Knight v. State, SC93473.
| Decision Date | 02 November 2000 |
| Docket Number | No. SC93473.,SC93473. |
| Citation | 770 So.2d 663 |
| Parties | Ronald KNIGHT, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee. |
| Court | Florida Supreme Court |
Curtis G. Levine, Boca Raton, Florida, for Appellant.
Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General, and Scott A. Browne, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, Florida, for Appellee.
We have on appeal the judgment and sentence of the trial court imposing the death penalty upon Ronald Knight. We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const. For the reasons expressed below, we affirm the judgment and sentence.
Ronald Knight (Knight) was convicted after a nonjury trial of first-degree murder, armed robbery, burglary of a dwelling, and grand theft of an automobile. Knight was sentenced to death for the first-degree murder conviction, life imprisonment for the armed robbery conviction, fifteen years for the burglary of a dwelling conviction, and five years for the grand theft conviction. During the guilt phase of his trial, Knight represented himself, assisted by standby counsel, Mr. Sosa.1
The evidence presented during the guilt phase indicated that Knight and two accomplices, Timothy Peirson (Peirson) and Dain Brennault (Brennault),2 agreed that they would go to a gay bar, lure a man away from the bar, and beat and rob him. The three found Richard Kunkel (Kunkel) and invited him to go to a party with them. Kunkel was driving his own car and followed Knight and the others to Miami Subs. After stopping to eat, the three convinced Kunkel to leave his car parked there and ride to the party with them. Knight then drove to a secluded area where they stopped twice and got out of the car to urinate.
Before they got back into the car after their second stop, Knight pointed a gun at Kunkel and told him to turn around and take off his jeans. As Kunkel was complying, Knight fired one shot striking Kunkel in the back. Kunkel fell to the ground and began crying for help. Knight then ordered Brennault and Peirson to search Kunkel's pockets. Peirson complied, but Brennault refused. Knight and Peirson then dragged Kunkel's body out of the road. They left Kunkel to die beside a canal where his body was later discovered. Knight threatened to kill Peirson and Brennault if they told anyone about the murder.
Later that night, the three men went back to Miami Subs where they had left Kunkel's car. Knight then stole Kunkel's car and took it for a joy ride to see how fast it would go. Some time later that evening, the three men broke into Kunkel's house and stole various items.3
When Peirson and Brennault were first questioned about the incident by the police, they denied any knowledge of the murder; however, both men later confessed. Knight bragged about the murder to Christopher Holt. Peirson, Brennault, and Holt all testified against Knight during the guilt phase of the trial.
During the penalty phase, the State presented evidence that Knight had previously been convicted of another murder occurring under very similar circumstances. The other aggravating factors presented and relied upon by the trial judge were that the murder occurred while Knight was engaged in the commission of a robbery, the murder was committed for pecuniary gain, and the murder was cold, calculated, and premeditated. The trial court merged the "committed during a robbery" and "for pecuniary gain" aggravators. Knight presented some mitigation, the most significant of which was expert witnesses who testified that Knight suffered from a paranoid disorder that was exacerbated by his unstable childhood. The court gave this mitigating factor considerable weight. Knight also presented mitigating evidence that he had the support and love of his mother, brother, and sisters and that the death penalty would be disparate treatment because his cofelons received much lighter sentences. The court gave these factors little weight.
Knight raises three arguments in this appeal: (1) the court erred in allowing Knight to represent himself; (2) the court erred in failing to renew its offer of court-appointed counsel at every critical stage of the proceeding; and (3) the court erred in considering Knight's prior murder conviction as an aggravating factor in sentencing him to death because the other murder occurred after Kunkel's murder. We find all of these arguments to be without merit and therefore affirm the convictions and sentences.
First, Knight argues the court erred in allowing him to represent himself. We disagree. There is a delicate balance between a defendant's right to counsel and the right to self-representation. In Nelson v. State, 274 So.2d 256 (Fla. 4th DCA 1973), the court held:
[W]here a defendant, before the commencement of trial, makes it appear to the trial judge that he desires to discharge his court appointed counsel, the trial judge, in order to protect the indigent's right to effective counsel, should make an inquiry of the defendant as to the reason for the request to discharge. If incompetency of counsel is assigned by the defendant as the reason, or a reason, the trial judge should make a sufficient inquiry of the defendant and his appointed counsel to determine whether or not there is reasonable cause to believe that the court appointed counsel is not rendering effective assistance to the defendant. If reasonable cause for such belief appears, the court should make a finding to that effect on the record and appoint a substitute attorney who should be allowed adequate time to prepare the defense. If no reasonable basis appears for a finding of ineffective representation, the trial court should so state on the record and advise the defendant that if he discharges his original counsel the State may not thereafter be required to appoint a substitute. See Wilder v. State, Fla.App.1963, 156 So.2d 395, 397. If the defendant continues to demand a dismissal of his court appointed counsel, the trial judge may in his discretion discharge counsel and require the defendant to proceed to trial without representation by court appointed counsel.
Id. at 258-59. Thus, pursuant to Nelson a defendant may be forced to represent himself if he chooses to dismiss court-appointed counsel without good cause.
This conclusion is supported by the Supreme Court's holding in Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975). In Faretta, the Court held a defendant may waive the right to court-appointed counsel and choose to represent himself as long as the waiver is knowing and intelligent:
When an accused manages his own defense, he relinquishes, as a purely factual matter, many of the traditional benefits associated with the right to counsel. For this reason, in order to represent himself, the accused must "knowingly and intelligently" forgo those relinquished benefits. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S., at 464-465. Cf. Von Moltke v. Gillies, 332 U.S. 708, 723-724, 68 S.Ct. 316, 92 L.Ed. 309 [(1948)] (plurality opinion of Black, J.). Although a defendant need not himself have the skill and experience of a lawyer in order to competently and intelligently to choose self-representation, he should be made aware of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation, so that the record will establish that "he knows what he is doing and his choice is made with eyes open." Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann, 317 U.S. [269] at 279[, 63 S.Ct. 236, 87 L.Ed. 268 (1942)].
Faretta, 422 U.S. at 835, 95 S.Ct. 2525. The combined effect of Nelson and Faretta is to allow a defendant to represent himself after he has waived his right to court-appointed counsel by knowingly and intelligently dismissing court-appointed counsel.
In this case, the trial court held a proper Nelson/Faretta inquiry on October 31, 1997, in response to Knight's request to dismiss his court-appointed counsel, Ms. Perry.4 At that time, Ms. Perry was his first-chair counsel and Mr. Sosa was his second-chair counsel.5 Knight was given an opportunity to explain any problems he had with Ms. Perry. He told the court that he was dissatisfied with her services and would like her taken off his case and another lawyer appointed. In the alternative, he requested the opportunity to hire a private attorney to represent him. When pressed by the trial court for a reason, Knight stated:
In response, the trial court indicated that this appeared to be a communication problem, rather than an ineffective representation problem, which would not require a full Nelson inquiry. See Lowe v. State, 650 So.2d 969 (Fla.1994) (); Smith v. State, 641 So.2d 1319 (Fla.1994); Augsberger v. State, 655 So.2d 1202 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995) (). However, in an abundance of caution, the trial court conducted a full Nelson inquiry.
The trial court asked Ms. Perry to detail some of the work she had performed on Knight's behalf, to which she responded:
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