Knotts v. United States, 50215.
Citation | 128 Ct. Cl. 489,121 F. Supp. 630 |
Decision Date | 08 June 1954 |
Docket Number | No. 50215.,50215. |
Parties | KNOTTS v. UNITED STATES. |
Court | Court of Federal Claims |
Saul G. Lichtenberg and Daniel F. Boone, Washington, D. C., for plaintiff.
Martin E. Rendelman, New York City, and S. R. Gamer, Washington, D. C., with whom was Warren E. Burger, Asst. Atty. Gen., for defendant.
Before JONES, Chief Judge, and LITTLETON, WHITAKER, MADDEN and LARAMORE, Judges.
Plaintiff alleges that she was illegally discharged from her position with the National Labor Relations Board and she sues for the salary of which she was thereby deprived.
The decisions of this court are uniform in holding that it will not review on the merits a removal of a Government employee where it appears that the procedural requirements prescribed by statute have been complied with, and where there is no showing that the action was taken maliciously or in bad faith. But we have also said that if it appears that an employee was discharged, not for the good of the service, but from motives of malice or for any reason other than for the good of the service, the discharge was unlawful and the employee is therefore entitled to recover the salary he would have earned had he not been illegally dischargd.
We stated the reason for this in Gadsden v. United States, 111 Ct.Cl. 487, 489-490, 78 F.Supp. 126, 127:
Our task in this case, therefore, is to determine whether or not plaintiff was discharged for the good of the service, or arbitrarily, or capriciously, or maliciously.
Personnel disputes are hard to resolve. In undertaking to do so, we start out with the presumption that the official acted in good faith. We are always loath to find to the contrary, and it takes, and should take, well-nigh irrefragable proof to induce us to do so. In this case, however, we have reluctantly come to the conclusion that plaintiff's superiors in discharging her were motivated, not by the good of the service, but by personal animus. In arriving at this conclusion we have not only considered the Commissioner's reports, and the briefs and argument of counsel, but we have read the testimony in the case, and considered the exhibits.
We are particularly impressed with plaintiff's testimony. It was straight-forward, frank, without any effort to evade, and not intemperate. It "stood up" on cross-examination. On the stand she showed no passion, but was at all times courteous and ladylike, even under rigid cross-examination by the Government counsel. We did not see her on the stand, but the Commissioner who did see her confirms our impression.
She was employed by the National Labor Relations Board on November 24, 1947, as a Classification Analyst on a probational basis. Upon the expiration of six months, her employment became permanent. Her superior was Mrs. Barbara Amerman, who was the only other employee of the National Labor Relations Board engaged in this work.
When the Taft-Hartley Act, 29 U.S. C.A. § 141 et seq., was passed, it was thought necessary to employ an additional analyst on a temporary basis to help classify the additional personnel to be employed to administer this Act. Mrs. Charlotte Gable was employed in March or April 1948. This woman — and this we regard of especial significance, in the light of what followed — was a personal friend of Mrs. Amerman's, the chief of the section. This fact was made known at the time to Mrs. Amerman's superiors, Mr. Shover and Mr. Shaw.
Mrs. Amerman and the plaintiff shared an office on the seventh floor of the N. L. R. B. building until Mrs. Gable was brought into the Classification Section. At that time, the plaintiff's desk was moved to the third floor where a desk was also provided for Mrs. Gable. Within a short time, however, Mrs. Gable moved back to the seventh floor with Mrs. Amerman, leaving the plaintiff alone in the room on the third floor. From then on the work which had been previously assigned to plaintiff was gradually taken away from her and turned over to Mrs. Gable, until finally plaintiff was left with no work to do. From then on she was completely ignored by her superior, Mrs. Amerman, except for one interview now to be related.
Plaintiff was employed on November 24, 1947, by the National Labor Relations Board on a probational basis, subject to audit of her personnel file by the Civil Service Commission. After a six months' trial period, her appointment became permanent. But in August or September 1948 it came to the attention of the Civil Service Commission that plaintiff had been separated from her former position with the Reconstruction Finance Corporation because she had abandoned her position; and, upon learning this, the Commission on September 7, 1948, notified the National Labor Relations Board that for this reason it would be necessary for plaintiff to fill out another form in which she should explain or justify the reason for her separation from the Reconstruction Finance Corporation. For some reason this request of the Civil Service Commission was not complied with, and on October 19 it again requested the National Labor Relations Board to have Mrs. Knotts make out this form.
When this came to the attention of Mrs. Amerman, she called plaintiff to her office and accused her of lying when she had made out her original form, since she had not disclosed that she had abandoned her former position at the Reconstruction Finance Corporation. Plaintiff told her that she did not know her separation was so regarded, that for a long period of time she had been sick following the birth of her last child, and that when she finally returned to her job with the Reconstruction Finance Corporation she was told that it had been filled; but she stated that she did not understand that her separation had been classified as an abandonment of position.
The record indicates that this was the last contact between Mrs. Amerman and plaintiff. Very shortly thereafter, however, Mrs. Amerman wrote to Mr. Shover, the Personnel Director, a memorandum recommending that Mrs. Knotts be relieved of her position and, by inference, that Mrs. Gable be retained. Her memorandum is set out in a footnote below.1
The assigned reasons for her recommendation were that on one occasion Mrs. Knotts had misstated the facts, that she had failed to obtain and report accurate and adequate facts, that she had been guilty of professional indiscretion and had made technical and clerical errors, and that she had been lacking in cooperation and in the observance of proper channels.
This recommendation was acted upon promptly by Mr. Shover. Indeed, it is apparent that Mrs. Amerman's recommendation was made after consultation with Mr. Shover and with Mr. Shover's superior, Mr. Shaw, the head of the Administrative Division. Mr. Shaw testified that he directed Mrs. Amerman to prepare the memorandum. On the next day, November 3, 1948, after receipt of Mrs. Amerman's memorandum, Mr. Shover wrote the Civil Service Commission a letter suggesting that it set aside plaintiff's permanent appointment, and that it give her a temporary appointment for 12 months from the date of her original appointment, which would have expired November 23, 1948. Shover also wrote that it was the intention of the Board to abolish the position of...
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