Knapp v. Miller
| Decision Date | 14 June 1990 |
| Docket Number | CA-CV,No. 1,1 |
| Citation | 799 P.2d 868,165 Ariz. 527 |
| Parties | John L. KNAPP, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Charles L. MILLER, Director, Arizona Department of Transportation; Lee A. Prins, Division Director, Arizona Department of Transportation; Arizona Department of Transportation and the Attorney General, State of Arizona, Real Parties in Interest, Respondents-Appellees. 89-083. |
| Court | Arizona Court of Appeals |
Petitioner-appellant John L. Knapp ("Knapp") appeals from a judgment affirming an administrative order suspending Knapp's driver's license pursuant to A.R.S. § 28-694. We affirm the judgment.
At approximately 5:30 p.m. on February 19, 1988, Knapp was involved in a minor automobile accident in Phoenix, Arizona. When Officer Wilson of the Department of Public Safety arrived at the accident scene fifteen minutes later, the Phoenix police officers at the scene told Wilson that they thought they had smelled alcohol on Knapp's breath. During conversation with Knapp, Wilson detected a moderate smell of alcohol on Knapp's breath. Knapp admitted to Wilson that he had drunk "a couple of beers" earlier in the afternoon.
Because of Knapp's admission, the smell of alcohol on his breath, and the accident, Wilson asked Knapp to perform standard field sobriety tests. Wilson concluded that Knapp failed the tests and placed Knapp under arrest for driving under the influence pursuant to A.R.S. § 28-692.A. 1
Wilson then transported Knapp to the police station. At 7:56 p.m., more than two hours after the accident, Knapp took a breath test, which indicated that his blood alcohol concentration (BAC) was 0.10. Pursuant to A.R.S. § 28-694.A, 2 Wilson required Knapp to surrender his driver's license and issued him a temporary driving permit. Wilson served the statutorily required order of suspension on Knapp, effective within 15 days after the date of service. Knapp immediately exercised his right under section 28-694.C to request an administrative hearing to challenge his license suspension. 3
At the administrative hearing, Gary Carmack, Knapp's expert witness, testified that Knapp's BAC at the time he was driving on the day of his arrest would have been approximately 0.08. Mr. Carmack also testified that the breathalizer used to test Knapp has an inherent error of plus or minus 0.01. The Department of Transportation did not dispute this testimony. The hearing officer found that Knapp's BAC at the time of the test was 0.10 or more and sustained the order suspending Knapp's driver's license.
Knapp filed a superior court action seeking review of the administrative decision. See A.R.S. § 12-901 et seq. The trial court found the administrative decision supported by competent evidence, rejected Knapp's argument that section 28-694 is unconstitutional, and affirmed the administrative decision.
Knapp filed a timely appeal in this court. We have jurisdiction pursuant to A.R.S. §§ 12-120.21.A and -2101.B.
In this appeal, Knapp argues that section 28-694 violates the United States Constitution's guarantees of substantive due process, procedural due process, and equal protection of the law. U.S. Const.Amend. XIV. A strong presumption favors the constitutionality of a legislative enactment. We will not declare invalid a legislative enactment unless we are satisfied that the enactment conflicts with the state or federal constitution. See Chevron Chemical Co. v. Superior Court, 131 Ariz. 431, 438, 641 P.2d 1275, 1282 (1982); State v. Book-Cellar, Inc., 139 Ariz. 525, 528, 679 P.2d 548, 551 (App.1984).
Knapp's challenge to section 28-694 centers upon the statutory requirement that, before the Department of Transportation may suspend the license of a driver arrested under section 28-692, the criminal drunk driving statute, the results of the driver's blood or breath alcohol test must indicate a BAC of 0.10 or more. See A.R.S. § 28-694.A and E. Knapp urges us to interpret section 28-694 to permit license suspension only if the driver's BAC was at least 0.10 at the time of driving rather than at the time of the test. Such an interpretation, Knapp argues, would make section 28-694 consistent with section 28-692.
The Arizona Supreme Court recently rejected that argument and construed section 28-694 to permit administrative suspension of a driver's license when a driver's BAC at the time of the test is 0.10 or more, "without regard to a projected reading at the time of driving." State v. Nance, 165 Ariz. 286, 289, 798 P.2d 1295, 1298 (Ariz.Sup.Ct.1990). The court distinguished section 28-694 from section 28-692, which requires "relation back" evidence, finding persuasive the fact that the legislature omitted section 28-692's "at the time of the alleged offense" language from section 28-694. Id. at 288-289, 798 P.2d at 1297-1298; see Desmond v. Superior Court, 161 Ariz. 522, 779 P.2d 1261 (1989). Under section 28-694, then, a driver's BAC at the time of the test, rather than his BAC at the time he was driving, is the determinative factor in suspension proceedings.
