Pryor v. State
| Decision Date | 05 April 2023 |
| Docket Number | 2D22-563 |
| Parties | CHRISTOPHER ALLEN PRYOR, Appellant, v. STATE OF FLORIDA, Appellee. |
| Court | Florida District Court of Appeals |
Appeal from the Circuit Court for Pinellas County; Philip J Federico, Judge.
Howard L. Dimmig, II, Public Defender, and Siobhan Helene Shea Special Assistant Public Defender, Bartow, for Appellant.
Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Cerese Crawford Taylor, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, for Appellee.
At the conclusion of a bifurcated trial, the jury found Christopher Allen Pryor guilty of possessing a firearm by a violent career criminal (VCC). See § 790.235, Fla Stat. (2019). We have jurisdiction.[1] See Fla. R. App. P 9.030(b)(1)(A). We affirm.
In December 2019, Mr. Pryor was dating the victim, A.H. He lived in her house. The relationship soured quickly on the day he forgot to bring home a rat to feed to A.H.'s pet snake. A heated squabble ensued.
The dispute escalated beyond shouting. Mr. Pryor hurled hot soup on A.H.'s face. He left the house for a short time. When he returned, he saw A.H. moving his belongings out of the house. He was incensed. Brandishing a gun, Mr. Pryor confronted A.H. in the driveway. He put the gun under her chin and pulled the trigger. She heard a click. The gun misfired. Seeing a chance to escape, A.H. ran to safety. Mr. Pryor fired several shots into the air.
A.H.'s neighbors heard multiple gunshots. Police officers recovered three spent shell casings. During a search for the gun, the officers discovered a .380 semiautomatic pistol and a box of ammunition stowed in a grill in the backyard. A neighbor recalled seeing Mr. Pryor walking from the direction where the gun and ammunition were found. A ballistics expert opined that the shell casings were discharged from that gun.
Prior to trial, Mr. Pryor filed a motion to sever the possession of a firearm by a VCC count from the remaining charges.[2] He claimed that "[s]everance . . . [wa]s necessary to achieve a fair determination of [his] guilt or innocence of each offense." The trial court denied severance but bifurcated the proceedings. The trial court reasoned that severing the charge would deprive the jury of hearing the event's full context:
[T]he firearm's found in the-in the grill. The implication is he ran in the house and then put it in the grill in the back, right? So why would he hide the firearm in the grill? Because he knows the cops are coming on a domestic because the whole blocks [sic] calling. I don't know how you separate that out as part of the circumstances related to the firearm. You can't-you can't just totally-hey, she-she says he fired some shots and there's a gun found in the grill, that's all you need to know about that situation. I mean, that's not a fair presentation of what the evidence is in that scenario.
The trial court divided the trial into two phases. The first phase required the jury to find whether Mr. Pryor possessed a firearm. At the conclusion of this phase, the jury found that Mr. Pryor had possessed a firearm.
After a brief recess, the jury reconvened for the second phase of the trial. The trial court advised the jury that "the [S]tate is going to present evidence that [Mr. Pryor i]s a [VCC]." The State introduced a Department of Corrections "Crime and Time Report" detailing Mr. Pryor's most recent release date from prison as well as multiple prior convictions. Specifically, the State introduced Mr. Pryor's 2012 Hernando County conviction for aggravated battery with great bodily harm, a 2005 Hernando County burglary conviction, and, as relevant here, a 1995 Pinellas County conviction for escape from a secure juvenile detention facility. Mr. Pryor raised no objection to the State's use of the 1995 conviction as a qualifying offense. Finding that Mr. Pryor qualified as a VCC, the jury found him guilty on the possession of a firearm by a VCC charge. The trial court imposed the statutorily mandated life sentence. See §§ 790.235(1); 775.084(4)(d)1, Fla. Stat. (2019).
Mr. Pryor contends that the trial court erred in denying his severance motion. He asserts that the trial court's decision did not cut the mustard, constitutionally speaking. See Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.152(a)(2)(A) ("In case 2 or more charges of related offenses are joined in a single indictment or information, the court . . . shall grant a severance of charges on motion of the state or of a defendant . . . before trial on a showing that the severance is appropriate to promote a fair determination of the defendant's guilt or innocence of each offense ...."); State v. Vazquez, 419 So.2d 1088, 1090 (Fla. 1982) (). Reviewing Mr. Pryor's argument for an abuse of discretion by the trial court, we cannot agree. See Knott v. State, 198 So.3d 768, 770 (Fla. 2d DCA 2016); Campfield v. State, 189 So.2d 642, 642 (Fla. 2d DCA 1966) ().
Those charges requiring proof of Mr. Pryor's criminal record had to be considered separately from other charges.[3] See Tucker v. State, 884 So.2d 168, 172 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004) ( ); cf. State v. Harbaugh, 754 So.2d 691, 693 (Fla. 2000) ; Fox v. State, 543 So.2d 340, 342 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989) ( ).[4] Mr. Pryor's case is akin to Jackson v. State, 881 So.2d 711 (Fla. 3d DCA 2004). There, the State charged Mr. Jackson with armed robbery, possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, and giving a false name after arrest. Id. at 715. Mr. Jackson moved to sever the armed robbery count. Id. The trial court denied severance but bifurcated Mr. Jackson's trial; the jury would first try the armed robbery count and if he was convicted, the same jury would reconvene to decide the remaining two counts. Id. The Third District observed that "the same goal was achieved here by bifurcation" and concluded that "bifurcation was within the court's discretion and follows established procedure for a trial of this type." Id. After all, during the trial of the armed robbery charge, the jury did not learn that Mr. Jackson had a prior felony record. Id. at 716. The jury's interrogatory verdict only found the defendant guilty of robbery with a firearm. Id. The Third District reasoned that bifurcation prevented the jury from hearing irrelevant and unduly damaging evidence of the defendant's prior convictions while considering whether he possessed a firearm. Id.
Similarly, in Walters v. State, 933 So.2d 1229 (Fla. 3d DCA 2006), the Third District explained the State's ability to rely on factual findings by the same jury in the first phase of a bifurcated trial to establish the charge of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon in the second phase:
The appropriate procedure in a bifurcated trial is to have the jury reconvene in the second phase for the trial of the charge of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. In the second phase, the jury would be instructed that the fact that the defendant possessed a firearm had already been established by the verdict in the first phase. The State must then introduce evidence that the defendant is a convicted felon.
For Mr. Pryor, because the jury did not learn of his prior convictions during the first phase of trial, "the same goal [sought by severance] was achieved here by bifurcation." Jackson, 881 So.2d at 715. As in Jackson, bifurcation accorded Mr. Pryor due process. Indeed, the State satisfied its burden of proof in phase one-possession of a firearm-without using evidence of Mr. Pryor's status as a VCC. In our view, the trial court crafted a sound solution.
Mr. Pryor contends that "[i]t was fundamental error to adjudicate [him] guilty of possession of a firearm by a [VCC] where the jury never reached a verdict, was never instructed on, and never found all the elements of possession of a firearm by a [VCC]." He contends that "[t]he trial court added the verdicts from separate trials together to adjudicate [him] guilty of possession of a firearm by a [VCC]." We disagree.
A bifurcated proceeding is conducted in "stages" or "phases." Yet,...
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