Knott v. State

• Decision Date: 02 March 2016
• Docket Number: No. 2D13–4945.,2D13–4945.
• Citation: 198 So.3d 768
• Parties: Derrick Leon William KNOTT, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
• Court: Florida District Court of Appeals

198 So.3d 768

Derrick Leon William KNOTT, Appellant,

v.STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 2D13–4945.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.

March 2, 2016.

Howard L. Dimmig, II, Public Defender, and Joseph N. D'Achille, Jr., Special Assistant Public Defender, Bartow, for Appellant.

Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Gillian N. Leytham, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, for Appellee.

ALTENBERND

, Judge.

Derrick Leon William Knott appeals his judgments and sentences for several felonies. We affirm and write primarily to address Mr. Knott's argument that the State failed to prove that he committed kidnapping with the intent to “[i]nterfere with the performance of any governmental or political function,” as proscribed by section 787.01(1)(a)(4), Florida Statutes (2011)

. Although this provision of the kidnapping statute is rarely invoked, we conclude that the evidence, which showed that Mr. Knott commandeered a car and driver to flee from a law enforcement officer who was lawfully attempting to detain Mr. Knott, established a prima facie case of an intent to interfere with the performance of a governmental function.

Mr. Knott broke up with his girlfriend in February 2012. She apparently moved from his residence into the apartment of one of his female cousins. Thereafter, Mr. Knott allegedly entered his cousin's apartment through a window and choked his former girlfriend. He was not apprehended at that time although law enforcement was notified of the incident. Later that day, in the parking lot of the apartment complex, Mr. Knott approached a car that was occupied by the two women and allegedly choked his former girlfriend again.

A uniformed deputy, who was familiar with the alleged circumstances of the first incident and could identify Mr. Knott from a picture that had been provided to him as part of the earlier investigation, arrived at the scene of the later incident shortly after it occurred. The deputy observed Mr. Knott in a verbal argument with his former girlfriend. Mr. Knott looked at the deputy and ran. The deputy identified himself as law enforcement and shouted verbal commands to Mr. Knott, which Mr. Knott ignored. The deputy pursued him, but Mr. Knott climbed a wall and seemingly disappeared into thin air.

But magic was not involved. While the deputy was still on the other side of the wall, Mr. Knott entered a parked vehicle that was occupied by its driver. The driver testified that a shirtless man, later identified as Mr. Knott, jumped into his car. When the driver attempted to get out of the car, Mr. Knott told him: “I wouldn't do that if I w[ere] you.” Mr. Knott told the driver that people were shooting at him and instructed the driver to drive away. The driver did not know whether Mr. Knott was armed, but he was afraid and so he did as Mr. Knott instructed. After they traveled some distance, Mr. Knott exited the vehicle and ran away. The driver reported the incident to the police, and Mr. Knott was later apprehended.

Mr. Knott was charged with ten felonies and one misdemeanor for these events. At trial, the jury found him not guilty of seven of the offenses. For the events involving his former girlfriend, Mr. Knott was convicted only of a single domestic battery.¹ For running from the officer, he was convicted of obstructing or opposing an officer without violence.² But for jumping in the car and ordering the driver to drive away, he was convicted of both burglary of a conveyance with assault³ and kidnapping with intent to interfere with a governmental or political function,⁴ which are both first-degree felonies punishable by life. For the battery, he was sentenced to ten years' imprisonment as a habitual offender. For the burglary and kidnapping, he was sentenced to concurrent terms of life imprisonment as a prison releasee reoffender.

On appeal, Mr. Knott first argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to sever the burglary and kidnapping charges from the earlier offenses. He argues that “the aggregation” of all eleven offenses “unfairly diluted [his] defense that the encounter” with the driver of the car “was consensual.” He argues also that the earlier offenses were improperly joined with the burglary and kidnapping charges because they were temporally disconnected. The trial court's decision to deny the severance is reviewed for abuse of discretion. See Smithers v. State, 826 So.2d 916, 923 (Fla.2002)

(citing Fotopoulos v. State, 608 So.2d 784 (Fla.1992) ); see also

Byrd v. State, 980 So.2d 627 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008).

