Klinke v. Mitsubishi Motors Corp.
| Decision Date | 15 October 1996 |
| Docket Number | 183206 and 183208,Docket Nos. 168384 |
| Citation | 219 Mich.App. 500,556 N.W.2d 528 |
| Parties | , Prod.Liab.Rep. (CCH) P 14,830 James E. KLINKE, Personal Representative for the Estate of Kimberly Marie Klinke, Deceased Plaintiff-Appellee, v. MITSUBISHI MOTORS CORPORATION, Defendant-Appellant. James E. KLINKE, Personal Representative for the Estate of Kimberly Marie Klinke, Deceased Plaintiff-Appellee, Cross-Appellant, v. CHRYSLER CORPORATION and John Colone Chrysler-Plymouth-Dodge, Inc., Defendants, and Mitsubishi Motors Corporation, Defendant-Appellant/Cross-Appellee. James E. Klinke, Personal Representative for the Estate of Kimberly Marie Klinke, Deceased, Plaintiff-Appellee, Chrysler Corporation and John Colone Chrysler-Plymouth-Dodge, Inc., Defendants-Appellants, and Mitsubishi Motors Corporation, Defendant. |
| Court | Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US |
Shaner & Olsen, P.C. by R. Stephen Olsen, V. Carl Shaner, and Robert John Daly, Ann Arbor, for James E. Klinke.
Dykema Gossett PLLC by Craig L. John and Mary E. Royce, Bloomfield Hills, for Mitsubishi Motors Corporation.
John P. Raleigh and Susan L. Barnowski, Berkley, amici curiae for Product Liability Advisory Council, Inc.
Clark, Klein & Beaumont by Dwight H. Vincent and J. Walker Henry, Detroit, amici curiae for Michigan Manufacturers Association.
Lee R. Franklin, Richard E. Shaw, and Jeffrey T. Meyers, Detroit, amici curiae for Michigan Trial Lawyers Association.
Before McDONALD, P.J., and MARKMAN and C.W. JOHNSON, * JJ.
This products liability and wrongful death action was tried to a jury in 1992. In Docket No. 168384, Mitsubishi Motors Corporation (defendant) appeals as of right a judgment for plaintiff in the amount of $4,848,000. We affirm the judgment and reverse and remand for redetermination of damages to account for the jury's finding that plaintiff's decedent was ninety percent comparatively negligent. In Docket No. 183206, defendant appeals as of right and plaintiff cross appeals an order awarding costs to plaintiff pursuant to MCR 2.403(O) and MCR 2.625. We reverse and remand for assessment of plaintiff's taxable costs pursuant to MCR 2.625 only. In Docket No. 183208, Chrysler Corporation and John Colone Chrysler-Plymouth-Dodge, Inc (Colone), appeal as of right an order denying their motion for costs pursuant to MCR 2.625. We reverse and remand.
This matter arises out of a one-car rollover accident that occurred in 1988. The decedent purchased the car at issue, a Dodge Colt, about two months before the accident. At the time of the accident, it had been driven approximately 6,300 miles. An eyewitness to the accident testified that he saw the car's left front tire "buckle out" at a forty-five-degree angle and that the car "lurch[ed] violently" to the left, proceeded onto the median and flipped over several times before coming to rest in the median. He testified that there was nothing in the roadway that could have caused the accident. Plaintiff's experts testified that the left front steering knuckle was defective and that a fracture of the steering knuckle caused the accident. At the time of the accident, the decedent was wearing only the lap portion of her seat belt; the shoulder harness portion was found behind her back after the accident.
Plaintiff's complaint alleged negligence, breach of implied warranty, and breach of express warranty in connection with the design, manufacture, and warnings regarding the vehicle, its left front suspension system, and its seat belt system. Plaintiff abandoned the claims with respect to the seat belt system. The trial court granted defendants' motion for a directed verdict regarding the design defect and failure to warn claims at the close of defendants' case. The jury found no cause of action against Chrysler and Colone. It returned a verdict of $5,104,000 on the basis that defendant negligently manufactured the vehicle. The jury also found the decedent ninety percent comparatively negligent for failing to wear her seat belt shoulder harness. The trial court did not reduce the verdict by ninety percent because of the decedent's comparative negligence but by five percent pursuant to the mandatory seat belt usage provision of the Vehicle Code, M.C.L. § 257.710e(6); M.S.A. § 9.2410(5)(6). Thus, the net award to plaintiff was $4,848,000.
The main issue on appeal is the effect of the decedent's comparative negligence on the damage award. Two statutes arguably apply. M.C.L. § 600.2949(1); M.S.A. § 27A.2949(1) 1 provided:
In all products liability actions brought to recover damages resulting from death or injury to person or property, the fact that the plaintiff may have been guilty of contributory negligence shall not bar a recovery by the plaintiff or the plaintiff's legal representatives, but damages sustained by the plaintiff shall be diminished in proportion to the amount of negligence attributed to the plaintiff.
M.C.L. § 257.710e(6); M.S.A. § 9.2410(5)(6) provides:
Failure to wear a safety belt in violation of this section may be considered evidence of negligence and may reduce the recovery for damages arising out of the ownership, maintenance, or operation of a motor vehicle. However, such negligence shall not reduce the recovery for damages by more than 5%.
