Knowles v. Butz

• Decision Date: 16 May 1973
• Docket Number: No. C-72-1578.,C-72-1578.
• Citation: 358 F. Supp. 228
• Parties: Karen KNOWLES et al., Plaintiffs, v. Earl L. BUTZ et al., Defendants, Cheryl Fine et al., Plaintiffs in Intervention.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of California

358 F. Supp. 228

Karen KNOWLES et al., Plaintiffs, v. Earl L. BUTZ et al., Defendants Cheryl Fine et al., Plaintiffs in Intervention.

No. C-72-1578.

United States District Court, N. D. California.

February 23, 1973.

On Motion for Summary Judgment May 16, 1973.

Steven M. Fleisher, El Macero, Cal., Gary Goodpaster, Davis, Cal., Food Advocates, El Macero, Cal., for plaintiffs and plaintiffs in intervention.

James L. Browning, Jr., U. S. Atty., Richard F. Locke, Asst. U. S. Atty., San Francisco, Cal., for defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

ZIRPOLI, District Judge.

Initially two food stamp applicants, the California Welfare Rights Organization (CWRO), and the President of CWRO brought this suit seeking a declaratory judgment that a federal administrative provision dealing with the Food Stamp Program, 7 U.S.C. Chapter 51, is invalid and injunctive relief prohibiting the enforcement of the provision. The challenged regulation, Food and Nutrition Service (FNS) Instruction 732-1, § III(D)(2)(b), provides that persons who share common living quarters and share the expense for such quarters shall be considered a "household" for Food Stamp Program purposes.¹ As a result, if any cotenant is ineligible for food stamps, all of the cotenants are made ineligible. See 7 C. F.R. § 271.3.

The court granted a temporary restraining order on August 31, 1972, and a preliminary injunction on November 2, 1972, prohibiting defendants from refusing to grant the two named food stamp-applicant plaintiffs such food stamps as they would be entitled to receive were it not for the challenged provision. In its order granting a preliminary injunction, the court certified the action as a proper one to be maintained as a class action pursuant to Rule 23(b) (2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. At that time the court also explained that, in its opinion, plaintiffs are clearly correct concerning the merits of their claim. Thereafter the parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment without submitting any additional legal argument or affidavits. On November 16, 1972, the court denied both motions, because it was uncertain whether any person presently being denied welfare benefits joined in the motion.

Several motions are now before the court: (1) motion to intervene of two members of the present class; (2) motion to intervene of two persons whose food stamp benefits were decreased, but not terminated, as a result of the challenged regulation; (3) motion to grant summary judgment on behalf of the original class; (4) motion to enter default judgment on behalf of the original class against Secretary Butz; (5) motion to grant a preliminary injunction on behalf of persons whose benefits are reduced, but not terminated.

1. Motions Concerning Present Class Members:

Two members of the present class seek to intervene, apparently because the initial food stamp-applicant plaintiffs are no longer eligible for food stamp benefits. The fact that the individual claims of the named plaintiffs are moot does not moot the class action portion of a lawsuit when, as in the present case, the controversy continues as to other members of the class. See Quevedo v. Collins, 414 F.2d 796, 797 (5th Cir. 1969); Crow v. California Dept. of Human Resources, 325 F.Supp. 1314, 1316 (N.D.Cal.1970), cert. denied, 408 U.S. 924, 92 S.Ct. 2495, 33 L.Ed.2d 335 (1972). There is, therefore, no need for these new class members to formally intervene. Instead, the court will permit them to enter an appearance through counsel and participate as class members. This eliminates the delay that might otherwise be required before the court could enter summary judgment on behalf of the class members. See Fed. R.Civ.P. 56(a).

The initial class members now move that the court enter judgment by default against Secretary Butz. The clerk entered default against this defendant on January 23, 1973. Secretary Butz has since asked that the entry of default be vacated, but he still has tendered no answer to the complaint, offered any excuse for not doing so, or suggested when he might file an answer. Nor has the Secretary suggested any defense he might wish to raise in his answer. The court will, therefore, proceed to consider whether judgment by default should be entered pursuant to Rule 55(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Because the issue is substantially the same, the court will simultaneously consider whether summary judgment should be entered against Charles Ernst, the remaining federal defendant.