Given that the charged intent for the kidnapping involved interfering with the officer's efforts to make a lawful stop for the prior events, we cannot agree that the trial court abused its discretion in denying the motion. See Fla. R.Crim. P. 3.152(a)(1), (2)

; Fotopoulos, 608 So.2d at 790 (explaining that severance is not required under rule 3.152(a)(1)

when offenses are “connected in an episodic sense” and that severance is not necessary to promote a fair determination of guilt or innocence under rule 3.152(a)(2) when “evidence of each offense would have been admissible at the trial of the other to show ... the entire context out of which the criminal action occurred”). As a practical matter, to the extent that Mr. Knott was concerned that the kidnapping charge would prevent him from obtaining a fair trial on the charges for the earlier events, the jury's seven acquittals seem to belie that concern.

Mr. Knott's remaining argument is that the trial court erred in denying his motion for judgment of acquittal for kidnapping because the State failed to prove that Mr. Knott intended to “[i]nterfere with the performance of any governmental or political function,” which is an element of section 787.01(1)(a)(4)

. Mr. Knott does not challenge the conviction for burglary. Although he seeks an acquittal on the charge of kidnapping, at best he would be entitled to a conviction for the lesser offense of false imprisonment. See § 787.02(1)(a), Fla. Stat. (2011) ; see also

State v. Sanborn, 533 So.2d 1169, 1169–70 (Fla.1988) ; Stanley v. State, 112 So.3d 718, 720 (Fla. 2d DCA 2013).

The dispositive issue in this case is whether a suspect's intentional imprisonment of the driver of a vehicle to flee from a law enforcement officer involves an intent to interfere with “any governmental function” when the officer has lawful authority to detain the suspect. Mr. Knott argues both that the statute does not apply to his conduct and that the statute is ambiguous. Mr. Knott primarily argues that this provision in the kidnapping statute is intended to protect elected officials and politicians running for office from kidnapping and acts of terrorism. He accurately claims that he did nothing more to the officer than show him “his backside.”

But implicit in Mr. Knott's argument is a requirement that the governmental employee or politician be the victim in the offense. In this case, the driver of the car was the victim. The statute does not transform a false imprisonment into a kidnapping if the victim is a politician; under the express language of the statute, the transformation occurs upon proof that the defendant intended to interfere with “the performance of any governmental or political function.” See § 787.01(1)(a)(4)

(emphasis added).

Admittedly, there are many functions performed by government. Some are vital to our society and others are far more mundane. For example, it seems unlikely that a person runs a serious risk of being falsely imprisoned by a person set on delaying the street sweeper. But without regard to the importance or insignificance of the function, the plain language of this statute applies to people who falsely imprison others with the intent to interfere with “any governmental function.” On its face, the statute demonstrates a purpose to deter such imprisonments. One would expect such a statute to protect victims who are innocent bystanders, as well as those who are politicians and governmental employees. The specific intent required by this statute appears to be exactly the intent demonstrated by Mr. Knott. He intended to interfere with a lawful detention. The fact that it was his detention makes no difference. There can be no serious question that a sworn law enforcement officer seeking to lawfully detain a person is involved in a governmental function. See, e.g., Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 690, 92 S.Ct. 2646, 33 L.Ed.2d 626 (1972)

(“Fair and effective law enforcement aimed at providing security for the person and property of the individual is a fundamental function of government....”); Graham v. Ramani, 383 So.2d 634, 637 (Fla.1980)

(“[T]he functions of police ... are fundamental obligations of a government to its constituency.” (citing Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291, 98 S.Ct. 1067, 55 L.Ed.2d 287 (1978) )). The statute read in context presents no ambiguity to construe in Mr. Knott's favor.

This statute was first enacted in 1974 as part of the ...