Klein v. Catalano

• Citation: 437 N.E.2d 514,386 Mass. 701
• Parties: Gary KLEIN v. Eduardo F. CATALANO et al. 1
• Decision Date: 07 July 1982
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts

Page 514

437 N.E.2d 514

386 Mass. 701

Gary KLEIN v. Eduardo F. CATALANO et al. ¹

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts,

Middlesex.

Argued March 1, 1982.

Decided July 7, 1982.

Ileene M. Lieberman, Boston, for plaintiff.

Cynthia J. Cohen, Boston (Robert M. Hacking, Boston, with her), for defendants.

Thomas J. Wynn and Edward J. Smith, Boston, for Mass. Bar Assn., amicus curiae, submitted a brief.

Carl M. Sapers and Robert G. Dreher, Boston, for Mass. State Ass'n of Architects, amicus curiae, submitted a brief.

Before HENNESSEY, C. J., and WILKINS, ABRAMS, NOLAN and O'CONNOR, JJ.

ABRAMS, Justice.

This case raises the issue of the application and constitutionality of G.L. c. 260, § 2B, ² a statute that places a time limit on the liability of architects and contractors. General Laws c. 260, § 2B, is not a statute of limitations but a statute of repose. A statute of limitations normally governs the time within which legal proceedings must be commenced after the cause of action accrues. See, e.g., Franklin v. Albert, 381 Mass. 611, --- - ---, Mass.Adv.Sh. (1980) 2187, 2194-2195, 411 N.E.2d 458. A statute of repose, however, limits the time within which an action may be brought and is not related to the accrual of any cause of action. The injury need not have occurred, much less have been discovered. See, e.g., Rosenberg v. North Bergen, 61 N.J. 190, 199-200, 293 A.2d 662 (1972). As a statute of repose, G.L. c. 260, § 2B, precludes recovery against those within the protection of the statute for any injury which occurs more than six years after the performance or furnishing of the design, planning, construction, or general administration of an improvement to real property. Simply put, after six years, the statute completely eliminates a cause of action against certain persons in the construction industry. ³

Since G.L. c. 260, § 2B, abolishes a cause of action in tort, the following issues arise: (1) whether G.L. c. 260, § 2B, may be applied to work completed prior to its effective date, and if so, whether the application of G.L. c. 260, § 2B, in those circumstances violates the due process guarantees of the United States or Massachusetts Constitutions; (2) whether, on its face, G.L. c. 260, § 2B, violates the equal protection and due process guarantees of the Federal or State Constitutions and the right to a remedy by recourse to the laws guaranteed by the Massachusetts Constitution; and (3) whether G.L. c. 260, § 2B, may bar a claim alleging breach of express or implied warranties.

We hold that the Legislature intended that G.L. c. 260, § 2B, apply to claims involving work completed before the statute took effect. We also believe that the application of G.L. c. 260, § 2B, in these circumstances is consistent with the due process guarantees of the Massachusetts and United States Constitutions. In addition, we think that, on its face, G.L. c. 260, § 2B, does not violate the due process and equal protection guarantees of the State and Federal Constitutions and the right to a remedy by recourse to the laws guaranteed by the Massachusetts Constitution. Finally, we conclude that G.L. c. 260, § 2B, bars the plaintiff's warranty claims, because in this case, the elements of these claims are identical to this claim of negligence.

We summarize the facts. In February, 1963, the defendant, Eduardo F. Catalano, agreed to design a student center on the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (M. I. T.) campus. Catalano completed and delivered all design drawings and other documents in July, 1963. By October, 1965, M. I. T. accepted and occupied the building. After September, 1967, Catalano did not perform any additional services in connection with the student center. In July, 1968, the Legislature enacted G.L. c. 260, § 2B, as appearing in St.1968, c. 612, to be effective October, 1968.

The plaintiff, Gary Klein, claims that he was injured on April 23, 1976, while leaving the Harvard Cooperative Society "Tech Coop" located in the student center. The injuries allegedly occurred when the outer door struck him and caused the plate glass panels of the door to shatter. The glass allegedly cut and damaged the nerves in his hand.

In February, 1979, the plaintiff commenced this action against Catalano individually and Eduardo F. Catalano Architects and Engineers, Inc. (Architects and Engineers), claiming negligence on the part of both Catalano and Architects and Engineers, and breach of express and implied warranties by Architects and Engineers. Prior to trial, the defendants filed motions for summary judgment claiming that G.L. c. 260, § 2B, barred the plaintiff's claims. ⁴ See Mass.R.Civ.P. 56(b), 365 Mass. 824 (1974). In support of their motions, the defendants filed three exhibits: the plaintiff's complaint, Catalano's agreement with M. I. T., and Catalano's affidavit stating that Architects and Engineers never performed any services in connection with the "Tech Coop." After a hearing, a judge of the Superior Court allowed the defendants' motions based on G.L. c. 260, § 2B. Pursuant to Mass.R.Civ.P. 54(b), 365 Mass. 820 (1974), another judge ordered the entry of final judgment for the defendants. The plaintiff appeals.

