LaHue v. General Motors Corp., 88-5063-CV-SW-1.

• Decision Date: 05 July 1989
• Docket Number: No. 88-5063-CV-SW-1.,88-5063-CV-SW-1.
• Citation: 716 F. Supp. 407
• Parties: Michelle Renee LaHUE, John LaHue and Sharon LaHue, Plaintiffs, v. GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of Missouri

716 F. Supp. 407

Michelle Renee LaHUE, John LaHue and Sharon LaHue, Plaintiffs, v. GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION, Defendant.

No. 88-5063-CV-SW-1.

United States District Court, W.D. Missouri, Southwestern Division.

July 5, 1989.

Erwin Milne, Stockard, Andereck, Jefferson City, for plaintiffs.

Rod Loomer, Turner, Reid, Duncan, Springfield, for defendant.

ORDER

WHIPPLE, District Judge.

Four motions are pending in this matter. Defendant filed a motion on April 10, 1989, for leave to file a first amended answer to the first amended complaint. Plaintiffs filed a motion on April 14, 1989, to strike part of the defendant's original answer to the first amended complaint. Plaintiffs' motion, filed May 4, 1989, to compel answers to interrogatories and to compel production of documents was the topic of a telephone conference on June 14, 1989, wherein the parties announced resolutions of most of the matters. Ruling on that motion will be deferred until the parties designate which issues remain for court intervention. Finally, defendant's motion to continue the trial date was granted orally at the conference. A trial order will issue accordingly, setting a pretrial conference for 1:00 p.m., August 4, 1989, and trial at 9:00 a.m., September 7, 1989, both in Springfield, Missouri. For the reasons set forth below, the motion to strike will be granted in part and denied in part, and the motion to file a first amended complaint will be granted in part and denied in part.

I. The Motions

Plaintiffs allege damages arising from an automobile accident involving a car manufactured by defendant. Plaintiffs claim the damages are due to defective design of the car seats. The motions concern paragraphs 14-16 of the defendant's answer, and paragraphs 14-18 of defendant's proposed amended answer to first amended complaint. The disputed parts of the answer are:

14. For further answer, Defendant avers that Plaintiff, Michelle LaHue, was chargeable with fault which contributed to cause or did, in fact, cause the damages referred to in her First Amended Complaint; avers that such contributory fault consisted of negligence on the part of said Plaintiff in the operation of her vehicle which she then was driving; and avers that such fault of said Plaintiff was in the following manner and particulars, to-wit:

(a) She drove at an excessive speed;

(b) She failed to yield the right-of-way;

(c) She failed to drive on the right side of the road.

15. For further answer, Defendant avers that Plaintiff, Michelle LaHue, is chargeable with fault which contributed to cause or did cause the damages referred to in her First Amended Complaint; and avers that such contributory fault consisted of her failure to wear a seat belt at the time of the occurrence.

16. For further answer, Defendant avers that, by reason of the foregoing, if (contrary to Defendant's contention) Defendant should be found to have been partially at fault for causing any of Plaintiffs' damages, the percentage of Plaintiff Michelle LaHue's said contributory fault should be determined, and the total amount of Plaintiffs' damages should be diminished proportionately by the percentage of the contributory fault of Plaintiff, Michelle LaHue.

Paragraph 14 of the answer is the same as Paragraph 14 of the proposed first amended answer to the first amended complaint. The other disputed parts of the proposed answer are:

15. For further answer, Defendant avers that any damages referred to in Plaintiffs' First Amended Complaint were avoidable consequences, and that Plaintiff, Michelle LaHue, failed to mitigate her damages by failing to wear her seat belt.

16. For further answer, Defendant avers that Plaintiff, Michelle LaHue, is chargeable with fault which contributed to cause or did cause the damages referred to in her First Amended Complaint, and avers that such fault of said Plaintiff was in the following manner and particulars, to-wit:

(a) She failed to wear a seat belt at the time of the occurrence;

(b) She failed to use the product as reasonably anticipated by the manufacturer;

(c) She misused the product by failing to wear her seat belt;

(d) She failed to undertake the precautions a reasonably careful user of the product would take to protect herself against dangers which she would reasonably appreciate under the same or similar circumstances.

17. For further answer, Defendant avers that, by reason of the foregoing, if (contrary to Defendant's contention) Defendant should be found to have been partially at fault for causing any of Plaintiffs' damages, the percentage of Plaintiff, Michelle LaHue's said contributory fault should be determined, and the total amount of Plaintiffs' damages should be diminished proportionately by the percentage of contributory fault of Plaintiff, Michelle LaHue.

