.2d 650 (1981). But even if the officers had probable cause to investigate a crime, the Fourth Amendment prohibited them from entering Kirsche's home or its curtilage without a warrant absent consent or a showing of exigent circumstances. Carranza v. State, 266 Ga. 263, 264-265(1), 467 S.E.2d 315 (1996); Bunn v. State, 153 Ga.App. 270, 274, 265 S.E.2d 88 (1980). See also State v. Gallup, 236 Ga.App. 321, 323(1)(b), 512 S.E.2d 66 (1999) (constitutional protection extends to curtilage of home).1

Here the officers had neither consent nor exigent circumstances. See Davis v. State, 262 Ga. 578, 582(3), 422 S.E.2d 546 (1992) (presence of contraband without more does not give rise to exigent circumstances); Gallup, 236 Ga.App. at 324, 512 S.E.2d 66 (same).

The trial court justified the intrusion based on Deputy Burton's testimony that he was securing the backyard for safety reasons. Burton testified he and the third officer went around back because of an allegation of drugs and a still very upset man. He explained that because the daughter was scared enough to leave the house, "I felt like we had to secure ourselves as well." He added that Agent Grindle of the drug crime unit had directed him to secure the back of the house and that he had no intent of searching the area. Therefore the trial court's finding that Burton was motivated by...

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22 cases
  • Corey v. State
    • United States
    • Georgia Court of Appeals
    • March 13, 2013
    ...without a warrant, exigent circumstances, or proper consent, they may not enter a home or its curtilage. See Kirsche v. State, 271 Ga.App. 729, 731, 611 S.E.2d 64 (2005). (a) Although there may be a dispute about whether an attached garage is always considered a part of the home for the pur......
  • State v. Vickers
    • United States
    • Georgia Court of Appeals
    • November 1, 2016
    ...the evidence must be construed most favorably to the upholding of the trial court's findings and judgment. [Cits.]" Kirsche v. State , 271 Ga.App. 729, 611 S.E.2d 64 (2005). And "[w]hether evidence is found within the curtilage of a residence is a mixed question of fact and law. On appeal, ......
  • Arp v. State
    • United States
    • Georgia Court of Appeals
    • May 21, 2014
    ...80 L.Ed.2d 214 (1984); see also United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294, 300(II), 107 S.Ct. 1134, 94 L.Ed.2d 326 (1987); Kirsche v. State, 271 Ga.App. 729, 731, 611 S.E.2d 64 (2005) (even if officers have probable cause to investigate a crime, without a warrant, exigent circumstances, or proper......
  • Edwards v. State
    • United States
    • Georgia Court of Appeals
    • October 27, 2020
    ...and punctuation omitted.) State v. Gray , 285 Ga. App. 124, 127-128 (2), 645 S.E.2d 598 (2007). See also Kirsche v. State , 271 Ga. App. 729, 732-733, 611 S.E.2d 64 (2005) ("use of protective sweeps has been limited to sweeps conducted in connection with an in-home arrest ... or where the o......
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