Kirtsey v. Papillon

• Decision Date: 01 August 2022
• Docket Number: 1:21-cv-23008-GAYLES
• Parties: JASPER R. KIRTSEY, Plaintiff, v. DR. FRANCK K. PAPILLON, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of Florida

JASPER R. KIRTSEY, Plaintiff, v. DR. FRANCK K. PAPILLON, Defendant.

No. 1:21-cv-23008-GAYLES

United States District Court, S.D. Florida

August 1, 2022

ORDER DENYING DR. PAPILLON'S MOTION TO DISMISS & DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR A PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION

DARRIN P. GAYLES UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

THIS CAUSE is before the Court upon Plaintiff's Motion for Preliminary Injunction [ECF No. 12] and Defendant Dr. Franck Papillon's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Amended Complaint. [ECF No. 25]. Plaintiff requests that the Court issue a preliminary injunction to command prison officials to perform a knee replacement surgery. [ECF No. 12 at 2]. In contrast, Defendant argues that Plaintiff's Amended Complaint fails to state an Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference to medical needs claim because: (1) Plaintiff failed to demonstrate that he has a “serious medical need,” (2) Dr. Papillon's failure to perform knee surgery was not the product of deliberate indifference, and (3) Plaintiff failed to demonstrate a causal relationship between Dr. Papillon's actions and Plaintiff's injuries.

Having reviewed the Amended Complaint [ECF No. 11], the Motion for Preliminary Injunction [ECF No. 12], the Motion to Dismiss [ECF No. 25], the respective responses [ECF Nos. 24, 26], and the relevant record, the Court concludes that both the Motion for Preliminary Injunction and Motion to Dismiss must be DENIED.

I. BACKGROUND

The Court begins by recounting the essential factual allegations in Plaintiff's Amended Complaint. [ECF No. 11]. Plaintiff, a prisoner in the custody of the Florida Department of Corrections, was transferred to Dade Correctional Institution (“Dade C.I.”) on August 12, 2020. Id. at 1. On February 10, 2021, Plaintiff was transported to the Reception and Medical Center (“RMC”) so that “Dr. Rayn” could take an x-ray of Plaintiff's right knee. Id. While the Amended Complaint does not describe what the x-rays revealed, Dr. Rayn ultimately recommended that Plaintiff receive a right knee replacement and that the surgery could be performed within four to six weeks. Id. Plaintiff agreed and gave Dr. Rayn written permission to perform the surgery. Id. at 3.

Plaintiff was transferred back to Dade C.I. on February 12, 2021. Id. Upon his arrival, Plaintiff informed Dr Papillon, the head physician at Dade C.I., that he would have to be transferred back to RMC to have the knee replacement surgery in approximately three weeks. Id. Many months later, on May 20, 2021, Dr. Papillon met with Plaintiff to explain that the surgery would not commence because Plaintiff had not “completed all the paperwork to have me transfer[red] for surgery at RMC.” Id. When Plaintiff showed Dr. Papillon his swollen right knee and asked for pain medication, Dr. Papillon purportedly refused to provide the medication and told Plaintiff that “I should stop filing grievance[s] [against] him, or I might not [ever] have the surgery.” Id. Plaintiff alleges that, as a result of this delay in providing the surgery, he is “now a cripple confined to a wheelchair” and that other medical personnel employed by the Florida Department of Corrections are now refusing to conduct the surgery do to its cost. Id. at 4.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

To survive a motion to dismiss brought pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a claim “must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face,'” meaning that it must contain “factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). While a court must accept well-pleaded factual allegations as true, “conclusory allegations . . . are not entitled to an assumption of truth-legal conclusions must be supported by factual allegations.” Randall v. Scott, 610 F.3d 701, 709-10 (11th Cir. 2010). “[T]he pleadings are construed broadly,” Levine v. World Fin. Network Nat'l Bank, 437 F.3d 1118, 1120 (11th Cir. 2006), and the allegations in the complaint are viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Bishop v. Ross Earle & Bonan, P.A., 817 F.3d 1268, 1270 (11th Cir. 2016). The dispositive question is not whether the claimant “will ultimately prevail . . . but whether his complaint [is] sufficient to cross the federal court's threshold.” Skinner v. Switzer, 562 U.S. 521, 530 (2011) (internal quotation and citation omitted).