Defendant claims that the verdict should have been reduced ninety percent pursuant to § 2949. It contends that § 710e is inapplicable to products liability actions because such actions do not arise out of the "ownership, maintenance, or operation of a motor vehicle." Whether § 710e applies to products liability actions is a question of law. This Court reviews questions of law de novo. Vicencio v. Ramirez, 211 Mich.App. 501, 503, 536 N.W.2d 280 (1995).
In the context of the no-fault act, the Michigan Supreme Court and this Court have interpreted the applicability of similar language to products liability actions. In Citizens Ins Co of America v. Tuttle, 411 Mich. 536, 544, 309 N.W.2d 174 (1981), the Court considered M.C.L. § 500.3135(2); M.S.A. § 24.13135(2), which abolished "tort liability arising out of the ownership, maintenance, or use within this state of a motor vehicle." It held 411 Mich. at 545, 309 N.W.2d 174:
Only persons who own, maintain or use motor vehicles can be subject to tort liability for injuries or damage caused by the ownership, maintenance or use of a motor vehicle. The non-motorist tortfeasor cannot be subject to tort liability for injuries or damage caused by the ownership, maintenance or use of a motor vehicle.
It cited with approval the comment to § 5 of the Uniform Motor Vehicle Accident Reparations Act 411 Mich. at 546, 309 N.W.2d 174:
[T]he only tort actions which are abolished are those which arise from the defendant's ownership, maintenance, or use of a motor vehicle. Among the potential tort actions thus retained by an automobile accident victim would be those against an automobile manufacturer for products liability or against a railroad in the case of an automobile-train collision.
In Ryan v. Ford Motor Co., 141 Mich.App. 762, 768, 368 N.W.2d 266 (1985), which involved the interplay of worker's compensation benefits and no-fault benefits with respect to settlement of a products liability action, this Court stated:
In the case at bar, the Ryans settled their products liability action against the vehicle manufacturer and dealership. These defendants were non-motorist tortfeasors whose liability did not arise from their ownership, maintenance or use of a motor vehicle. Tuttle, supra.
See also Placek v. Sterling Heights, 405 Mich. 638, 654, n. 7, 275 N.W.2d 511 (1979); Turner v. Auto Club Ins. Ass'n., 448 Mich. 22, 31, 528 N.W.2d 681 (1995). These authorities clearly indicate that a products liability action is not an action "arising out of the ownership, maintenance, or operation of a motor vehicle" under § 710e.
Defendant cites LaHue v. General Motors Corp., 716 F.Supp. 407 (W.D.Mo.1989), a design defect products liability action arising out of an automobile accident in which the plaintiff was not wearing a seat belt. The LaHue court considered the applicability of a Missouri statute that provided:
In any action to recover damages arising out of the ownership, common maintenance or operation of a motor vehicle, failure to wear a safety belt in violation of this section shall not be considered evidence of comparative negligence. Failure to wear a safety belt in violation of this section may be admitted to mitigate damages, but only under the following circumstances:
(1) Parties seeking to introduce [such] evidence ... must first introduce expert evidence proving that a failure to wear a safety belt contributed to the injuries claimed by the plaintiff.
(2) If the evidence supports such a finding, the trier of fact ... may reduce the amount of the plaintiff's recovery by an amount not to exceed one percent of the damages awarded after any reductions for comparative negligence. [LaHue, at 410-411.]
In [this statute,] the legislature established that the evidence of failure to use seat belts could not be used (except under certain circumstances to mitigate damages) "[i]n any action to recover damages arising out of the ownership, common maintenance or operation of a motor vehicle." (emphasis added) [sic]
Conspicuously absent is any reference to the design or construction of a motor vehicle. Even the most liberal interpretation of the words "ownership," "common maintenance" and "operation" cannot stretch far enough to include design and construction. The plain meaning of the statute compels a conclusion that it was not intended to prevent evidence of failure to use seat belts in a products liability case.
The absence of a restriction on such evidence in products liability cases cannot be presumed to be an oversight. Before the statute was enacted,...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Guerrero v. Smith
...We review for an abuse of discretion the trial court's ruling on a motion to tax costs under MCR 2.625. Klinke v. Mitsubishi Motors Corp., 219 Mich.App. 500, 518, 556 N.W.2d 528 (1996). However, whether a particular expense is taxable as a cost is a question of law. We review questions of l......
-
Angott v. Chubb Group Ins.
...award. "The determination whether a party is a `prevailing party' under MCR 2.625 is a question of law." Klinke v. Mitsubishi Motors Corp., 219 Mich.App. 500, 521, 556 N.W.2d 528 (1996), aff'd 458 Mich. 582, 581 N.W.2d 272 MCR 2.625(A)(1) provides: Costs will be allowed to the prevailing pa......
-
Mann v. ST. CLAIR CTY. RD. COMM.
...under the vehicle code. Defendant's position would be supported by the Court of Appeals decision in Klinke v. Mitsubishi Motors Corp., 219 Mich.App. at 500, 509, 556 N.W.2d 528 (1996), where this Court stated that a products liability action against an automobile manufacturer does not arise......
-
Braunberger v. Interstate Engineering, Inc.
...1432 (10th Cir. 1996); Turnbow v. K.E. Enterprises, Inc., 155 Or.App. 59, 962 P.2d 764, 769 (1998); Klinke v. Mitsubishi Motors Corp., et al., 219 Mich.App. 500, 556 N.W.2d 528, 539 (1996); First Southwestern Financial Services v. Sessions, 875 P.2d 553, 554 (Utah 1994). Cf. Chenery v. Agri......