Knapp contends, however, that if the Department of Transportation can suspend a license as the result of a driver's BAC at the time of a test administered after driving ends, the statute lacks a rational basis. Whatever may be the relationship between a driver's BAC while he is driving and the state's interest in deterring drunk driving, Knapp argues, no reasonable relationship exists between a driver's BAC at the time of a test and the state's interest in deterring drunk driving.
To comply with due process requirements, a statute must be reasonably related to a legitimate state interest. Baseline Liquors v. Circle K Corp., 129 Ariz. 215, 218, 630 P.2d 38, 41 (App.1981), cert. denied, Skaggs Drugs Centers v. Baseline Liquors, 454 U.S. 969, 102 S.Ct. 515, 70 L.Ed.2d 387 (1981). If a statute could serve any purpose related to public health, safety, or welfare, we will not question the wisdom of the legislature. State v. McI nelly,, 146 Ariz. 161, 163, 704 P.2d 291, 293 (App.1985).
The legislature's purpose in enacting section 28-694 was to provide an expeditious procedure for removing drunk drivers from the roads. Ariz. H.R. 38th Leg., 1st Sess., Judiciary Comm. 3/9/87; Nance, 165 Ariz. at 288, 798 P.2d at 1297. That purpose is related to the state's compelling interest in removing alcohol-impaired drivers from the roads because they pose a clear threat to the safety of the public. See Hinson v. Coulter, 150 Ariz. 306, 310, 723 P.2d 655, 659 (1986); Fuenning v. Superior Court of the State of Arizona, 139 Ariz. 590 at 595, 680 P.2d 121 at 126 (1983). The terrible carnage on our highways caused the legislature to adopt "[s]tringent laws ... designed to end the lethal combination of alcohol and automobile." Fuenning, 139 Ariz. at 595, 680 P.2d at 126.
The legislature could reasonably conclude that a driver who registers a BAC of 0.10 at the time of a test administered after the driver's arrest for a section 28-692 violation presents sufficient danger to the public to justify license suspension, subject to the protection provided by the hearing procedure. 4 See Nance, 165 Ariz. 289, 798 P.2d at 1298; see also Fuenning, 139 Ariz. at 595, 680 P.2d at 126 (). We therefore conclude that section 28-694 is reasonably related to the legislative end of removing people who drink and drive from the roads. 5
Knapp next argues that the statute is void for vagueness. A statute is void for vagueness if it fails to give a person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know what is prohibited so that he may act accordingly. See Fuenning, 139 Ariz. at 598, 680 P.2d at 129. Knapp contends that a person of ordinary intelligence cannot anticipate the point in time after arrest when a police officer will administer a breath test and therefore cannot act to avoid violating section 28-694.
In Fuenning, our supreme court rejected a similar challenge to the constitutionality of section 28-692. The court concluded that, although a particular drinker may not know the precise moment when his BAC becomes 0.10, that fact does not invalidate the statute. 6 The court stated:
Those who drink a substantial amount of alcohol within a relatively short period of time are given clear warning that to avoid possible criminal behavior they must refrain from driving.
Id. at 598, 680 P.2d at 129. Because due process does not require perfect notice, absolute precision, or impossible standards, a statute that gives fair notice of the conduct to be avoided is not void for vagueness "simply because it may be difficult for the public to determine how far they can go before they are in actual violation." Id. Assuming that one has a right to drive and a right to drink, the court concluded that the statute does not prohibit driving. It does not prohibit drinking. It prohibits drinking and driving. We know of no constitutional right to drink and drive; we recognize no right to ingest a substantial amount of alcohol and then drive. If, therefore, this statute inhibits and "chills" the mixture of alcohol and gasoline, it will fulfill the precise objective sought by the legislature. We think such a goal is salutary, and that it is permitted by the constitution.
The reasoning of Fuenning is equally persuasive here. Section 28-694 clearly gives notice that a driver faces suspension of driving privileges if he drinks enough alcohol before or while driving to later register a 0.10 BAC. Simply because the driver cannot predict whether his BAC will be...
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