Knight v. State

• Decision Date: 15 December 2016
• Docket Number: No. SC14–567,No. SC13–820,SC13–820,SC14–567
• Citation: 211 So.3d 1
• Parties: Ronald KNIGHT, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee. Ronald Knight, Petitioner, v. Julie L. Jones, Etc., Respondent.
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

211 So.3d 1

Ronald KNIGHT, Appellant,

v.STATE of Florida, Appellee.

Ronald Knight, Petitioner,

v.Julie L. Jones, Etc., Respondent.

No. SC13–820

No. SC14–567

Supreme Court of Florida.

[December 15, 2016]

Neal Andre Dupree, Capital Collateral Regional Counsel—Southern Region, William McKinley Hennis, III, Litigation Director, Capital Collateral Regional Counsel

—Southern Region, and Nicole M. Noel, Assistant Capital Collateral Regional Counsel—Southern Region, Fort Lauderdale, Florida, for Appellant/Petitioner

Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida; and Leslie T. Campbell, Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, Florida, for Appellee/Respondent

PER CURIAM.

Ronald Knight appeals an order of the circuit court denying his motion to vacate his conviction of first-degree murder and sentence of death filed under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850¹ and petitions this Court for a writ of habeas corpus. We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(1), (9), Fla. Const. For the reasons that follow, we affirm the postconviction court's denial of relief and deny habeas relief.²

FACTS

After a nonjury trial, Knight was convicted of first-degree murder in the 1993 shooting death of Richard Kunkel. Knight v. State , 770 So.2d 663, 664 (Fla. 2000). He was also convicted of armed robbery, burglary of a dwelling, and grand theft of an automobile in connection with the crime. Id. "Knight was sentenced to death for the first-degree murder conviction, life imprisonment for the armed robbery conviction, fifteen years for the burglary of a dwelling conviction, and five years for the grand theft conviction." Id. During the guilt phase, Knight represented himself,³ with attorney Jose Sosa acting as standby counsel. Id. For the penalty phase, Knight was represented by Sosa. Id. On direct appeal, we described the facts as follows:

The evidence presented during the guilt phase indicated that Knight and two accomplices,⁴ Timothy Peirson (Peirson) and Dain Brennault (Brennault), [n.2] agreed that they would go to a gay bar, lure a man away from the bar, and beat and rob him. The three found Richard Kunkel (Kunkel) and invited him to go to a party with them. Kunkel was driving his own car and followed Knight and the others to Miami Subs. After stopping to eat, the three convinced Kunkel to leave his car parked there and ride to the party with them. Knight then drove to a secluded area where they stopped twice and got out of the car to urinate.

[N.2] Peirson received three years in prison and Brennault received five years' probation. The evidence revealed neither of them knew Knight planned to kill Richard Kunkel.

Before they got back into the car after their second stop, Knight pointed a gun at Kunkel and told him to turn around and take off his jeans. As Kunkel was complying, Knight fired one shot striking Kunkel in the back. Kunkel fell to the ground and began crying for help. Knight then ordered Brennault and Peirson to search Kunkel's pockets. Peirson complied, but Brennault refused. Knight and Peirson then dragged Kunkel's body out of the road. They left Kunkel to die beside a canal where his body was later discovered. Knight threatened to kill Peirson and Brennault if they told anyone about the murder.

Later that night, the three men went back to Miami Subs where they had left Kunkel's car. Knight then stole Kunkel's car and took it for a joy ride to see how fast it would go. Some time later that evening, the three men broke into Kunkel's house and stole various items. [n.3]

[N.3] Knight took Kunkel's keys and wallet from him after he shot him. He got Kunkel's address from his driver's license.

When Peirson and Brennault were first questioned about the incident by the police, they denied any knowledge of the murder; however, both men later confessed. Knight bragged about the murder to Christopher Holt. Peirson, Brennault, and Holt all testified against Knight during the guilt phase of the trial.

During the penalty phase, the State presented evidence that Knight had previously been convicted of another murder occurring under very similar circumstances. The other aggravating factors presented and relied upon by the trial judge were that the murder occurred while Knight was engaged in the commission of a robbery, the murder was committed for pecuniary gain, and the murder was cold, calculated, and premeditated. The trial court merged the "committed during a robbery" and "for pecuniary gain" aggravators. Knight presented some mitigation, the most significant of which was expert witnesses who testified that Knight suffered from a paranoid disorder that was exacerbated by his unstable childhood. The court gave this mitigating factor considerable weight. Knight also presented mitigating evidence that he had the support and love of his mother, brother, and sisters and that the death penalty would be disparate treatment because his cofelons received much lighter sentences. The court gave these factors little weight.

