Klatt v. N. C. Foster Lumber Co.

• Decision Date: 27 March 1896
• Docket Number: No. 294.,294.
• Citation: 66 N.W. 791,92 Wis. 622
• Parties: KLATT v. N. C. FOSTER LUMBER CO.
• Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

92 Wis. 622

66 N.W. 791

KLATT

v.N. C. FOSTER LUMBER CO.

No. 294.

Supreme Court of Wisconsin.

March 27, 1896.

Appeal from circuit court, La Crosse county; O. B. Wyman, Judge.

This is an action brought by William Klatt, by his guardian, against the N. C. Foster Lumber Company for injuries alleged to be caused by the negligence of defendant. There was verdict and judgment for plaintiff, and defendant appealed. Reversed.

The action is to recover damages for personal injuries received by the plaintiff while working for the defendant in its sawmill. The complaint alleges two particulars in which the defendant was negligent: (1) In not warning the plaintiff of the dangers incident to the employment, and (2) in not keeping the machinery with which he worked in a safe condition. The answer was a general denial and the defense of contributory negligence. There was both a special and general verdict for the plaintiff. A motion, on the minutes, for a new trial, was denied, and judgment for the plaintiff was entered on the verdict, from which the defendant appeals. At the time of his accident the plaintiff was 18 years old. So far as appears, he was a boy of average intelligence. He had been to school between four and five years; had worked on a farm, in the pine woods, and had had some experience working about the mill. At the time of his accident his work was in the mill, removing edgings from the edger table. He had been at this work about a month. Passing under that part of the edger table at which his work was, and transversely to it, was a set of five chains, at some little distance apart, whose business and purpose was to remove the edgings from that table to another table at a little distance from it. They were called “carrier chains.” They were endless chains, which lay, substantially, upon the floor. At the left-hand side of the table they were met by another similar set of chains, called “elevating chains,” whose purpose was to elevate the edgings to another table, still further to the left. Both sets of chains were moved by sprocket wheels at their line of meeting, which were affixed to a shaft under the floor. The chains were in plain view, and moved at the rate of 50 feet a minute. The plaintiff's station was near the head of this extension of the edger table, and on the left-hand side. The sprocket wheels were on that side of the table, and fully within his view. His duty was to remove the edgings from the table in such way that the chains should take and remove them to the other table. At the time of his accident the elevating chain which was next to him had stopped running. While so at work, from some unexplained cause, his foot slipped, was caught in the sprocket, and was injured.V. W. James and Losey & Woodward, for appellant.

Doolittle & Shoemaker, for respondent.

NEWMAN, J. (after stating the facts).

Many errors in the record are claimed. The more important and decisive will be considered. There was a special verdict. The defendant requested the submission, in the verdict, of certain questions which it proposed in writing. Among these proposed questions were the following: “(4) Was the injury sustainedby the plaintiff the result of being placed to work in the place and manner in which he was put to work, which the defendant might have reasonably expected might probably occur?” “(10) Was the plaintiff injured by the want of ordinary care on the part of the defendant, which was the direct cause of said injuries?” “(13) Was the injury sustained by the plaintiff the result of mere accident?” These questions, in effect, would require the jury to find whether the negligence of the defendant, if such was found, was also the proximate cause of the plaintiff's accident. It is well settled that negligence alone does not make the defendant liable. The defendant is liable only when its negligence is found to be the cause of the accident. And this negligence is the proximate cause only when it is of such character as that men of ordinary prudence, judgment, and experience ought, reasonably, in the light of the attending circumstances, to have foreseen such an accident as likely to occur. And unless this question of proximate cause is fairly and substantially answered by the special verdict, no judgment can be given on it. Atkinson v. Transportation Co., 60 Wis. 141, 161, 18 N. W. 764;Guinard v. Knapp, Stout & Co. Company, 90 Wis. 123, 62 N. W. 625;McGowan v. Railway Co. (Wis.) 64 N. W. 891;Deisenrieter v. Malting Co. (Wis.) 66 N. W. 112. This question of proximate cause is one of fact. It is the resultant fact or inference which is to be found from the testimony. It is the sum of all the testimony bearing on that point. It is familiar that, except in a clear case, this fact or inference is to be found by the jury. It is not considered that in this case the proper inference from the testimony was so plain as that the court might properly draw it. It was thought--at least by the defendant--that there was sufficient testimony to require the case to be submitted on all questions to the jury. While it was agreed at the bar, on the question of the plaintiff's contributory negligence, that there was little in the situation, considering the slow movement of the machinery involved, to suggest to the mind of the plaintiff that such an accident was probable, this same consideration would be entitled to some weight, it would seem, on the question whether the defendant ought...