Mann v. ST. CLAIR CTY. RD. COMM.
Decision Date | 20 February 2003 |
Docket Number | Docket No. 226443. |
Citation | 657 N.W.2d 517,254 Mich. App. 86 |
Parties | Patrick MANN, Sr., and Gaye Mann, Individually and as Next Friend of Patrick Mann, Jr., Minor, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. ST. CLAIR COUNTY ROAD COMMISSION, Defendant-Appellant. |
Court | Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US |
Moss & Colella, P.C. (by David M. Moss) (Sommers, Schwartz, Silver & Schwartz, P.C., by Patrick Burkett, of counsel), Southfield, Southfield, for the plaintiffs.
Smith, Haughey, Rice & Roegge (by Jon D. Vander Ploeg) and Highland & Zanetti, P.C. (by R. Michael John), Grand Rapids, Southfield, for the defendant.
Before: HOOD, P.J., and MURPHY and MARKEY, JJ.
Defendant St. Clair County Road Commission appeals by leave granted the trial court's order denying defendant's motion in limine to preclude application of the five percent damage reduction cap authorized by M.C.L. § 257.710e(6)1 in circumstances where the injured parties were allegedly not wearing safety belts at the time of the accident. We affirm.
Under the controlling language of Klinke v. Mitsubishi Motors Corp., 458 Mich. 582, 581 N.W.2d 272 (1998), and principles governing analysis of issues under the Title-Object Clause, Const. 1963, art. 4, § 24, any comparative negligence of plaintiffs, if established at trial, is subject to application of the statutory five percent damage reduction cap.2 In this action involving the alleged liability of defendant road commission under the highway exception to governmental immunity, M.C.L. § 691.1402,3 application of the cap under subsection 710e(6) does not violate the Michigan Constitution's Title-Object Clause.
Plaintiffs4 allege that Patrick Mann, Sr., and Patrick Mann, Jr., suffered various injuries after their vehicle "slipped" off the edge of the roadway and onto the shoulder. Plaintiffs represent that Mann, Sr., had difficulty returning the vehicle to the roadway because of a "significant shoulder drop-off." As a consequence, Mann, Sr., lost control of the vehicle and it eventually collided with a tree on the side of the roadway. Thereafter, plaintiffs filed an action against defendant, alleging in part that defendant's negligent maintenance of the shoulder of the roadway proximately caused plaintiffs' injuries.
Defendant filed an affirmative defense alleging plaintiffs' comparative negligence based on their failure to wear safety belts.5 Defendant moved in limine for a ruling that the statutory provision, M.C.L. § 257.710e(6), does not apply in this highway liability case. The circuit court disagreed, ruling that the statutory cap of five percent applies and declining to extend the rationale of Klinke, supra. Defendant's interlocutory application for leave to appeal was granted, and the circuit court has stayed the trial pending a decision from this Court.
On appeal, defendant argues that the trial court erred in concluding that the five percent statutory cap on the reduction of damages for failure to wear safety belts applies to a claim against a road commission for failure to maintain a roadway in reasonable repair. We disagree.
This case turns on the interpretation of the safety belt law,6 Klinke, and the Title-Object Clause, Const. 1963, art. 4, § 24. Some perspective on the history of the "seat belt defense" is helpful.7
For years, an injured party's failure to mitigate or eliminate the risk of injury by using safety belts was not considered a valid defense under the common law. Hierta v. Gen. Motors Corp., 147 Mich.App. 274, 278-280, 382 N.W.2d 765 (1985), remanded for reconsideration on other grounds 429 Mich. 887, 416 N.W.2d 313 (1987); Schmitzer v. Misener-Bennett Ford, Inc., 135 Mich.App. 350, 359-360, 354 N.W.2d 336 (1984); Romankewiz v. Black, 16 Mich.App. 119, 127, 167 N.W.2d 606 (1969). At the time, the law in Michigan did not require a driver or passengers to use safety belts, so the court declined to impose such a duty and create a common-law seat belt defense. Id. at 127, 167 N.W.2d 606.
In 1984, the federal Department of Transportation announced that passive restraint systems (such as air bags) would be required beginning with 1990 model year vehicles unless states representing two-thirds of the nation's population enacted and enforced mandatory safety belt laws. Senate Analysis, SB 6, January 15, 1985; Casenotes: Lowe v. Estate Motors Ltd.— The Michigan Supreme Court Says Yes to the Seat Belt Defense, 5 Cooley L. R. 159, 163 (1988); 49 Fed. Reg. 28962 (July 17, 1984).