To state a claim for relief under § 1983, a plaintiff must show that he was deprived of a federal right by a person acting under color of state law. See Griffin v. City of Opa Locka, 261 F.3d 1295, 1303 (11th Cir. 2001). Pro se complaints are held to “less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers and can only be dismissed for failure to state a claim if it appears ‘beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.'” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1979) (quoting Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972)). Nevertheless, the Court does not have “license to serve as de facto counsel for a party, or to rewrite an otherwise deficient pleading in order to sustain an action.” GJR Invs., Inc. v. Cnty. of Escambia, Fla., 132 F.3d 1359, 1369 (11th Cir. 1998) (citations omitted).

“A preliminary injunction is an extraordinary remedy never awarded as of right.” Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 24 (2008). To obtain one, the moving party must establish four separate requirements-namely, that: “(1) it has a substantial likelihood of success on the merits; (2) irreparable injury will be suffered unless the injunction issues; (3) the threatened injury to the movant outweighs whatever damage the proposed injunction may cause the opposing party; and (4) if issued, the injunction would not be adverse to the public interest.” Jones v. Governor of Fla., 950 F.3d 795, 806 (11th Cir. 2020) (quotation omitted). The Court may consider additional evidence provided by the parties to determine whether a preliminary injunction is appropriate. See Levi Strauss & Co. v. Sunrise Int'l Trading, Inc., 51 F.3d 982, 985 (11th Cir. 1995); see also Alabama v. United States Dep't of Commerce, 546 F.Supp.3d 1057, 1063 (M.D. Ala. 2021) (“[When ruling on a preliminary injunction,] [t]he court may also consider supplemental evidence, even hearsay evidence, submitted by the parties.”).

The scope of court authority to enter an injunction in the corrections context is circumscribed by the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”). See Nelson v. Campbell, 541 U.S. 637, 650 (2004). Under the PLRA, “preliminary injunctive relief must be narrowly drawn, extend no further than necessary to correct the harm the court finds requires preliminary relief, and be the least intrusive means necessary to correct that harm.” 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(2); see also Ga. Advoc. Off. v. Jackson, 4 F.4th 1200, 1206-07 (11th Cir. 2021) (holding that the PLRA prevents a preliminary injunction from issuing unless it meets the statute's “need-narrowness-intrusiveness requirements”). In addition, “[t]he court shall give substantial weight to any adverse impact on public safety or the operation of a criminal justice system caused by the relief.” 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(1)(A).

III. DISCUSSION

A. The Motion to Dismiss Should be Denied

“[D]eliberate indifference to [the] serious medical needs of prisoners” constitutes an Eighth Amendment violation that is redressable under § 1983. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104. To prove deliberate indifference, a plaintiff must show: “(1) a serious medical need; (2) the defendants' deliberate indifference to that need; and (3) causation between that indifference and the plaintiff's injury.” Mann v. Taser Int'l, Inc., 588 F.3d 1291, 1306-07 (11th Cir. 2009) (citing Goebert v. Lee Cnty., 510 F.3d 1312, 1326 (11th Cir. 2007)). Plaintiff argues that the Amended Complaint has failed to establish all three of these essential elements. [ECF No. 25 at 5-6].

Prior to the instant motion to dismiss, the Court screened Plaintiff's Amended Complaint in accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e) and 1915A. While the Court dismissed all of the other claims against all the other defendants, it allowed the deliberate indifference claim against Dr. Papillon to proceed. The Court reasoned that:

These allegations are sufficient to state a claim for deliberate indifference to serious medical needs against Dr. Papillon. “[A] defendant who delays necessary treatment for non-medical reasons may exhibit deliberate indifference.” Farrow v. West, 320 F.3d 1235, 1246 (11th Cir. 2003). “Delay in access to medical attention can violate the Eighth Amendment . . . when it is tantamount to unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.” Hill v. Dekalb Reg'l Youth Det. Ctr., 40 F.3d 1176, 1187 (11th Cir. 1994) (quotation and citation omitted). Here, Plaintiff has alleged that Dr. Papillon has deliberately delayed his knee replacement surgery for non-medical reasons, telling Plaintiff to “stop filing grievances” or he “might never have the surgery.” [ECF No. 11 at 3]. Plaintiff further alleges that Dr. Papillon refused to prescribe pain medication and that he is now confined to a wheelchair as a result of the delay in surgery. Id. Thus, Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged that Dr. Papillon delayed treatment for non-medical reasons, and that this delay, along with his refusal to provide pain medication, “was tantamount to unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.” Hill, 40 F.3d at 1187.

[ECF No. 15 at 2-3]. Having already screened the Amended Complaint, the Court already reviewed the sufficiency of Plaintiff's claim against Dr. Papillon under the...