Knowles v. Corkill

• Decision Date: 09 August 2002
• Docket Number: No. 00-254, No. 00-255.
• Citation: 51 P.3d 859,2002 WY 119
• Parties: Clark Tyler KNOWLES, as Personal Representative for the Estate of Lynn Rae Knowles, deceased, Appellant (Plaintiff), v. Debora Eileen CORKILL, Appellee (Defendant). Debora Eileen Corkill, Appellant (Defendant), v. Clark Tyler Knowles, as Personal Representative of the Estate of Lynn Rae Knowles, deceased, Appellee (Plaintiff).
• Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

51 P.3d 859

2002 WY 119

Clark Tyler KNOWLES, as Personal Representative for the Estate of Lynn Rae Knowles, deceased, Appellant (Plaintiff), v. Debora Eileen CORKILL,¹ Appellee (Defendant).

Debora Eileen Corkill, Appellant (Defendant), v. Clark Tyler Knowles, as Personal Representative of the Estate of Lynn Rae Knowles, deceased, Appellee (Plaintiff).

Nos. 00-254, 00-255.

Supreme Court of Wyoming.

August 9, 2002.

Cameron S. Walker of Schwartz, Bon, Walker & Studer, LLC, Casper, Wyoming, Representing Clark Tyler Knowles, Personal Representative for the Estate of Lynn Rae Knowles, Deceased.

John I. Henley of Vlastos, Brooks, Henley & Drell, P.C., Casper, Wyoming, Representing Debora Eileen Corkill.

Before HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, LEHMAN,² KITE, and VOIGT, JJ.

GOLDEN, Justice.

[¶ 1] This is a wrongful death action that was decided after a jury trial. Although the alleged tortfeasor, Debora Eileen Corkill (Corkill), was apportioned 52% of the fault for the accident resulting in Lynn Rae Knowles' death, no monetary damages were awarded. In appeal number 00-254, Lynn's father, Clark Tyler Knowles (Knowles), acting in his capacity as the personal representative appeals certain evidentiary rulings made during trial and the denial of a motion for a new trial based upon an inconsistent verdict. In appeal number 00-255, Corkill appeals an evidentiary ruling that potentially affected the apportionment of fault. We find no error in the holdings of the trial court as alleged in appeal number 00-254. Because no monetary damages were awarded, appeal number 00-255 is dismissed as moot.

ISSUES

[¶ 2] Knowles, as appellant in appeal number 00-254, presents the following issues:

A. Did the District Court err when it refused to admit evidence of the effects of their mother's disappearance and death upon Cassandra Ulmer and Chad Ulmer?

B. Did the District Court err in refusing to admit evidence of counseling, and the sense of loss and abandonment experienced by Chad and Cassandra Ulmer as a result of their mother's disappearance and death?

C. Did the District Court err in refusing to admit evidence of emotional distress of Lynn Knowles' survivors?

D. Did the District Court err in overruling plaintiff's objection to an inconsistent verdict for failure to award damages?

E. Did the District Court err in denying plaintiff's motion for a new trial?

Appellees restate the issues as:

1. The case law, principles of statutory construction, and logic, all support the trial court's application of the Wyoming Wrongful Death statute.

2. The testimony of Dr. Shilling was irrelevant, without foundation, and speculative; the trial court appropriately exercised its discretion in limiting her testimony.

3. The jury applied both the law and the facts of the case in determining that the plaintiff, Clark Knowles, who sought reimbursement for disinterment and a funeral service, was not entitled to the same.

In the cross-appeal, appeal number 00-255, appellant Corkill challenges the introduction of certain evidence relating to her alleged blood alcohol level at the time of the accident.

FACTS³

[¶ 3] Lynn Knowles, the decedent, grew up in Iowa. She married Randy Ulmer shortly after her eighteenth birthday in 1977. Lynn and Randy had two children: Cassandra, born in 1977; and Chad, born in 1978. At Lynn's instigation, Lynn and Randy separated in August 1979 and were divorced in January 1980. Originally upon their separation, Lynn had physical custody of the children. A strike occurred at Randy's workplace so he was able to help take care of the kids during the day. In December 1979, Randy got a new job and was no longer able to help care for the children. Within a couple of weeks, just before Christmas 1979, Lynn asked Randy to take physical custody of the children. He agreed to take the children, and Lynn never had physical custody of the children after that time.

[¶ 4] Although Randy had physical custody of the children at the time of the divorce in January 1980, the divorce decree granted legal custody of the children to Lynn. That arrangement, however, did not last long. In March 1980, Lynn asked Randy to assume legal custody of the children because she was thinking about joining the Navy. Randy assumed legal custody, but Lynn never did enlist. Nor did she ever attempt to regain legal or physical custody of the children. Over the course of the next several months, she saw the children only infrequently. She never paid any child support, nor was she required to under the divorce decree or custody agreement.