In response, the Legislature in 1985 enacted M.C.L. § 257.710e(3) to generally require the use of safety belts. In another subsection, M.C.L. § 257. 710e(6), the Legislature allowed defendants to use a seat belt defense as evidence of negligence, but the Legislature capped the amount of comparative negligence to five percent.8 Thus, for the first time, defendants could argue that a plaintiff's failure to use safety belts contributed to the plaintiff's injuries, but this failure to mitigate could result in a reduction of the recovery by no more than five percent. At the time, any defense for failure to use safety belts was legislatively created. If the statutory defense were not applied, a defendant would be deprived of any seat belt defense whatsoever. The purpose for the five percent cap was "to protect plaintiffs against [a] drastic reduction in damage awards." Thompson v. Fitzpatrick, 199 Mich.App. 5, 8, 501 N.W.2d 172 (1991).
Shortly after these statutes were adopted, the Supreme Court decided to create a common-law seat belt defense as well. Lowe v. Estate Motors Ltd., 428 Mich. 439, 410 N.W.2d 706 (1987) ( ). This was occasioned at least in part by the abolition of contributory negligence9 in favor of the less harsh system of comparative negligence. Id. at 459-460, 410 N.W.2d 706 (Riley, C.J.). The effect of Lowe is that the five percent cap can be increased under the common law if the statute does not apply. Thus, if the statutory cap does not apply, a defendant would be free to seek a more substantial deduction for a plaintiff's comparative negligence for failing to wear safety belts.
The Supreme Court in Lowe addressed the possible effect of the safety belt statute on comparative negligence and reduction of damages even though the parties had not briefed the issue. Id. at 485, 410 N.W.2d 706 (Levin, J., dissenting). In section V of Chief Justice Riley's separate opinion, she wrote:
Before addressing the second issue, we pause to acknowledge the recent enactment of the mandatory seat belt usage legislation, M.C.L. § 257.710e; MSA 9.2410(5), and to respond to the positions expressed in the dissenting opinions as they relate to that legislation. That statute, which took effect on July 1, 1985, requires drivers and front-seat passengers of motor vehicles operated in this state to wear seat belts, making the failure to use them unlawful. Section five provides, furthermore, that failure to use a seat belt in violation of the statute may be considered evidence of negligence, also providing that such negligence shall not reduce a plaintiff's recovery by more than five percent. The statutory seat belt usage requirement and its accompanying provisions are inapplicable in the instant case because: (1) the accident occurred prior to the statute's effective date, (2) plaintiff was a rear-seat passenger to whom the statute, by its terms, would not have applied, and (3) the accident occurred beyond the territorial boundaries of this state where it would not have been contrary to this statute for any passenger not to have used a seat belt. [Id. at 462-463, 410 N.W.2d 706.]
This section of the opinion received four votes. See id. at 476, 410 N.W.2d 706. Although Lowe was a products liability case, the Supreme Court did not include a violation of the Title-Object Clause in its list of reasons the safety belt statute would not apply. Nonetheless, because this section of the opinion was dicta, it did not bind the Supreme Court in Klinke.
In 1998, the Supreme Court considered the case of Klinke, in which an automobile manufacturer argued that it was not bound by the five percent cap in a products liability case. Klinke, supra at 589, 581 N.W.2d 272. In a plurality decision, the Supreme Court agreed with the manufacturer's position.
The Supreme Court wrote three opinions. The lead opinion, written by Justice Weaver and joined by Justice Taylor, interpreted the state constitution's Title-Object Clause to mean that the vehicle code's safety belt section did not affect the civil liability of manufacturers. Id. at 590-591, 581 N.W.2d 272. The title of the vehicle code stated that it was in part an act "to provide for civil liability of owners and operators of vehicles...."10 The title could not be used to extend civil liability to manufacturers not mentioned in the title. Klinke, supra at 589-591, 581 N.W.2d 272.
Justice Boyle penned the second opinion, joined by Chief Justice Mallett and Justice Brickley. In it, she wrote that the terms of art used in M.C.L. § 257.710e(6)—namely, its statement that it applies in cases "`arising out of the ownership, maintenance, or operation of a motor vehicle'"—tracked the language of the no-fault act and showed a legislative intent to apply the statute only to no-fault cases. Klinke, supra at 594, 581 N.W.2d 272. Justice Boyle also agreed with Justice Weaver's position regarding the Title-Object Clause:
However, the Vehicle Code, designed to regulate the liability of "owners and operators of vehicles,"11 was not intended to regulate the liability of a manufacturer in a products liability action by subjecting the manufacturer to liability for an owner's or...
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