Plaintiffs attack the validity of FNS Instruction 732-1, § III(D) (2) (b) on the ground that the regulation is inconsistent with the Food Stamp Program statutory provisions. This regulation was promulgated by the Secretary of Agriculture pursuant to the express provisions of 7 U.S.C. § 2013(a) and (c), which provide:

(a) The Secretary is authorized to formulate and administer a food stamp program under which . . . eligible households . . . shall be provided with an opportunity to obtain a nutritionally adequate diet through the issuance to them of a coupon allotment which shall have a greater monetary value than the charge to be paid for such allotment by eligible households. . . .

(c) The Secretary shall issue such regulations, not inconsistent with this chapter, as he deems necessary or appropriate for the effective and efficient administration of the food stamp program.

This court, as it must, shows great deference to the interpretation given a statute by an agency charged with its administration. See Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1, 16, 85 S.Ct. 792, 13 L.Ed.2d 616 (1965). But in this particular case, there is little that the Secretary may properly interpret, because in § 2012(e) the statute provides a definition of the term "household." Thus, the Secretary's rulemaking power is limited in this case, despite the express statutory authorization.

The power of an administrative officer or board to administer a federal statute and to prescribe rules and regulations to that end is not the power to make law, for no such power can be delegated by Congress, but the power to adopt regulations to carry into effect the will of Congress as expressed by the statute. A regulation which does not do this, but operates to create a rule out of harmony with the statute, is a mere nullity.

Manhattan Gen. Equip. Co. v. Commissioner, 297 U.S. 129, 134, 56 S.Ct. 397, 400, 80 L.Ed. 528 (1936).

The statutory definition of "household," 7 U.S.C. § 2012(e), as modified by Moreno v. USDA, 345 F.Supp. 310 (D.D.C.1972) (three-judge court), prob. juris. noted, 409 U.S. 1036, 93 S.Ct. 526, 34 L.Ed.2d 485 (1972), provides:

The term household shall mean a group of . . . individuals who are not residents of an institution or boarding house, but are living as one economic unit sharing common cooking facilities and for whom food is customarily purchased in common.

Notably, the statute contains no suggestion that all persons who share living quarters and share expenses for such quarters shall per se be considered a "household." Defendants, however, claim that all persons who share living quarters and share expenses for such quarters constitute an "economic unit," and for that reason, they must be considered a "household."

Although the term "economic unit" is used in the statutory definition of "household," it is nowhere itself defined in the statute. The term is, however, defined by the regulations; FNS Instruction 732-1, § III(D)(1)(d) provides:

Economic unit means that the common living expenses are shared from the income and resources of all members and that the basic needs of all members are provided for without regard to their ability or willingness to contribute.

There can be no doubt that this is a proper regulation for the Secretary to promulgate pursuant to 7 U.S.C. § 2013(a) and (d). It appears to be a full and fair attempt to interpret in a commonsense manner what Congress probably meant by the term. Under this definition, however, not all who share living quarters and share the expenses for such quarters are an "economic unit," which is what defendants contend; rather, the sharing of living quarters and the expenses for them would be but one factual datum to be considered. Those who do not share income and other resources with their cotenants and who do not share any expenses except the expense of housing probably could not constitute an "economic unit" together with their cotenants under this definition. Certainly, the definition does not support any per se rule that they would.

There is a second reason why defendants' argument is untenable: even if plaintiffs did constitute an "economic unit" together with their cotenants, the express terms of the statutory definition of "household" preclude the defendants from considering every group that is an "economic unit" to be per se a "household." Section 2012(e) provides that a "household" is a group: "1 living as one economic unit 2 sharing common cooking facilities and 3 for whom food is customarily purchased in common." Thus, in no case can a group be a "household," even if it is an "economic unit," unless it shares cooking facilities and customarily purchases food in common.

The court, therefore, concludes that the members of the present class are entitled to the entry of a judgment by default against Secretary Butz and summary judgment against the remaining federal defendant.

2. Motions Concerning Prospective Intervenors:

Two individuals, whose benefits are not denied, but only reduced, because they and their cotenants are considered a "household" as a result of the challenged regulation, seek to intervene, represent the class of all persons similarly situated, and obtain declaratory and injunctive relief against defendants. Because their claim is so nearly identical to the claim of the present class of pl...