Knight v. Allen
| Decision Date | 29 June 1959 |
| Docket Number | No. 17548,17548 |
| Citation | 234 S.C. 559,109 S.E.2d 585 |
| Parties | H. Paul KNIGHT, Appellant, v. J. Ed ALLEN, County Supervisor, and J. Rufus Craig, Joe A. Adkins, Malcolm G. Rogers, Sam Clinton and William T. Sherer, Jr., together constituting the County Board of Directors of York County, Respondents. |
| Court | South Carolina Supreme Court |
Nolen L. Brunson, Rock Hill, for appellant.
John M. Spratt, York, Huger Sinkler, Charleston, for respondents.
This is an appeal from a judgment refusing an injunction against the proposed issuance of $1,000,000 general obligation bonds of York County pursuant to an act of the General Assembly, approved March 25, 1959, entitled, 'An Act to empower the County Supervisor and the County Board of Directors of York County to issue not exceeding one million dollars of general obligation bonds of York County to provide further hospital facilities in said County if the election herein required shall result favorably, to prescribe the conditions under which said bonds shall be issued and to make provision for their payment.'
The county was, of course, subject to the bonded debt limitation of eight per cent of the assessed value of the taxable property therein which is contained in Article X, Section 5, of the Constitution of 1895. However, that section was amended in 1927 with respect to York County by the addition of the following, which is found at page 285 of Volume 7 of the Code of 1952:
'Provided, That the limitation herein provided as to the amount of bonded debt of any county shall not apply to the Couty of York, when the proceeds of such bonds are to be used for highway and bridge construction, in which case it shall never exceed eighteen per cent of the assessed value of all taxable property in said county.'
The present bonded debt status of the county is disclosed by the following which is taken from the record for appeal:
The assessed value of all taxable property in the County is $27,909,181.
Eight per cent of that figure is approximately $2,232,000.
Eighteen per cent is approximately $5,022,000.
The aggregate bonded debt (exclusive of sinking funds) is $3,930,000.
The bonded debt incurred for the purposes of highway and bridge construction is $2,955,000.
The bonded debt incurred for other purposes is $975,000.
If the $1,000,000 of bonds authorized for hospital purposes are issued, the aggregate bonded debt for all purposes will be $4,930,000.
Under such conditions, the bonded debt for purposes other than highway and bridge construction will be $1,975,000, which is less than eight per cent of the assessed value of the taxable property.
The contention of appellant is that the bonded debt of the County can never exceed the original eight per cent as provided in Article X, Section 5, before amendment, unless such bonded debt be incurred for highway and bridge construction. The lower court was, and we are, of the opinion that such was not the intention of the constitutional amendment; but that it was intended that bonds for highway and bridge construction might be issued within the eighteen per cent limit, without impairment of the right to issue bonds for other county purposes to the original limitation of eight per cent. Surely any contrary intention would have been expressed.
All of the many amendments to this section of the constitution have been for the purpose of enlarging, not reducing, the original debt limits and it would be unreasonable to assume that it was intended by the York amendment to deprive the county to any extent of its original limit of eight per cent for purposes other than highways and bridges. Our conclusion is that the constitution, as amended, provides two bonded debt limitations for York County--one of eight per cent...
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...bonds which are subject to the debt limit. See City of Truth or Consequences v. Robinson, 58 N.M. 111, 266 P.2d 356; Knight v. Allen, 1959, 234 S.C. 559, 109 S.E.2d 585; Iron Products Inv. Co. v. City of Picher, Oklahoma, 10 Cir., 83 F.2d 443, and cases cited; cf., Austin v. Snodgrass, 209 ......
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...court has consistently given a broad interpretation to the language used in order to effect the legislative intent. Knight v. Allen, 234 S.C. 559, 109 S.E.2d 585 (1959). In the case of Knight v. Hollings, 242 S.C. 1, 129 S.E.2d 746 (1963), the court stated '* * * a constitutional provision ......
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