Knapp v. Evgeros, Inc.

• Decision Date: 09 September 2016
• Docket Number: 15 C 754
• Citation: 205 F.Supp.3d 946
• Parties: Kitty KNAPP, Plaintiff, v. EVGEROS, INC., d/b/a Olympic Star Restaurant, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois

205 F.Supp.3d 946

Kitty KNAPP, Plaintiff,

v.EVGEROS, INC., d/b/a Olympic Star Restaurant, Defendant.

15 C 754

United States District Court, N.D. Illinois, Eastern Division.

Signed September 9, 2016

Jason R. Craddock, Sr., Law Office of Jason R. Craddock, Chicago, IL, for Plaintiff.

Frank John Andreou, Brittni Wynser King, Courtney Elizabeth Lindbert, Andreou & Casson, Ltd., Chicago, IL, for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Gary Feinerman, United States District Judge

Kitty Knapp filed this suit against her former employer, Evgeros, Inc., in Illinois state court, alleging violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq. , the Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA"), 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq. , and the Illinois Human Rights Act ("IHRA"), 775 ILCS § 5/1–101 et seq. Doc. 1-1. Evgeros removed the suit to federal court. Doc. 1. Now before the court are Evgeros's motion for summary judgment, Doc. 57; Evgeros's motion to strike certain exhibits that Knapp submitted in response to the summary judgment motion, Doc. 80; Knapp's motion for leave to file instanter a response to Evgeros's motion to strike, Doc. 90; and Knapp's motion for leave to file instanter an amended response to the summary judgment motion, an amended Local Rule 56.1(b)(3)(B) response to Evgeros's Local 56.1(a)(3) statement, and an amended Local Rule 56.1(b)(3)(C) statement, Doc. 86. Knapp's motion for leave to file instanter amended summary judgment responses is denied, Evgeros's summary judgment motion is granted, Evgeros's motion to strike is denied as moot, and Knapp's motion for leave to file instanter a response to the motion to strike is denied as moot as well.

Background

A. Knapp's Motions for Leave to File Instanter and Evgeros's Motion to Strike

Evgeros moved for summary judgment on March 31, 2016, and the court set a briefing schedule requiring Knapp to respond by May 13, 2016. Docs. 57, 61. At 11:57 p.m. on May 13, Knapp moved for an extension of time to file her summary judgment response. Doc. 64. The court granted the extension and set a new briefing schedule requiring Knapp to respond by June 3, 2016, but it warned that she would "receive no further extensions absent extraordinary circumstances." Doc. 66.

June 3 came around, but instead of filing her response, Knapp again moved for an extension—this time at 11:53 p.m. Doc. 67. Again, the court granted the motion, pushing Knapp's deadline back to June 6, 2016, and again it warned that she would "receive no further extensions absent extraordinary circumstances." Doc. 69. Knapp missed the June 6 deadline as well, but this time waited until June 9 even to ask for her third extension. Doc. 72. Even so, the court granted the extension and set yet another briefing schedule, this time requiring Knapp to respond by June 14, 2016, and requiring Evgeros to reply by June 28, 2016. Doc. 74. The court also warned Knapp that "[n]o further extensions for the response papers will be granted." Ibid.

Knapp filed her summary judgment response on June 14, including a brief opposing summary judgment, a Local Rule 56.1(b)(3)(B) response to Evgeros's Local Rule 56.1(a)(3) statement, and a Local Rule 56.1(b)(3)(C) statement. Docs. 75-76. Those filings were defective in various ways. For one, Knapp's Local Rule 56.1(b)(3)(C) statement at times cited whole deposition transcripts without specifying page or line numbers. Doc. 75 at 3-4 ¶ 13; see Packer v. Trs. of Ind. Univ. Sch. of Med. , 800 F.3d 843, 850 (7th Cir.2015) ("It is not the court's role or obligation to read an entire deposition or affidavit in an effort to locate the particular testimony a party might be relying on; the court ought to know what portion of a witness's testimony the party is invoking so that it can focus its attention on that testimony and assess whether it is admissible and actually supports the fact or inference for which it is cited."); Ammons v. Aramark Uniform Servs., Inc. , 368 F.3d 809, 817–18 (7th Cir.2004) (affirming the district court's decision to disregard Local Rule 56.1 responses on the ground that they "cited an entire deposition transcript rather than specific page references"). Knapp also attached materials that her papers did not cite at all, and her brief contained no citations to the record, to her Local Rule 56.1(b)(3)(B) response, or to her Local Rule 56.1(b)(3)(C) statement. Docs. 76, 79.

The court held a hearing on June 23, 2016, five days before Evgeros's summary judgment reply was due. Evgeros had moved to strike five exhibits attached to Knapp's response. Doc. 80. The court entered and continued that motion, noting:

I know the defendant's probably thinking, well, how can I reply [in support of the summary judgment motion] when I don't know whether these exhibits are going to be stricken. And my answer to you is this: There's no need to address exhibits that are not referenced in either the brief, the plaintiff's 56.1(b)(3)(B) response to your 56.1(a)(3) statement, or in the plaintiff's 56.1(b)(3)(C) statement of additional facts.

