Knotts v. Frazier
| Decision Date | 23 June 2021 |
| Docket Number | No. 20-0523,20-0523 |
| Court | West Virginia Supreme Court |
| Parties | Christopher Knotts, Petitioner Below, Petitioner v. Everett Frazier, Commissioner, West Virginia Division of Motor Vehicles, Respondent Below, Respondent |
(Harrison County (19-P-166-1)
Petitioner Christopher Knotts, by counsel Zachary S. Dyer, Thomas G. Dyer, and Mary Guy Dyer, appeals the Circuit Court of Harrison County's June 18, 2020, order affirming the Office of Administrative Hearings' order, which affirmed the Department of Motor Vehicle's revocation of petitioner's driver's license due to driving under the influence of alcohol and/or drugs. Respondent Everett Frazier, Commissioner, West Virginia Division of Motor Vehicles, by counsel Janet E. James, filed a response.
This Court has considered the parties' briefs and the record on appeal. The facts and legal arguments are adequately presented, and the decisional process would not be significantly aided by oral argument. Upon consideration of the standard of review, the briefs, and the record presented, the Court finds no substantial question of law and no prejudicial error. For these reasons, a memorandum decision is appropriate under Rule 21 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
On January 3, 2017, at approximately 6:24 p.m., Officer F.S. Toothman of the Bridgeport Police Department responded to the McDonald's parking lot in Bridgeport in response to a call from Kaitlin Murrell regarding a possible hit and run. Officer Toothman made contact with petitioner and Ms. Murrell and took a witness statement from Ms. Murrell. She told the officer that she was parked at a liquor store when petitioner pulled in behind her and bumped her car. When Ms. Murrell exited her vehicle to assess potential damage, petitioner told Ms. Murrell he did not know if he hit her, though she noticed that petitioner could barely stand and was slurring his words. She also stated that she smelled alcohol on petitioner's breath. Because there was no damage to Ms. Murrell's vehicle, she pulled away to get petitioner's license plate number and contact police. In addition to the plate number, Ms. Murrell provided a description of petitioner's truck and his location to police. Further, when petitioner exited the liquor store parking lot, Ms. Murrell contacted police again and followed petitioner's vehicle. She reported that petitioner's vehicle was swerving before he pulled into the McDonald's parking lot. Ms. Murrell pulled in behind him.
When Officer Toothman arrived, petitioner's truck was in the drive-through with the engine running. The officer observed that petitioner had slurred speech, was disoriented, and was uncoordinated. He also saw a case of beer in petitioner's car. Petitioner was unsteady and staggered while getting out of his car, while walking, and while standing. Petitioner had to hold onto his truck to walk to the back of it. Petitioner admitted to the officer that he had consumed three to four beers and several medications, including Klonopin, earlier that day. Petitioner did not exhibit any clues of impairment during the horizontal gaze nystagmus test. The walk and turn and one leg stand tests were not administered because petitioner reported that he could not perform the tests due to a medical condition. The officer did, however, administer a preliminary breath test ("PBT"), during which time he noticed an odor of alcohol on petitioner's breath. According to the circuit court, the officer did not obtain a result on the PBT due to an insufficient breath sample, as indicated by the machine. The officer believed that petitioner was trying to evade the test by putting his tongue on the tube and not blowing hard enough. Petitioner was placed under arrest for driving under the influence, and he was transported to the Bridgeport Police Department, where Officer Toothman administered a secondary chemical test of the breath. The officer observed petitioner for twenty minutes prior to administering the test to ensure that he did not ingest food, drink, or other substances. After petitioner signed the implied consent statement and performed the test, the machine showed a blood alcohol content of .156 at 7:28 p.m. In a post-arrest interview, petitioner stated that he was operating a vehicle; that he had consumed three or four beers; and that he was under the influence of "a lot of drugs," including Propanol, Gabapentin, and Klonopin. He said that he took the drugs around 6:00 p.m. on the day of his arrest.
