Knight v. Baptist Hosp. of Miami, Inc.

• Decision Date: 14 May 2003
• Docket Number: No. 02-10861.,02-10861.
• Citation: 330 F.3d 1313
• Parties: Alma KNIGHT, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. BAPTIST HOSPITAL OF MIAMI, INC., a Florida corporation, Defendant-Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eleventh Circuit

330 F.3d 1313

Alma KNIGHT, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. BAPTIST HOSPITAL OF MIAMI, INC., a Florida corporation, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 02-10861.

United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit.

May 14, 2003.

Stuart A. Rosenfeldt, Michael Anthony Pancier, Shawn L. Birken, Rothstein, Rosenfeldt, Dolin & Pancier, P.A., Fort Lauderdale, FL, for Plaintiff-Appellant.

Robert T. Kofman, Susan J. Toepfer, Stearns, Weaver, Miller, Weissler, Alhadeff & Sitterson, P.A., Miami, FL, for Defendant-Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida.

Before EDMONDSON, Chief Judge, ANDERSON, Circuit Judge, and POGUE^*, Judge.

PER CURIAM:

In this Title VII racial discrimination case, Alma Knight appeals the district court's grant of summary judgment to her former employer, Baptist Hospital of Miami, Inc. (Baptist). The district court concluded that Knight failed to establish a prima facie case. We affirm.

BACKGROUND

In May 1996, Knight, an African-American female, was hired by Baptist to work as a clinical nurse in the surgical services department. She worked as a Charge Nurse and had various responsibilities. Knight was supervised by Isabel Hotchkiss (Nurse Manager) and Jessy Theisen (Assistant Nurse Manager). Hotchkiss and Theisen were supervised by Michele Ryder the Assistant Director of Surgical Services. Knight claims that Ryder often treated her with intolerance, unfairness, and a lack of objectivity. Knight was employed by Baptist until her termination on 23 May 2000.

Baptist utilizes a 4-step disciplinary process: (1) "informal discussion and agreement," (2) "discussion and formal written agreement," (3) "decision-making leave," and (4) termination. Decision-making leave is a paid day of suspension for the employee to decide whether they want to continue working for Baptist. During decision-making leave, the employee is required to draft and to submit an "action plan" that proposes a solution to the noted deficiencies. If no "action plan" is submitted the employee must either resign or face termination.

Knight was given decision-making leave on 9 May 2000. Knight's decision-making leave arose out of an incident where Knight was rude and disrespectful to two other employees: Patrice Hines and Doctor Wendy Whittick. Hines complained to her supervisor, Robert Zayas, about Knight's conduct and then filed a complaint with Ryder about the incident.

Ryder investigated the complaint. She then met with Hotchkiss and Theisen, and they decided to place Knight on decision-making leave based on the incident and Knight's "well documented disciplinary history." This four-year history included several performance issues: (1) failing to check refrigerator temperatures; (2) failing to comply with latex-allergy procedures; (3) scheduling standby cases without permission; (4) failing to send for patients in a timely manner; (5) unnecessarily calling in staff; (6) on other occasions, acting rudely and disrespectfully toward coworkers; and (7) having substantial problems of absenteeism and tardiness. Knight earlier received formal counseling, the second step in the disciplinary process, for her tardiness and for unnecessarily calling in staff.

Along with the decision-making leave, Knight was asked to submit an action plan covering two problems: her tardiness and her unprofessional and disrespectful behavior. Following her decision-making leave, on 11 May 2000, Knight turned in an action plan. Knight's action plan adequately addressed her tardiness issues but did not mention her behavior problems. Knight was asked to turn in a second action plan addressing this issue by 12 May. Knight missed this deadline.

Knight submitted her second action plan on 22 May. Ryder rejected this plan as inadequate, because the "action plan" was argumentative and proposed no solution. The plan merely restated Knight's version of the incident with Hines and said that it was "petty." On 23 May 2000, Knight's employment was terminated.

Knight filed a grievance through Baptist's grievance program. Her termination was upheld. Knight then filed this lawsuit in the Southern District of Florida. She alleged that she was the victim of disparate treatment and retaliation in violation of Title VII of the Civil Right's Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e) et seq., 42 U.S.C. § 1981, and the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992, Florida Statutes, § 760.10 (2000).¹ Baptist moved for summary judgment, arguing that Knight could not establish a prima facie case of discrimination because she could not identify a similarly situated person from a different class who was treated more favorably. In response, Knight pointed to Jean Arnold.

