Klein v. Children's Hospital Medical Center

• Decision Date: 20 June 1996
• Docket Number: No. A072286,A072286
• Citation: 46 Cal.App.4th 889,54 Cal.Rptr.2d 34
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: , 96 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 4509, 96 Daily Journal D.A.R. 7261 Joel KLEIN et al, Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. CHILDREN'S HOSPITAL MEDICAL CENTER OF NORTHERN CALIFORNIA et al., Defendants and Respondents.

Page 34

54 Cal.Rptr.2d 34

46 Cal.App.4th 889, 96 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 4509,

96 Daily Journal D.A.R. 7261

Joel KLEIN et al, Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. CHILDREN'S HOSPITAL MEDICAL CENTER OF NORTHERN CALIFORNIA et al., Defendants and Respondents.

No. A072286.

Court of Appeal, First District, Division 5, California.

June 20, 1996.

Steel, Clarence & Buckley Thomas Steel, Esq. Kate Dyer, Esq., San Francisco, for appellants.

Craddick, Candland & Conti, Judy S. Craddick, Esq., Phillip J. Maddux, Esq., Jean L. Perry, Esq., Danville, for Children's Hosp. Medical Center of Northern California.

Anderson, Galloway & Lucchese, G. Patrick Galloway, Esq., Karen A. Sparks, Esq., Walnut Creek, for Dr. Mouied Alashari and Dr. Roger A. Williams.

HANING, Associate Justice.

Plaintiffs and appellants Joel and Cynthia Klein appeal the dismissal of their action for negligent infliction of emotional distress (NIED) against defendants and respondents Children's Hospital Medical Center of Northern California (CHMC), Dr. Mouied Alashari and Dr. Roger A. Williams, after respondents' demurrers were sustained without leave to amend. We affirm.

BACKGROUND

Since this appeal is taken from a judgment of dismissal after demurrers to appellants' complaint were sustained without leave to amend, established principles of appellate review require that we must accept all material facts properly pleaded as true (Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318, 216 Cal.Rptr. 718, 703 P.2d 58), that appellants' ability to prove their allegations is not a factor for our consideration, and that appellants need only plead facts showing they may be entitled to some form of relief (Alcorn v. Anbro Engineering, Inc. (1970) 2 Cal.3d 493, 496, 86 Cal.Rptr. 88, 468 P.2d 216).

This action arises from the alleged misdiagnosis of appellants' daughter, Paula. ¹ On March 2, 1994, six-year-old Paula was admitted At some unspecified time after communicating the incorrect diagnosis to appellants, respondents "sought authorization for treatment decisions" from them. Appellants gave authorization for unnecessary treatment, accompanied Paula to her medical treatments, and were "made aware of [her] highly negative prognosis." As a result of respondents' negligence, appellants suffered severe emotional distress.

                to CHMC for diagnosis of possible cancer.  On March 3, 1994, respondents negligently misdiagnosed Paula as suffering from Ewing's Sarcoma, "a deadly form of bone cancer with an extremely poor prognosis...."  At that time respondents knew or should have known that Paula did not have Ewing's Sarcoma. 2  Paula remained in respondents' care until May 1994 when she was transferred to University of California San Francisco Medical Center for treatment
                

The trial court ruled that appellants could not state a cause of action for NIED, and on that ground sustained respondents' demurrers without leave to amend.

DISCUSSION

I

The right to recover damages for NIED is still evolving in California, manifested by differences of opinion among the Courts of Appeal (see, e.g., Bro v. Glaser (1994) 22 Cal.App.4th 1398, 27 Cal.Rptr.2d 894 and Mercado v. Leong (1996) 43 Cal.App.4th 317, 50 Cal.Rptr.2d 569), causing our Supreme Court to continue to explain or revise its earlier decisions (Burgess v. Superior Court (1992) 2 Cal.4th 1064, 1074, 9 Cal.Rptr.2d 615, 831 P.2d 1197 (Burgess ) [clarifying Molien v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals (1980) 27 Cal.3d 916, 167 Cal.Rptr. 831, 616 P.2d 813 (Molien ) ]; Huggins v. Longs Drug Stores California, Inc. (1993) 6 Cal.4th 124, 130, 24 Cal.Rptr.2d 587, 862 P.2d 148 (Huggins ) [further clarification of Molien ]; Thing v. La Chusa (1989) 48 Cal.3d 644, 668, 257 Cal.Rptr. 865, 771 P.2d 814 (Thing ) [clarifying Dillon v. Legg (1968) 68 Cal.2d 728, 69 Cal.Rptr. 72, 441 P.2d 912 (Dillon ) and rejecting dicta in Ochoa v. Superior Court (1985) 39 Cal.3d 159, 216 Cal.Rptr. 661, 703 P.2d 1] ).

Negligent infliction of emotional distress is not an independent tort in California, but is regarded simply as the tort of negligence. (Burgess, supra, 2 Cal.4th at p. 1072, 9 Cal.Rptr.2d 615, 831 P.2d 1197; Christensen v. Superior Court (Pasadena Crematorium of Altadena et al.) (1991) 54 Cal.3d 868, 884, 2 Cal.Rptr.2d 79, 820 P.2d 181; Marlene F. v. Affiliated Psychiatric Medical Clinic, Inc. (1989) 48 Cal.3d 583, 588, 257 Cal.Rptr. 98, 770 P.2d 278 (Marlene F.).) Whether plaintiffs can recover damages for NIED is dependent upon traditional tort analysis, and the elements of duty, breach of duty, causation and damages must exist to support the cause of action. (Burgess, supra, 2 Cal.4th at p. 1072, 9 Cal.Rptr.2d 615, 831 P.2d 1197; Huggins, supra, 6 Cal.4th at p. 129, 24 Cal.Rptr.2d 587, 862 P.2d 148.)

