Knight v. State
Decision Date | 24 June 1982 |
Docket Number | No. 3-1081A277,3-1081A277 |
Citation | 436 N.E.2d 866 |
Parties | Mark Allen KNIGHT, Appellant (Defendant Below), v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee (Plaintiff Below). |
Court | Indiana Appellate Court |
George C. Paras, Merrillville, for appellant.
Linley E. Pearson, Atty. Gen., Michael Gene Worden, Deputy Atty. Gen., Indianapolis, for appellee.
Mark Allen Knight was convicted at trial by jury of robbery 1 and confinement, 2 both class B felonies. Knight now appeals.
The evidence most favorable to the State discloses that on February 13, 1980, appellant drove another man, Eddie Dean Farris, to the home of Knight's seventy-five year old great-aunt, Anna Rockovich, in Munster, Indiana. After summoning Ms. Rockovich to the door, Farris pushed his way inside the house, whereupon he grabbed her by the neck and then beat her about the head with a metal candlestick. In addition, Farris brandished a knife while demanding money from Ms. Rockovich.
During this time Knight was apparently looking through the house for valuables. Ms. Rockovich testified that throughout this incident Knight avoided turning his face toward her so that positive visual identification was impossible. Once Farris had secured some cash from Ms. Rockovich, however, Knight directed him to lock her in the bathroom. Ms. Rockovich stated that she was then able to identify Knight from his voice.
The Munster Police Department subsequently received information from a confidential informant that implicated Knight in the robbery. After being approached with this information, Knight gave the police a voluntary statement in which he admitted driving Farris to the home of Ms. Rockovich for the express purpose of robbing her, but he denied taking any active part in the actual commission of the crime.
Appellant initially contends that the trial court erred in admitting his statement as it constituted neither a confession nor an admission. Knight's statement reads in part as follows:
It was established in Parsons v. State (1975), 166 Ind.App. 152, at 155-156, 333 N.E.2d 871, at 873, that IC 1971, 35-41-2-4 (Burns 1979 Repl.), reads:
"A person who knowingly or intentionally aids, induces, or causes another person to commit an offense commits that offense, even if the other person:
(1) Has not been prosecuted for the offense;
(2) Has not been convicted of the offense; or
(3) Has been acquitted of the offense."
It was held in Baker v. State (1980), Ind., 402 N.E.2d 951, at 953, that:
Knight's statement was therefore an admission which tended to show that, at the very least, he aided Farris in the commission of the robbery. Thus, it was relevant probative evidence on the issue of Knight's participation, and was properly submitted to the jury.
Appellant alleges further error in the admission of his statement as it contains his own reference to a prior crime. The original statement reads in part:
In Maldonado v. State (1976), 265 Ind. 492, at 495, 355 N.E.2d 843, at 846, it was held:
Knight's statement was not admitted to prove his guilt in the instant cause. Rather, appellant's reference to the prior crime was deemed to be a part of his admission as to how Farris and Knight chose their target. The statement was properly admissible for this purpose. "Evidence that is admissible for one purpose is not rendered inadmissible simply because it coincidently discloses or suggests other criminal activity." Samuels v. State (1978), 267 Ind. 676, at 680, 372 N.E.2d 1186, at 1188. Furthermore, "happenings near in time and place which complete the story of the crime are admissible under the theory of res gestae." Brown v. State (1981), Ind., 417 N.E.2d 333, at 337. The court below made every possible effort to mitigate any prejudice to appellant while still preserving the testimonial integrity of his voluntary admission by deleting the phrase "before I went to jail the last time," and then reading the statement in its entirety to the jury. No error was committed thereby.
Appellant next contends the trial court erred when it granted the State's motion for nondisclosure of the confidential informant. In Rihl v. State (1980), Ind.App., 413 N.E.2d 1046, at 1052, it was noted that:
(Citations omitted.)
Appellant has failed to meet this burden. The record reveals that it was during the defense's cross-examination of the investigating police officer that the existence of the informant was first mentioned. The officer testified that some six days after the robbery this informant contacted him by phone and advised that Farris and Knight were possibly involved. With this information, the police were able to put together an array of photographs from which Ms. Rockovich identified Farris as one of the perpetrators. The police then contacted Knight and he gave a voluntary statement. This situation is strikingly similar to that in Williams v. State (1981), Ind., 417 N.E.2d 328, at 331, in which it was stated:
Since the court had granted the State's motion for nondisclosure, the...
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Hudson v. State
...here for lack of fundamental error. Samuels v. State, supra; see also Badelle v. State, (1983) Ind., 449 N.E.2d 1055; Knight v. State, (1982) Ind.App., 436 N.E.2d 866. Insufficiency of the Hudson challenges the sufficiency of the evidence underlying the jury verdicts against him, particular......