Id. at 664–65. On appeal, Knight argued that the court erred in (1) allowing Knight to represent himself; (2) failing to renew its offer of court-appointed counsel at every critical stage of the proceeding; and (3) considering Knight's prior murder conviction as an aggravating factor in sentencing him to death because the other murder occurred after Kunkel's murder. Id. at 665. We found all of Knight's arguments to be without merit and affirmed his convictions and sentences. Id.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Knight was originally charged—in circuit court case number 1994–CF–4855 ("the 1994 case")—with second-degree murder in relation to Kunkel's death. In that case, Shirley DeLuna served as the prosecutor, and Jose Sosa represented Knight. However, on January 3, 1995, the State entered a nolle prosequi , dismissing the case. On December 8, 1995, subsequent to the dismissal of the 1994 case, Knight was convicted of the first-degree murder in another case for the death of Brendan Meehan under unrelated circumstances ("the Meehan case"). Andrew Slater prosecuted the Meehan case and also represented the State in the instant postconviction proceedings. On May 8, 1997, Knight was re-indicted in circuit court case number 1997–CF–5175 (the instant case), for Kunkel's murder—the same crime as in the 1994 case, except this time he was charged with first-degree murder. The 1994 case and the instant case will be collectively referred to as "the Kunkel cases."

On October 31, 1997, Knight discharged Ann Perry, his court-appointed guilt phase counsel in this case, and kept Sosa as penalty phase counsel. Id. at 666. On January 8, 1998, Knight also discharged Sosa, but Sosa was reappointed as standby counsel for the guilt phase on or around February 18, 1998. Knight's nonjury trial in the instant case was held from March 11, 1998, through March 16, 1998. On April 15, 1998, the first day of Knight's nonjury penalty phase hearing, Sosa was reappointed as penalty phase counsel, per Knight's request. After the trial court sentenced Knight to death, and we affirmed on direct appeal, Knight petitioned the United States Supreme Court for certiorari review, which that Court denied on April 30, 2001. Knight v. Florida , 532 U.S. 1011, 121 S.Ct. 1743, 149 L.Ed.2d 666 (2001).

On or about September 27, 2001, Knight filed an unverified shell motion for postconviction relief, which was stricken but later reinstated following a determination that the verification had been notarized on September 10, 2001. Throughout the postconviction proceedings, Knight was either pro se or represented by his current counsel, Capital Collateral Regional Counsel—Southern Region (CCRC–South), which resulted in numerous pro se amendments and supplements to Knight's postconviction motion—all of which were adopted by counsel. These filings present the following twenty-one claims for relief: (1) the State violated Brady v. Maryland , 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963), and Giglio v. United States , 405 U.S. 150, 92 S.Ct. 763, 31 L.Ed.2d 104 (1972) ; (2) Knight's guilt phase jury waiver was not knowing, intelligent, and voluntary; (3) Knight's waiver of guilt phase counsel was not knowing, intelligent, and voluntary; (4) Knight's penalty phase jury waiver was not knowing, intelligent, and voluntary; (5) Knight is "innocent of first-degree murder"; (6) penalty phase counsel was ineffective for failing to present available mitigation evidence; (7) Knight was denied an adequate mental health evaluation under Ake v. Oklahoma , 470 U.S. 68, 105 S.Ct. 1087, 84 L.Ed.2d 53 (1985) ; (8) Knight is "innocent of the death penalty"; (9) Knight's right to confront witnesses under Crawford v. Washington , 541 U.S. 36, 124 S.Ct. 1354, 158 L.Ed.2d 177 (2004), was violated; (10) Florida's capital sentencing procedures are unconstitutional under Ring v. Arizona , 536 U.S. 584, 122 S.Ct. 2428, 153 L.Ed.2d 556 (2002) ; (11) Knight was unconstitutionally denied access to public records under Chapter 119, Florida Statutes; (12) Knight's sentence is unconstitutional because it has been applied discriminately against those accused of killing Caucasians; (13) Florida's capital sentencing structure fails to prevent arbitrary and capricious imposition; (14) Florida's lethal injection procedures are unconstitutional; (15) Knight is "insane to be executed"; (16) cumulative error; (17) Knight's conviction violates double jeopardy and speedy trial based on entry of a nolle prosequi in Knight's 1994 case; (18) counsel was ineffective for failing to file a motion to discharge the instant case; (19) newly discovered evidence that Knight's sentence constitutes cruel and unusual punishment; (20) the State violated Richardson v. State , 246 So.2d 771 (Fla. 1971) ; and (21) counsel was ineffective for failing to ensure that Knight had access to a complete record on appeal. The postconviction court granted an evidentiary hearing on all of Knight's claims, except claims 14, 19, and 20. The evidentiary hearing was held on...