On or about January 31, 2017, the Division of Motor Vehicles mailed a letter to petitioner notifying him that his license would be revoked effective March 7, 2017. He timely filed his written objection and hearing request. On July 12, 2017, the OAH held an administrative hearing at which petitioner appeared with counsel. During the hearing, petitioner testified that he drank two beers before going to the liquor store. The OAH entered its final order on August 19, 2019, upholding the revocation of petitioner's driver's license for DUI with a blood alcohol content of .15 or above ("aggravated DUI"). Petitioner appealed that final order to the Circuit Court of Harrison County.
In its June 18, 2020, final order, the circuit found that Officer Toothman had reasonable suspicion to stop petitioner and investigate. The circuit court quoted Dale v. Ciccone, 233 W. Va. 652, 659, 760 S.E.2d 466, 474 (2014), wherein this Court addressed a traffic stop initiated because a caller contacted police to report that a vehicle was weaving and swerving while proceeding south on Route 119. The caller Id. In its final order, the circuit court found that not only was there a tip from Ms. Murrell, the officer observed petitioner. The court found that the facts in the instant case were analogous to those in Dale v. Ciccone, where this Court found that "the initial traffic stop was lawfully accomplished by [the officer]." The circuit court also determined that the instant case met the standard set forth in Syllabus Point 2 of Albrecht v. State, 173 W. Va. 268, 314 S.E.2d 859 (1984):
Where there is evidence reflecting that a driver was operating a motorvehicle upon a public street or highway, exhibited symptoms of intoxication, and had consumed alcoholic beverages, this is sufficient proof under a preponderance of the evidence standard to warrant the administrative revocation of his driver's license for driving under the influence of alcohol.
The circuit court also found that even if the officer had not observed petitioner driving, he still had reason to make a warrantless arrest because he had reasonable grounds to believe that petitioner had been driving while drunk. "[T]he statute requires only that the observations of the arresting officer establish a reasonable basis for concluding that the defendant had operated a motor vehicle upon a public street in an intoxicated state." Cain v. W. Va. Div. of Motor Vehicles, 225 W. Va. 467, 471, 694 S.E.2d 309, 313 (2010) (emphasis in original).
Ullom v. Miller, 227 W. Va. 1, 10, 705 S.E.2d 111, 120 (2010). The officer testified that he was initially informed that a hit and run had been called in, stating, "[w]e definitely show up on scene to wherever the vehicle is and investigate further." He also testified that he "went back out and to start talking to him again to let him know that-what was going on with the leaving the scene part, and then talked to him a little more." The circuit court determined that the community caretaker doctrine dictates that the officer's encounter with petitioner was justified.
In its final order, the circuit court further found that the Intoximeter result of .156 is prima facie proof that petitioner was intoxicated. Petitioner did not challenge that result so Finally, the circuit court affirmed the OAH's final order. Petitioner appeals from the circuit court's June 18, 2020, final order.
"On appeal of an administrative order from a circuit court, this Court is bound by the statutory standards contained in W. Va. Code § 29A-5-4(a) and reviews questions of law presented de novo; findings of fact by the administrative officer are accorded deference unless the reviewing court believes the findings to be clearly wrong." Syl. Pt. 1, Muscatell v. Cline, 196 W.Va. 588, 474 S.E.2d 518 (1996).
Frazier v. Bragg, 244 W. Va. 40, ___, 851 S.E.2d 486, 490 (2020).
On appeal, petitioner sets forth four assignments of error. Initially, he asserts that the circuit court erred by affirming the OAH's final order because the majority of the findings of fact uponwhich the order was based were not known by law enforcement until after petitioner's arrest. Petitioner argues that the discussion section of the OAH's order shows that the hearing examiner was laboring under a misunderstanding of the facts upon which he based his decision. Citing two volumes of the appendix, without further specificity, petitioner argues that the circuit court was confused, as "a review of the...
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