Knight v. State

• Decision Date: 26 April 2016
• Docket Number: No. 2013–CP–01621–COA.,2013–CP–01621–COA.
• Parties: Armstrong KNIGHT a/k/a Armstrong Jacob Knight a/k/a A.J. Knight, Appellant, v. STATE of Mississippi, Appellee.
• Court: Mississippi Court of Appeals

192 So.3d 360

Armstrong KNIGHT a/k/a Armstrong Jacob Knight a/k/a A.J. Knight, Appellant,

v.STATE of Mississippi, Appellee.

No. 2013–CP–01621–COA.

Court of Appeals of Mississippi.

April 26, 2016.

Armstrong Knight, appellant, pro se.

Office of the Attorney General by Barbara Wakeland Byrd, attorney for appellee.

EN BANC.

GREENLEE, J., for the Court:

¶ 1. In 2003, Armstrong Knight negotiated a plea deal to avoid a murder conviction and the possibility of spending the rest of his life in prison. He pled guilty to manslaughter, two counts of felon in possession of a firearm, and one count of carrying a concealed weapon after a felony conviction. His combined sentences essentially operated as thirty years in the custody of the Mississippi Department of Corrections (MDOC). Approximately ten years later, he claimed that one of his convictions for felon in possession of a firearm must be vacated because he has been subjected to double jeopardy. But we find that Knight waived the issue through his negotiated plea deal. Accordingly, we affirm the Harrison County Circuit Court's judgment denying Knight's motion for postconviction relief (PCR).

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶ 2. In 2003, Knight was facing a murder charge. If convicted, he would have received a mandatory life sentence. Miss.Code Ann. § 97–3–21 (Rev.2006). He would not have been eligible for parole. Miss.Code Ann. § 47–7–3(1)(g) (Supp.2006). And the prosecution had been building its case.

¶ 3. The prosecution's theory was that while beginning his return trip to California, Knight had emptied two firearms into a mobile home, killing Charles Dawson in the process. When authorities first investigated the scene, Dawson's wife implicated Knight based on his ongoing dispute with someone other than the victim. A pistol had been recovered at the scene, and it had been identified as Knight's. When he was arrested in Texas, Knight had four other firearms, including an SKS semiautomatic rifle. Shell casings recovered at the scene were consistent with those used in the pistol and the SKS.

¶ 4. Additionally, Knight's sister had been charged as an accessory to murder, but she took a plea deal to a lesser charge as an accessory after the fact. Her plea deal was contingent on her testimony against Knight, which would place him directly at the scene. And the circuit court had denied Knight's motion to suppress the firearms seized when he was arrested. Considering the apparent strength of the prosecution's case, Knight chose to take a plea deal.

¶ 5. Knight agreed to plead guilty to manslaughter and three other charges. He filed a guilty-plea petition to that effect. In furtherance of the plea agreement, Knight also filed a “waiver of indictment and agreement to prosecution by information.” He attached a bill of information specifically charging him with felon in possession of a firearm—the SKS. He then filed a second waiver of indictment, and attached a bill of information charging him with possession of a shotgun that had been recovered when he was arrested. Finally, he took similar steps to plead guilty to carrying a concealed weapon—the pistol—after a felony conviction.

¶ 6. In exchange, the prosecution agreed to recommend sentences of twenty years for manslaughter, two and one-half years for each count of felon in possession of a firearm, and five years for carrying a concealed weapon after a felony conviction. The sentences would all run consecutively, equivalent to a combined thirty-year sentence. The prosecution fulfilled its end of the bargain. The circuit court accepted Knight's guilty pleas and sentenced Knight consistent with the prosecution's recommendation.

¶ 7. Knight subsequently filed an unsuccessful PCR motion. Knight v. State, 983 So.2d 348, 350 (¶ 3) (Miss.Ct.App.2008). On appeal, this Court vacated Knight's conviction for carrying a concealed weapon after a felony conviction. Id. at 352 (¶¶ 13–14). But there was no merit to Knight's claim that he had not been previously convicted of a felony. Id. at 354 (¶ 24). And there was no merit to his claim that he received ineffective assistance of counsel when he pled guilty to two counts of felon in possession of a firearm. Id. at (¶ 25).

¶ 8. In February 2013, Knight filed another PCR motion. In his second PCR motion, he claimed his two convictions for felon in possession of a firearm violate the prohibition against double jeopardy. According to Knight, he can only be convicted once for simultaneous possession of multiple firearms. Knight reasoned that because the SKS and the shotgun were both in the same U–Haul when he was arrested, he had been punished twice for the same offense, so one of his convictions had to be vacated. The circuit court found that Knight's 2013 PCR motion was time-barred and successive-writ barred. Notwithstanding the procedural bars, in a thorough and detailed analysis, the circuit court found that Knight's claim had no merit. Accordingly, the circuit court denied Knight's 2013 PCR motion. Knight appeals and reiterates his double-jeopardy claim.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶ 9. We will not disturb a circuit court's decision to deny a PCR motion unless the decision was clearly erroneous. Id. at 350 (¶ 4). However, a double-jeopardy claim is a question of law, which we review de novo. Brown v. State, 731 So.2d 595, 598 (¶ 6) (Miss.1999). Statutory interpretation is also a matter of law. Lewis v. Hinds Cty. Circuit Court, 158 So.3d 1117, 1120 (¶ 6) (Miss.2015).