Arnold was a Caucasian nurse at Baptist. Knight claims that Arnold had significant tardiness and behavioral problems but was not severely disciplined. Arnold's 1997 performance evaluation noted that "[o]n occasion, severe, unproductive, and inappropriate exchanges occur with coworkers." She was not placed on decision-making leave, and her employment was not terminated.

The district court concluded that Arnold and Knight were not similarly situated and granted Baptist's motion for summary judgment.

DISCUSSION

Summary judgment is only appropriate where there "is no genuine issue as to any material fact and ... the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). We review a district court's grant of summary judgment de novo. Pritchard v. Southern Co. Servs., 92 F.3d 1130, 1132 (11th Cir.1996). We view all the evidence, and make all reasonable factual inferences, in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Maniccia v. Brown, 171 F.3d 1364, 1367 (11th Cir.1999).

The district court granted Baptist's motion for summary judgment because it determined that Knight failed to establish a prima facie case.² Where direct evidence of discrimination is absent, a plaintiff establishes a circumstantial, prima facie case of racial discrimination based on disparate treatment by showing several things: "(1) [she] belongs to a racial minority; (2) [she] was subjected to adverse job action; (3) [her] employer treated similarly situated employees outside [her] classification more favorably; and (4) [she] was qualified to do the job." Holifield v. Reno, 115 F.3d 1555, 1561-62 (11th Cir.1997)(citing McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 1824-25, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973)).

For the purpose of the motion for summary judgment, Baptist concedes that (1) Knight was a member of a racial minority; (2) she was subject to adverse employment actions — including being placed on a decision-making day and being fired — and (3) she was qualified for her job. Baptist argues, and the district court concluded, that Knight cannot establish a prima facie case because she cannot show that similarly situated employees of other races were treated better.

To show that employees are similarly situated, the plaintiff must show that the "employees are similarly situated in all relevant respects.... In determining whether employees are similarly situated... it is necessary to consider whether the employees are involved in or accused of the same or similar conduct and are disciplined in different ways." Id. at 1562.

Knight argues that Jean Arnold was a similarly situated Caucasian nurse who was treated more favorably.³ Knight was placed on decision-making leave after a review of her entire record. Knight claims that Arnold "committed similar, if not more egregious, acts of misconduct." Despite Arnold's acts of misconduct, Knight points out that Arnold was not placed on decision-making leave.⁴

A review of Knight's and Arnold's cumulative records reveals that the two were not similarly situated. While their histories of problems with coworkers are similar, Arnold's record is substantially better then Knight's when it comes to job performance and tardiness.

Both Arnold and Knight have documented histories of problems with coworkers. Knight's history includes the incident involving Ms. Hines and Dr. Whittick (which led to the decision-making leave) and two prior documented instances of rude and disrespectful conduct. Arnold's record includes two instances where surgeons complained about her disrespectful attitude.⁵ While Arnold was reprimanded after the instances, she was not placed on decision-making leave. Had Knight's decision-making leave been based solely on her behavioral problems, Arnold might have been similarly situated. But Knight's decision-making leave was based on a review of her entire record, including her performance and tardiness issues.

Knight's history of performance problems is substantially worse than Arnold's. Knight's four-year history includes documented instances of these things: (1) failure to check refrigerator temperatures, (2) failure to comply with latex-allergy procedures, (3) scheduling standby cases without permission, (4) failure to send for patients in a timely manner, and (5) unnecessarily calling in staff.⁶ Arnold's seven-year history includes only one documented performance issue: her failure to document a problem with the blood refrigerator on 5 June 2000. Arnold was given an Agreement for Performance Improvement based on this event and required to write an action plan on the bottom of the Performance Improvement form. Arnold's performance history is substantially better than Knight's.

Knight and Arnold's problems with absenteeism and tardiness are very different. While both had problems in this area, their problems were not of the same nature. Arnold's record indicates someone who had problems, but was improving. Her record also indicates that she took on extra responsibilities to compensate for some of her problems. Knight's problems progressively worsened, and despite counseling, she made little, if any, effort to compensate for her problems. The differences between Knight and Arnold are apparent from the performance evaluations.

In December 1995,...