And I'll go further by saying that unless there's a page number to a deposition that is referenced in any of those papers, you don't have to respond to anything having to do with that deposition. So, if it just says "Smith deposition," no pages, you don't have to respond to that. Because it's a party's obligation—and the Seventh Circuit has been clear time and again on this—it's a party's obligation to not just cite an entire deposition transcript and make the other party and the judge page through the whole deposition transcript, you actually have to cite page numbers. So, you don't have to respond to anything—any of the matters that I've just referenced.

On June 28, 2016, the day that Evgeros's reply was due, Knapp filed two documents purporting to be "corrected" versions of her summary judgment response brief, Local Rule 56.1(b)(3)(B) response, and Local Rule 56.1(b)(3)(C) statement. Docs. 83-84. The court immediately struck both filings on the ground that they were untimely and that Knapp had filed them without seeking leave of the court. Doc. 85. Later that day, Knapp moved for leave to file instanter the same two documents. Doc. 86. That motion is now before the court.

It is best to consider Knapp's motion for leave to file instanter amended summary judgment response papers as a request for another extension of time to file her summary judgment responses. See Keeton v. Morningstar, Inc. , 667 F.3d 877, 883 (7th Cir.2012) (treating a late motion for leave to file instanter a summary judgment response as a motion to extend the deadline for filing the response). Rule 6(b)(1)(B) provides that when a party moves to extend a deadline that has already passed, the court should deny the motion unless the movant can show that her failure to meet the deadline was the result of "excusable neglect." Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(b)(1)(B) ; see Hassebrock v. Bernhoft , 815 F.3d 334, 341 (7th Cir.2016) (" Rule 6 provides that when a request for extension of time is made after an expired deadline, ‘the court may, for good cause, extend the time ... if the party failed to act because of excusable neglect.’ "). The determination whether a party's neglect is excusable is "at bottom an equitable one, taking account of all relevant circumstances surrounding the party's omission." Pioneer Inv. Servs. Co. v. Brunswick Assocs. L.P. , 507 U.S. 380, 395, 113 S.Ct. 1489, 123 L.Ed.2d 74 (1993) (interpreting a parallel provision of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure); see also Flint v. City of Belvidere , 791 F.3d 764, 768 (7th Cir.2015) (applying Pioneer 's definition of "excusable neglect" to Civil Rule 6(b)(1)(B) ); Global Tech. & Trading, Inc. v. Tech Mahindra Ltd. , 789 F.3d 730, 732 (7th Cir.2015) (same); Raymond v. Ameritech Corp. , 442 F.3d 600, 606 (7th Cir.2006) ("We have held that Pioneer applies whenever ‘excusable neglect’ appears in the federal procedural rules."). Relevant circumstances include "the danger of prejudice to the [non-movant], the length of the delay and its potential impact on judicial proceedings, the reason for the delay, including whether it was within the reasonable control of the movant, and whether the movant acted in good faith." Pioneer , 507 U.S. at 395, 113 S.Ct. 1489 ; see also Peters v. Wal – Mart Stores E., LP , 512 Fed.Appx. 622, 628 (7th Cir.2013) ; Raymond , 442 F.3d at 606. The "[m]ost important" of those factors is "the reason for the delay"; if the moving party fails to demonstrate "genuine ambiguity or confusion about the scope or application of the rules or some other good reason for missing the deadline," she cannot establish excusable neglect, regardless of how short the delay was or how little it prejudiced the opposing party. Satkar Hospitality, Inc. v. Fox Television Holdings , 767 F.3d 701, 707 (7th Cir.2014). A party is "accountable for the acts and omissions of [her] attorneys." Pioneer , 507 U.S. at 396–97, 113 S.Ct. 1489 ; see also Moje v. Fed. Hockey League, LLC , 792 F.3d 756, 758 (7th Cir.2015) ("[A] lawyer's errors are imputed to the client for the purpose of [excusable neglect].").

Knapp has not shown that her delay was the result of excusable neglect; her motion states only that her attorney, Jason Craddock, "noticed" various errors in the original response papers. Doc. 86 at ¶¶ 2-4. That Craddock simply took too long to notice the mistakes in her original filings is a weak enough excuse by itself, but it is actually no excuse at all given that the court identified the mistakes in open court, with Craddock present, on June 23, five days earlier. Yet instead of taking immediate action on June 23 or perhaps the next day, Knapp waited a full five days to clean up the mess, until the very day Evgeros was to file its reply. Because Knapp has not demonstrated any "genuine ambiguity or confusion about the scope or application of the rules" or any "other good reason for missing the deadline," she cannot establish...