ANALYSIS

¶ 10. The circuit court found that Knight's double-jeopardy claim was both time-barred and procedurally barred as a successive writ. Without question, Knight filed his 2013 PCR motion well beyond the three-year statutory deadline that began to run when he entered his guilty pleas in 2003. See Miss.Code Ann. § 99–39–5(2) (Rev.2015). And Knight's unsuccessful 2006 PCR motion would generally render his 2013 PCR motion barred as a successive writ. See Miss.Code Ann. § 99–39–23(6) (Rev.2015).

¶ 11. But in Rowland v. State, 42 So.3d 503, 508 (¶ 15) (Miss.2010), the Mississippi Supreme Court held that double-jeopardy claims “are excepted from the procedural bars” in the Uniform Postconviction Collateral Relief Act. This is an absolute matter not subject to an appellate court's discretion. Id. at 507 (¶ 12). The supreme court has also “held that neither the common law nor our own constitutional law applies the doctrine of res judicata to constitutional claims.” Smith v. State, 149 So.3d 1027, 1032 (¶ 11) (Miss.2014). Consequently, Knight's current claim is not barred by time or the fact that he raised it in a successive PCR motion. But whether Knight waived it by pleading guilty is a more complicated issue.

¶ 12. “The most basic rights of criminal defendants are ... subject to waiver.” Peretz v. United States, 501 U.S. 923, 936, 111 S.Ct. 2661, 115 L.Ed.2d 808 (1991). “[T]he Constitution affords no protection to a defendant who waives these fundamental rights.” Id. at 937, 111 S.Ct. 2661. Broadly speaking, the United States Supreme Court has further held:

[A] guilty plea represents a break in the chain of events which has preceded it in the criminal process. When a criminal defendant has solemnly admitted in open court that he is in fact guilty of the offense with which he is charged, he may not thereafter raise independent claims relating to the deprivation of his constitutional rights that occurred prior to the entry of the guilty plea.

Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 267, 93 S.Ct. 1602, 36 L.Ed.2d 235 (1973). This broad principle has been extended to numerous constitutional rights. More specifically, a valid guilty plea operates as a waiver of one's rights related to a speedy trial, refusal of self-incrimination, confrontation of accusers, cross-examination of witnesses, a jury trial, and the State's obligation to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. See Anderson v. State, 577 So.2d 390, 391 (Miss.1991) (regarding waiver of the right to a speedy trial); Jefferson v. State, 556 So.2d 1016, 1019 (Miss.1989).

¶ 13. Characterizing a constitutional right as “fundamental” does not mean it is impossible to waive it by pleading guilty. Along with double jeopardy, three other claims have been included in the “fundamental” label: (1) illegally harsh sentencing; (2) denial of due process during sentencing, and (3) ex post facto claims. Boyd v. State, 155 So.3d 914, 918 (¶ 13) (Miss.Ct.App.2014). The Mississippi Supreme Court has held that an ex post facto claim may be waived through a negotiated guilty plea. See Twillie v. State, 892 So.2d 187, 190 (¶ 11) (Miss.2004). As our supreme court has stated:

If a defendant in a criminal case can waive the constitutional right to remain silent and give an incriminating confession [that] eventually places [him] on death row, it logically follows that a defendant ... can waive his ex post facto rights and knowingly enter into an agreement to be sentenced to life without parole in order to avoid the death penalty.

Id. And under certain circumstances, the United States Supreme Court has held that a double-jeopardy claim may be waived through a guilty plea. United States v. Broce, 488 U.S. 563, 573, 109 S.Ct. 757, 102 L.Ed.2d 927 (1989).

¶ 14. Noting previous decisions to the contrary under different circumstances, the Broce Court reiterated that a guilty plea “does not waive a claim that—judged on its face—the charge is one [that] the State may not constitutionally prosecute.”

Id. at 575, 109 S.Ct. 757. But prisoners who plead guilty to “indictments that on their face described separate” crimes essentially waive the right to contradict “the admissions inherent in their guilty pleas.” Id. “[C]onscious waiver” of double jeopardy is not required. Id. at 573, 109 S.Ct. 757. “Relinquishment derives not from any inquiry into a defendant's subjective understanding of the range of potential defenses, [including one based on double jeopardy,] but from the admissions necessarily made upon entry of a voluntary plea of guilty.” Id...