NIED claims to date fall generally into three categories: "exposure" claims, "bystander" claims and "direct victim" claims.

"Exposure" cases are typified by Potter v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. (1993) 6 Cal.4th 965, 25 Cal.Rptr.2d 550, 863 P.2d 795, wherein plaintiffs who have not suffered any physical injury claim emotional distress from fear of contracting a disease because of their exposure thereto due to the defendant's misconduct. In such cases plaintiffs cannot recover unless they demonstrate that it is more likely than not they will contract the disease.

"Bystander" claims involve emotional distress caused by witnessing an injury to another, as occurred in Dillon and Thing, and are limited to close family members. (Thing, supra, 48 Cal.3d at pp. 667-668, 257 Cal.Rptr. 865, 771 P.2d 814.)

The "direct victim" label is a misnomer, since it literally describes all plaintiffs who have been injured from the breach of a duty owed them by another. The term originated with Molien which held that a hospital and a physician it employed owed a duty to the husband of a patient who had been misdiagnosed In the instant case appellants are asserting claims as direct victims arising from the negligent misdiagnosis of their young child, as they were erroneously told their daughter was likely to die from a cancerous condition which in fact did not exist. As a result, they subjected her to a heroic course of treatment in the attempt to forestall her death, thereby causing her further injury as a result of the unnecessary treatment. It is clearly foreseeable that parents may suffer severe emotional distress under such circumstances. However, whether respondents' alleged negligence permits appellants to recover damages for their resulting emotional distress is dependent upon the traditional tort analysis of duty, breach of duty, causation and damages, in which foreseeability assumes a minor role. (Burgess, supra, 2 Cal.4th at pp. 1072-1074, 9 Cal.Rptr.2d 615, 831 P.2d 1197; Huggins, supra, 6 Cal.4th at pp. 129-130, 24 Cal.Rptr.2d 587, 862 P.2d 148.)

                by the physician as having syphilis, and had been told to advise her husband so he could obtain testing and, if necessary, treatment.  The Molien court reasoned that because the risk of harm to the husband was reasonably foreseeable and the physician's negligence was directed at both the husband and the wife, the husband was a "direct victim."  (Molien, supra, 27 Cal.3d at pp. 922-923, 167 Cal.Rptr. 831, 616 P.2d 813.)   Subsequently, the Supreme Court clarified that " '[F]oreseeability ... alone is not a useful "guideline" or a meaningful restriction on the scope of [an action for [NIED].]' [Citation.]  [p] ... [A] cause of action to recover damages for negligently inflicted emotional [46 Cal.App.4th 895] distress will lie, notwithstanding the criteria imposed upon recovery by bystanders, in cases where a duty arising from a preexisting relationship is negligently breached.  [Citations.]  In fact, it is this later principle which defines the phrase 'direct victim.'   That label signifies nothing more."  (Burgess, supra, 2 Cal.4th at p. 1074, 9 Cal.Rptr.2d 615, 831 P.2d 1197.)   In a still later case the court stated that the duty in Molien arose because the doctor directed his patient, the wife, to tell the plaintiff husband of the diagnosis, not because the doctor's misdiagnosis " 'necessarily involved [the husband] directly.' "  (Huggins, supra, 6 Cal.4th at p. 130, 24 Cal.Rptr.2d 587, 862 P.2d 148.)
                

The existence of a duty is a question of law, and that duty must be one that the defendant has assumed, has been imposed upon the defendant as a matter of law, or arises out of the defendant's preexisting relationship with the plaintiff. (Huggins, supra, 6 Cal.4th at pp. 129-130, 24 Cal.Rptr.2d 587, 862 P.2d 148; Marlene F., supra, 48 Cal.3d at p. 590, 257 Cal.Rptr. 98, 770 P.2d 278.)

Appellants contend that because the diagnosis was directed at them there was a preexisting relationship between them and respondents from which respondents' duty of care to them arose. Their position is supported by a number of Court of Appeal decisions involving medical malpractice, some of which they cite, but all of which predate the most recent Supreme Court decisions on the subject. (E.g., Schwarz v. Regents of University of California (1990) 226 Cal.App.3d 149, 276 Cal.Rptr. 470 (Schwarz ); Accounts Adjustment Bureau v. Cooperman (1984) 158 Cal.App.3d 844, 204 Cal.Rptr. 881 (Cooperman ); Newton v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals (1986) 184 Cal.App.3d 386, 228 Cal.Rptr. 890; Andalon v. Superior Court (1984) 162 Cal.App.3d 600, 208 Cal.Rptr. 899.)

In Marlene F., supra, 48 Cal.3d 583, 257 Cal.Rptr. 98, 770 P.2d 278 two mothers who were engaged in joint therapy with their sons for family emotional problems were permitted to seek recovery for emotional distress from the therapist upon discovering his sexual molestation of their children. In Burgess, supra, 2 Cal.4th 1064, 9 Cal.Rptr.2d 615, 831 P.2d 1197 a mother was allowed to proceed with her NIED action against an obstetrician and a hospital when her child was injured due to oxygen deprivation during birth. In both cases the plaintiffs were regarded as patients, thus supporting a...