[¶ 5] In the fall of 1980, Lynn left her hometown to go to college. She went to Iowa City and stayed with her brother briefly, then briefly tried the college dorms, which she did not like, then lived with a female roommate off-campus. She placed at most two phone calls to Randy after she left her hometown. During one of these calls Lynn informed Randy that she was going to go to another school, perhaps in Cedar Rapids, but she did not give any more information. That was the last communication Randy had with Lynn. On October 31, 1980, Lynn placed a phone call to her sister's house, stating that she was in San Jose. That was the last contact any of her family ever had with Lynn. Eventually, around October or November 1980, Randy received a phone call from a truck stop. Lynn had abandoned her automobile (still registered in his name) in the parking lot of the truck stop. The car had some of her clothes in it. Lynn's family picked up the car.

[¶ 6] In the early morning hours of November 2, 1980, Lynn was struck and killed by a vehicle driven by Corkill in Casper. It is alleged that Corkill was operating the vehicle under the influence of alcohol. Corkill fled the scene of the accident without rendering aid to the victim or reporting the incident to authorities. Investigators and police officers were able to identify Corkill as the driver because pieces of her vehicle's grill were left on the highway when she struck the decedent. Corkill was cited for leaving the scene of an accident involving injury or death.

[¶ 7] Authorities were unable to identify Lynn after the accident. Her purse and her wallet were missing, and she carried no other form of identification. For the next fourteen years Lynn's family did not know what had happened to her. Her two children thought she had abandoned them. Knowles hired a private investigator to find his daughter, but to no avail. Fourteen years later, after making further inquiries, investigating dental records, and exhuming the body, authorities were finally able to identify Lynn and contact her family. On March 6, 1995, Knowles reviewed police photographs of Lynn's body, read a note found on her body, and identified the body as that of his daughter. Knowles had the body cremated, and the ashes were scattered in a family ceremony at Davenport, Iowa. In his capacity as the personal representative, Knowles filed this wrongful death action against Corkill in 1996. The case was tried to a jury in November 1999. The jury returned a verdict finding Corkill 52% at fault for the accident, and Lynn 48% at fault. The jury awarded no monetary damages. These timely appeals followed.

DISCUSSION

Damages Compensable under the Wrongful Death Act

[¶ 8] At trial, Knowles proffered the testimony of a psychologist, Dr. Martha Shilling, regarding feelings of abandonment suffered by the children after their mother disappeared. The trial court refused to allow Dr. Shilling to testify on the subject because it determined that any damages relating to feelings of abandonment constituted mental anguish damages and as such were not compensable under Wyoming law. The question before this Court, therefore, is a question of law regarding damages compensable under Wyoming's Wrongful Death statute. We review questions of law de novo. Gray v. Stratton Real Estate, 2001 WY 125, ¶ 5, 36 P.3d 1127, ¶ 5 (Wyo.2001).

[¶ 9] As will be discussed below, based upon Wyoming's Wrongful Death statute and also this Court's interpretation of the statute, Wyoming has a long history of allowing damages for loss of probable future companionship, society and comfort, but does not allow damages for mental anguish. On appeal, Knowles first argues that feelings of abandonment are but a symptom of the loss of probable future companionship, society and comfort, and, therefore, the damages alleged fall within the statutory language. In the alternative, Knowles argues that, if the damages are in the nature of mental anguish, then this Court should take this opportunity to recognize damages for mental anguish as compensable under the statute.

[¶ 10] With regard to Knowles' first argument, we agree with the trial court that any feelings of abandonment suffered by the children must be categorized as mental anguish. The difference between the loss of probable future companionship, society and comfort, which is compensable, and mental anguish, which is not compensable, has been explained and summarized as follows:

[R]ecovery for the beneficiaries' mental anguish is primarily concerned, not with the benefits they have lost, but with the issue of compensating them for their harrowing experience resulting from the death of a loved one. This requires a somewhat negative approach. The fundamental question in this area of damages is what deleterious effect has the death, as such, had upon the mental tranquility and emotional well-being of the claimants? In other areas of damage, the law focuses on more positive aspects of the injury such as what would the decedent, had he lived, have contributed in terms of support, assistance, training, comfort, consortium, etc.

1 Stuart M. Speiser et al., Recovery for Wrongful Death and Injury § 3:38 (3rd ed.1998). Put simply, loss of probable future companionship, society and comfort entails the loss of positive benefits, while mental anguish represents an emotional reaction to the wrongful death.

[¶ 11] Knowles attempts to...