1. Application of G.L. c. 260, § 2B, to torts arising out of work in connection with improvements to real property completed prior to the statute's effective date.

a. Statutory argument. The plaintiff claims that the judge erred in granting the defendants' motions for summary judgment because the Legislature did not intend that G.L. c. 260, § 2B, apply to work in connection with improvements to real property completed prior to the statute's effective date. We disagree.

Elementary rules of statutory construction require us to look to the statutory language itself as the principal source of insight into the legislative purpose. Hoffman v. Howmedica, Inc., 373 Mass. 32, 37, 364 N.E.2d 1215 (1977). We construe the words of the statute according to their "usual and natural meaning." Commonwealth v. Gove, 366 Mass. 351, 354, 320 N.E.2d 900 (1974). Commonwealth v. Thomas, 359 Mass. 386, 387, 269 N.E.2d 277 (1971).

General Laws c. 260, § 2B, as amended by St.1973, c. 777, § 2, provides that "[a]ctions of tort for damages arising out of any deficiency or neglect in the design, planning, construction or general administration of an improvement to real property shall be commenced only within three years next after the cause of action accrues; provided, however, that in no event shall such actions be commenced more than six years after the performance or furnishing of such design, planning, construction or general administration." The statute does not depend on the date of the improvement to real property but depends on the time the design, planning, construction, or general administration of the improvement to real property was furnished. We hold that G.L. c. 260, § 2B, applies to this action, although the defendants completed their work before the statute took effect.

b. Constitutional argument. The plaintiff claims that the judge erred in granting the defendants' motions for summary judgment, because application of the statute to work completed prior to the statute's effective date violates the due process guarantees of the United States and Massachusetts Constitutions. In making this argument, the plaintiff assumes that the application of G.L. c. 260, § 2B, in those circumstances is retroactive. We do not agree with the plaintiff's assumption that the application of the statute is retroactive.

"It is only where vested substantive rights of the parties have been adversely affected that we can say a statute operates retroactively, and it is only then that we need analyze the nature of the governmental interest involved in order to determine whether the statute, as applied, violates due process." McCarthy v. Sheriff of Suffolk County, 366 Mass. 779, 781, 322 N.E.2d 758 (1975). There is a "distinction between a cause of action which has accrued and the expectation which every citizen has if a legal wrong should occur to find redress according to the rules of statutory and common law applicable at that time.... '[N]o person has a vested interest in any rule of law entitling him to insist that it shall remain unchanged for his benefit.' New York Cent. R. R. v. White, 243 U.S. 188, 198, 37 S.Ct. 247, 250, 61 L.Ed. 667 [1917]. Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 134, 24 L.Ed. 77 [1876]." Pinnick v. Cleary, 360 Mass. 1, 10-11, 271 N.E.2d 592 (1971).

In this case, the plaintiff's cause of action accrued when he was injured on April 23, 1976, almost eight years after the statute's effective date. Thus, any application of the statute in this case does not adversely affect any vested substantive rights of the plaintiff. The application of G.L. c. 260, § 2B, in these circumstances does not violate the due process guarantees of the United States and Massachusetts Constitutions.

2. Facial Validity of G.L. c. 260, § 2B.

The plaintiff claims that the judge erred in granting the defendants' motions for summary judgment because G.L. c. 260, § 2B, violates the due process and equal protection guarantees of the United States and Massachusetts Constitutions and the right to a remedy by recourse to the laws guaranteed by the Massachusetts Constitution. ⁵ We disagree a. Standard of review. We note at the outset that the plaintiff has a "heavy burden in seeking to overcome the statute's presumption of constitutionality. See El Paso v. Simmons, 379 U.S. 497, 508-509, 85 S.Ct. 577, 583-584, 13 L.Ed.2d 446 (1965). 'Every rational presumption is indulged in favor of the validity of an act of the General Court. Enforcement of such legislative enactment will not be refused unless its conflict with some provision of the Constitution is established beyond reasonable doubt.' " American Manufacturers Mut. Ins. Co. v. Commissioner of Ins., 374 Mass. 181, 190, 372 N.E.2d 520 (1978), quoting Campbell v. Boston, 290 Mass. 427, 429, ...