In re Walsh
Decision Date | 23 August 2004 |
Docket Number | No. 03-164.,03-164. |
Citation | 96 P.3d 1,2004 WY 96 |
Parties | In re Cleve Calvin WALSH and Jennifer Lynn Walsh, Debtors. Randy Royal, Appellant (Trustee/Objector), v. Cleve Calvin Walsh and Jennifer Lynn Walsh, Appellees (Debtors/Respondents). |
Court | Wyoming Supreme Court |
Representing Appellant: Randy L. Royal, Greybull, Wyoming.
Representing Appellees: Stephen R. Winship of Winship & Winship, P.C., Casper, Wyoming.
Before HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, LEHMAN, KITE, and VOIGT, JJ.
[¶ 1] In their bankruptcy petition, Cleve Calvin Walsh and Jennifer Lynn Walsh (the Walshes) claimed an exemption of seventy-five percent of the funds garnished from their bank account. The bankruptcy trustee objected to the claimed exemption. The United States Bankruptcy Court, for the District of Wyoming, then certified to this Court the following questions, which we have agreed to answer:
[¶ 2] On April 29, 2003, the Walshes filed a Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition. On the same date, a judgment creditor garnished their bank account. The money in the account—$2,541.18—was derived solely from Mr. Walsh's personal service earnings with his employer. The trustee has objected to the Walshes' claim under Wyo. Stat. Ann § 1-15-408 (LexisNexis 2003) that seventy-five percent of the funds are exempt from garnishment. The pertinent portion of that statute reads as follows:
(a) A writ of post judgment garnishment attaching earnings for personal services shall attach that portion of the defendant's accrued and unpaid disposable earnings, specified in subsection (b) of this section. The writ shall direct the garnishee to withhold from the defendant's accrued disposable earnings the amount attached pursuant to the writ and to pay the exempted amount to the defendant at the time his earnings are normally paid. Earnings for personal services shall be deemed to accrue on the last day of the period in which they were earned or to which they relate. If the writ is served before or on the date the defendant's earnings accrue and before the same have been paid to the defendant, the writ shall be deemed to have been served at the time the periodic earnings accrue. If more than one (1) writ is served, the writ first served shall have priority. Notwithstanding any other provision of this subsection, an income withholding order for child support obtained pursuant to W.S. 20-6-201 through 20-6-222 shall have priority over any other garnishment.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
57 P.3d at 1230 (quoting Wyoming Community College Com'n, 2001 WY 86, ¶ 17, 31 P.3d at 1249).
[¶ 4] In addition to these general rules of construction, we also note more specifically that courts are not free to ignore any word the legislature has used. Keats v. State, 2003 WY 19, ¶ 28, 64 P.3d 104, 113 (Wyo.2003). And finally, "`it is a universal rule that courts will not enlarge, stretch, expand or extend a statute to matters not falling within its express provisions.'" Knowles v. Corkill, 2002 WY 119, ¶ 19, 51 P.3d 859, 865 (Wyo.2002) (quoting Lo Sasso v. Braun, 386 P.2d 630, 632 (Wyo.1963)
).
[¶ 5] It is impossible reasonably to read the words "accrued and unpaid" in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-15-408(a) as meaning anything other than money the debtor has earned but has not yet received. This is especially true inasmuch as the entire subsection is concerned with an employer's responsibilities when served with a writ of garnishment. For example, the garnishee is to "withhold" the amount attached before paying the exempted amount "at the time ... earnings are normally paid." Wyo. Stat. Ann § 1-15-408(a). That is not language directed to a bank holding a debtor's deposits. Further, the statute requires that income withholding orders for child support, which orders attach to "payments" due to an obligor, continue to have priority. See Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 20-6-201 et seq. (LexisNexis 2003). Clearly, this is a statutory construct designed to reach monies not yet paid to the debtor.
[¶ 6] The same is true of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 40-14-505(a)(ii) (LexisNexis 2003), which concerns garnishments resulting from consumer credit transactions. Under that statute, certain amounts are exempt from garnishment where "the earnings of an individual are required to be withheld for payment of a debt." (Emphasis added.) The legislative intent is clear on the face of both Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-15-408(a) and Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 40-14-505(a)(ii)—these statutes deal with unpaid wages or other earnings. They do not deal with wages or other earnings that have made their way into a debtor's bank account.
[¶ 7] While it may seem illogical to extend an exemption to a debtor only until such time as he or she has earnings "in hand," it is not this Court's job to say that the law should be something other than it is. Rather, it is this Court's job only to determine legislative intent from the law as it is. And as it is, the law now clearly limits this exemption to "accrued and unpaid" earnings.
[¶ 8] We answer the first certified question in the negative, making it unnecessary to answer the second question.
[¶ 9] I must respectfully dissent. Upon consideration of the certified questions, I reach a different conclusion than that reached by the majority. Accordingly, I would hold that disposable income derived from a debtor's wages and deposited into the debtor's bank account are exempt from garnishment under Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 1-15-408 and 40-14-505(b) (LexisNexis 2003) if the debtor can establish by competent evidence that such sums were derived from earnings for personal services.
[¶ 10] It is clear that pursuant to Wyoming Stat. Ann. § 1-20-109 (LexisNexis 2001), Wyoming has "opted-out" of the federal exemptions and has prescribed its own recognized exemption structure as allowed by law. Section 1-15-408 provides such an exemption. That statute provides:
Section 40-14-505 sets forth:
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