Knauf Fiber Glass, GmbH v. State Bd. of Tax Com'rs, 49T10-9303-TA-00016
| Decision Date | 25 February 1994 |
| Docket Number | No. 49T10-9303-TA-00016,49T10-9303-TA-00016 |
| Citation | 629 N.E.2d 959 |
| Parties | KNAUF FIBER GLASS, GmbH, Petitioner, v. STATE BOARD OF TAX COMMISSIONERS, Respondent. |
| Court | Indiana Tax Court |
Robert T. Thopy, McNeely, Sanders, Stephenson & Thopy, Shelbyville, for petitioner.
Pamela Carter, Atty. Gen. of Indiana and Ted J. Holaday, Deputy Atty. Gen., Indianapolis, for respondent.
The Petitioner, Knauf Fiber Glass, GmbH (Knauf), appeals the final determination of the Respondent, the State Board of Tax Commissioners (the State Board), denying in part Knauf's claim for an Economic Revitalization Area (ERA) deduction for 1992.
Whether Knauf is entitled to an ERA deduction for manufacturing equipment installed in its facility before the area was declared an ERA.
Knauf manufactures fiber glass insulation products in its Shelbyville, Indiana facility. Between March 1 and September 9, 1991, Knauf installed manufacturing equipment (the equipment in question) in its facility at a cost of $1,063,477.
On September 9, 1991, the Shelbyville Common Council (the Council) declared the area in which Knauf operates an ERA. At the same time, the Council waived Knauf's requirement to file the statement of benefits form required under IND.CODE 6-1.1-12.1-4.5. Knauf had, however, filed the statement of benefits form with the Council that day. 1
In June 1992, Knauf filed an application for an ERA deduction from assessed valuation of the equipment in question. The State Board denied the deduction because the area was not designated an ERA before the equipment in question was installed. The matter is now before the court on Knauf's motion for summary judgment. Additional facts will be supplied as necessary.
A motion for "[s]ummary judgment may be granted only when there is no genuine issue of material fact and a party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Horizon Bancorp v. Indiana Dep't of State Revenue (1993), Ind.Tax, 626 N.E.2d 603, 605 (citing Harlan Sprague Dawley, Inc. v. Indiana Dep't of State Revenue (1992), Ind.Tax, 605 N.E.2d 1222, 1224). See also Ind.Trial Rule 56. Either the movant or the non-movant may be granted summary judgment. C & C Oil Co. v. Indiana Dep't of State Revenue (1991), Ind.Tax, 570 N.E.2d 1376, 1378 (citing Indianapolis Pub. Transp. Corp. v. Indiana If there is no genuine issue of material fact, the court's task is to apply the law to the undisputed facts. See SFN Shareholders v. Indiana Dep't of State Revenue (1992), Ind.Tax, 603 N.E.2d 194, 196-197. Cases, like the case at bar, which call on the court to construe statutes are particularly amenable to resolution by summary judgment. Bulkmatic Transp. Co. v. Indiana Dep't of State Revenue (1994), Ind.Tax, 629 N.E.2d 955, 956-957 (citing Faris Mailing, Inc. v. Indiana Dep't of State Revenue (1990), Ind.Tax, 557 N.E.2d 713, 715).
Dep't of State Revenue (1987), Ind.Tax, 512 N.E.2d 906, 907, aff'd (1990), Ind., 550 N.E.2d 1277). The evidence presented in a summary judgment case will be viewed in the light most favorable to the non-movant. Horizon, 626 N.E.2d at 604-05 (citing C & C Oil, 570 N.E.2d at 1379)
Knauf seeks a deduction for "new manufacturing equipment" located in an ERA. IC 6-1.1-12.1-4.5(d). An ERA is
an area which ... has become undesirable for, or impossible of, normal development and occupancy because of a lack of development, cessation of growth, deterioration of improvements or character of occupancy, age, obsolescence, substandard buildings, or other factors which have impaired values or prevent a normal development of property or use of property.
IND.CODE 6-1.1-12.1-1(1). When Knauf applied for the ERA deduction, "new manufacturing equipment" was defined as: any tangible personal property which:
(A) was ... installed during the period beginning March 1, 1983, and ending December 31, 1991, in an area that is declared an economic revitalization area after February 28, 1983, in which a deduction for tangible personal property is allowed ...
IC 6-1.1-12.1-1(3). The parties' dispute centers on the interpretation of this statute.
Knauf argues IC 6-1.1-12.1-1(3) establishes a two prong test to qualify for the ERA deduction: (1) "new manufacturing equipment" be installed between March 1, 1983, and December 31, 1991; (2) in an area declared an ERA sometime after February 28, 1983. Knauf installed its new manufacturing equipment between March 1983 and December 1991, and the area in which Knauf operates was designated an ERA after February 28, 1983. Thus, Knauf maintains, it met both prongs of the test and qualified for the deduction. The State Board counters, however, that the area must be designated an ERA before the equipment is installed and that, consequently, Knauf is ineligible for an ERA deduction because its area was not designated an ERA until after the equipment in question was installed. The State Board is correct.
"[T]he court's foremost goal in construing statutes is to ascertain the legislature's true intent." Universal Group Ltd. v. Indiana Dept. of State Revenue (1993), Ind.Tax, 609 N.E.2d 48, 56 (). As a result, the court will give "statutory words and phrases their plain, ordinary, and usual meaning ..." Kenny Kent Chevrolet Co. v. Indiana Dep't of State Revenue (1994), Ind.Tax, 627 N.E.2d 890, 893 (citing Fort Wayne Nat'l Corp. v. Indiana Dep't of State Revenue (1993), Ind.Tax, 621 N.E.2d 668, 671). Furthermore, statutes must be read within the context of the entire act of which they are a part, thereby giving full effect to all words and clauses. Maurer v. Indiana Dep't of State Revenue (1993), Ind.Tax, 607 N.E.2d 985, 987 (citing Harlan Sprague Dawley, 605 N.E.2d at 1225). When construed in light of the other...
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