Knight v. State

• Decision Date: 10 July 1915
• Docket Number: (No. 438.)
• Citation: 143 Ga. 678,85 S.E. 915
• Parties: KNIGHT. v. STATE.
• Court: Georgia Supreme Court

85 S.E. 915

143 Ga. 678

KNIGHT.

v.STATE.

(No. 438.)

Supreme Court of Georgia.

July 10, 1915.

Rehearing Denied July 21, 1915.

(Syllabus by the Court.)

10. Conviction—Evidence—Sufficiency.

The evidence authorized the verdict.

Error from Superior Court, Polk County; Price Edwards, Judge.

Will Knight was convicted of murder, and he brings error. Affirmed.

John A. Boykin and Philip Weltner, both of Atlanta, and Bunn & Trawick, of Cedartown, for plaintiff in error.

J. R. Hutcheson, Sol. Gen., of Douglasville, Warren Grice, At-ty. Gen., A. L. Henson, of Calhoun, I. F. Mundy, of Rockmart, and W. W. Mundy, of Ce-dartown, for the State.

BECK, J. Will Knight and Jerry Farlow were jointly indicted for the murder of J. D. Freeman in Polk county, which murder was alleged to have been committed on the 29th day of April, 1914. On the trial of Will Knight the jury returned a verdict of murder, with a recommendation that he be imprisoned for life. The accused made a motion for a new trial, which was overruled, and he excepted.

1. Counsel for the defendant requested the court in writing to charge as follows:

"It is not sufficient that the accomplice is corroborated as to the time, place, and cir-eumstances of the transaction, if there is nothing in this corroborating testimony to connect the defendant with the crime; and the corroborating circumstances must be such as to connect the defendant on trial with the offense, and, independently of the testimony of the accomplice, must be sufficient to raise the inference that the defendant on trial is guilty of [as] an accomplice. The corroborating circumstances should be such as, independently of his testimony, to lead to the inference that the defendant is guilty. Facts which merely cast on the defendant a grave suspicion of guilt are not sufficient."

This request was refused by the court. While the language of the request is somewhat confusing, it states substantially the law upon the subject dealt with therein (McCalla v. State, 66 Ga. 346; and see, in connection therewith, Hargrove v. State, 125 Ga. 270, 54 S. E. 164); but the refusal to give it is not error in view of the court's actual charge upon the same subject. Upon the subject of corroboration the court charged the jury as follows:

"It is not sufficient that the accomplice is corroborated as to the time, place, and circumstances of the transaction, if there is nothing in the corroborating testimony to connect the defendant with the crime—and the corroborating circumstances must be such as to connect the defendant on trial with the offense, independently of the testimony of the accomplice. It must be sufficient to cause the inference that the defendant on trial is guilty of the offense. To warrant a conviction based on the testimony of an accomplice, the corroborating circumstances should be such as, independently of the testimony of the accomplice, to lead to the inference that the defendant is guilty. Now, gentlemen of the jury, this is a matter that is addressed to the, sound judgment of the jury. As I say, it is conceded that Jerry Farlow is an accomplice in this offense; that he and some other person committed the offense. Before any other person and before the accused could be convicted upon his testimony alone, there must be some circumstance shown which, independent of the evidence of Jerry Farlow, points to the guilt of the accused. You take all the evidence on that subject, all the surroundings, and judge of the conduct of the accused, if any conduct on his part is shown in connection with this matter, as you would with matters of the highest importance with which you have to deal in life. You judge of it as sensible men, seeking to discover the truth; you bring to bear your experience in life, and determine whether, independently of the testimony of Jerry Farlow, you believe there has been circumstances shown which points to the guilt of the accused. As I say, before any conviction could be had, these circumstances must be shown; whether, when shown, taken altogether, the case is of that character as convinces you beyond a reasonable doubt, is a question for you to determine."

In view of these ample instructions contained in the court's charge to the jury upon the subject of the testimony of an accomplice and the degree and kind of corroboration required, it could hardly be insisted that the refusal to give the requested instruction is ground for reversal of the judgment in this case.

2. The request to charge upon the subject of admissions and confessions, so far as the same was material and pertinent, was sufficiently covered by the charge given.

3. Error is assigned upon the following charge of the court:

"Now, gentlemen of the jury, this is a matter that is addressed to the sound judgment of the jury._ As I say, it is conceded that Jerry Farlow is an accomplice in this offense; that he and some other person committed the offense."

This charge is criticized in the motion upon the ground that it contains an intimation of opinion by the court upon the facts of the case, and on the ground that it tended unduly to prejudice the defendant's ease by instructing the jury that the defendant had conceded that Jerry Farlow had committed the crime, contrary to the theory of the defense, which was to the effect that Jerry Farlow and his entire gang of confederates, who had been with him in another robbery, were the guilty parties in the murder. Whether or not this court will assume, in the absence of a certificate to the contrary, that the...