18. For further answer, Defendant avers that Plaintiff, LaHue, voluntarily and unreasonably exposed herself to any alleged danger by failing to wear her seat belt and that such conduct caused or directly contributed to cause any damage that Michelle LaHue may have sustained.

Plaintiffs argue that this lawsuit is a products liability matter and, therefore, defendant cannot plead or offer evidence concerning its proposed theories of contributory negligence, contributory fault, avoidance of consequences, mitigation of damages, assumption of risk, product misuse and comparative fault. Plaintiffs further argue that Mo.Rev.Stat. § 307.178.3 (1985) precludes admission of evidence concerning failure to wear a seat belt. Plaintiffs argue alternatively that, if such evidence is admissible, the admission concerns only mitigation of damages and the damages can be reduced only by one percent of the amount awarded.

Defendant argues that Missouri law permits the defenses of assumption of risk, contributory negligence and product misuse in products liability cases. Defendant further argues that the mitigation-of-damages/avoidable-consequences theory is permitted where all or part of the injury results from failure to use a seat belt. Defendant argues that the Missouri statute does not apply to "crashworthiness" cases¹. Finally, defendant argues that the statute violates the equal-protection, due-process, and jury-trial clauses of the constitutions of the United States and Missouri.

II. Statement of Facts

According to the allegations in the complaint, Michelle LaHue, a minor, was driving a 1980 Buick Century about 10:30 p.m., January 9, 1987, in Stone County, Missouri, when it collided with another vehicle. She was thrown rapidly into the back seat, suffering numerous and substantial permanent and progressive injuries. She also incurred expenses and loss of future earnings capacity. The other two plaintiffs are her parents. Plaintiffs allege the damages are due to defective seat design.

III. Discussion

A. Introduction

In this diversity action involving an accident occurring in Missouri, the law of that state as enunciated by Missouri courts controls. Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 58 S.Ct. 817, 82 L.Ed. 1188 (1938). The parties do not dispute that Missouri law controls, but there is considerable disagreement about what the law is. A similar problem arose in Sours v. General Motors Corp., 717 F.2d 1511 (6th Cir.1983), when it discussed Roberts v. Bohn, 26 Ohio App.2d 50, 269 N.E.2d 53 (1971), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Suchy v. Moore, 29 Ohio St.2d 99, 279 N.E.2d 878 (1972). In Roberts, evidence of failure to use a seat belt was held inadmissible. The court said in Sours, 717 F.2d at 1520-1521:

* * * * * *

Roberts was decided in 1971. Since then the law on the admissibility of seat belt evidence has been in a state of flux. The policy implications of the various rules have been roundly debated, with a resulting patchwork-quilt of state law on the issue. In some states, such evidence is wholly inadmissible, on the theory that automakers must design a vehicle that is safe for those who, foreseeably, will not wear seat belts. In others, the policy of encouraging seat belt use has led to approval of the seat belt defense under either a contributory negligence or mitigation of damages rationale. Under the circumstances it is possible that the Ohio Supreme Court, if the question were properly presented, might adopt a rule different from that of Roberts ... Thus we find ourselves in the somewhat unenviable position of attempting to anticipate a ruling of the Ohio Supreme Court in an important area of state law.

Our attempt to predict the Ohio Supreme Court's position on the seat belt defense is complicated further by the peculiarly legislative nature of the issue. The penalties to be attached to seat belt non-use are uniquely amenable to resolution by the state legislature. Indeed a number of other state courts have left to their legislatures the determination of the evidentiary effect of a plaintiff's failure to wear a seat belt. In light of the nature of the undertaking and the contrasting developments in other jurisdictions, any decision we might reach concerning this delicate balance of policy interests might not pass muster by the Ohio Supreme Court. We hesitate to announce a decision, unless absolutely required to do so, in an important area of state law where there is no sure guidance from the state courts.

Fortunately, we need not resort to tea leaves or to judicial tarot cards — or to a bold substitution of our own views for those of the Ohio Supreme Court — to resolve the issue of admissibility of the seat belt evidence in the instant case. We hold that, regardless of whether the evidence should have been admitted, its exclusion, if error at all, was harmless. * * *

(footnotes and citations omitted)

This court is less fortunate and in a more unenviable position than the Sours court because it is absolutely required in this instance to make a decision. Enough has been written about the "seat-belt defense" to show the body of law related to it is split, fragmented and changing. It varies in...