Knowles v. State
| Decision Date | 26 January 1977 |
| Docket Number | No. 49449,49449 |
| Citation | 341 So.2d 913 |
| Parties | Jack KNOWLES v. STATE of Mississippi. |
| Court | Mississippi Supreme Court |
Mitchell, Rogers, Eskridge, Voge & Clayton, Dennis W. Voge, Tupelo, for appellant.
A. F. Summer, Atty. Gen., by Catherine Walker, Sp. Asst. Atty. Gen., Jackson, for appellee.
Before PATTERSON, SUGG and WALKER, JJ.
SUGG, Justice, for the Court:
Jack Knowles was convicted in the Circuit Court of Lee County for the crime of receiving stolen property and sentenced to serve a term of five years in the State Penitentiary.
The questions on this appeal are: (1) Whether defendant, who was an accessory before the fact, but was not present at the actual caption and asportation of the stolen goods or took no part therein, but who received the goods after the theft, may be convicted of receiving stolen property. (2) Whether defendant was entitled to written statements in possession of the district attorney made by the state's witnesses.
Johnson and Wren testified for the state that they approached the defendant and asked him if he would buy some chairs from them. The defendant agreed to purchase some chairs and Johnson told defendant that he and Wren were going to steal some chairs that night from Action Industries. Johnson asked defendant for the use of a tractor to pull a trailer that was to be used in the robbery. The defendant agreed that he would furnish a red Chevrolet tractor which would be left parked at his service station, but Johnson and Wren would have to wait until he closed the service station before picking up the tractor. Keys were left in the tractor and Johnson and Wren both testified that they found the red Chevrolet tractor at the service station as planned. They drove to Pontotoc County, picked up a trailer from a furniture manufacturing company, proceeded to Action Industries and stole about one hundred chairs. These chairs, along with the trailer, were left at the furniture manufacturing plant in Pontotoc County. Johnson and Wren then returned to Action Industries where they connected the tractor to a trailer loaded with chairs owned by Action Industries and delivered the chairs to the Walking Horse Truck Stop for the defendant, in accordance with their plans. Johnson and Wren returned the trailer to Action Industries and the tractor to defendant's service station. They further testified that defendant agreed to lend them the tractor and purchase the chairs with full knowledge of the planned robbery. They stated that the defendant paid them $1500 the next day and owed them an additional sum of money for the chairs stolen and delivered to him.
The defendant denied any knowledge of the robbery, denied that he lent a tractor to the robbers, denied that he agreed to purchase the chairs, and denied that he purchased the chairs.
Defendant's first assignment of error is that he was entitled to a peremptory instruction because the proof showed that he was an accessory before the fact. He argues that, under our holding in Anderson v. State, 232 So.2d 364 (Miss.1970), he could not be convicted of receiving stolen property because the state's case showed he was guilty as a principal of the crime of larceny. In Anderson, Booth, a witness for the state, testified that Anderson agreed to buy a cow from him for $70 and to cancel Booth's debt at Anderson's liquor store if Booth would steal a cow from Joe Jones. He also testified that he stole a second cow from Jones and got a person to help him load the first cow, and Anderson secured the services of Bobby Easterling to haul the second stolen cow. He said the second cow was delivered to Anderson who paid for the cow. We held that Anderson actually advised and procured the commission of the crime; therefore, he was an accessory before the fact and thus was deemed and considered a principal under the provisions of Mississippi Code Annotated section 97-1-3 (1972). We further held that Anderson could not be convicted of receiving stolen property because he was guilty as a principal of the crime of larceny and we adhere to the rule that one who steals property cannot be convicted of receiving, concealing or aiding in concealing stolen property. Thomas v. State, 205 Miss. 653, 39 So.2d 272 (1949); Manning v. State, 129 Miss. 179, 91 So. 902 (1922). In Manning we held that the offense of stealing property and the offense or receiving stolen property are akin to the extent that the crime of receiving stolen goods cannot be committed, except as to goods which have been stolen, but the thief cannot be guilty of both offenses.
Anderson, supra, conflicts with our holding in Steele v. State, 213 Miss. 739, 57 So.2d 574 (1952). The facts in Steele are very similar to the facts in Anderson. The testimony for the state in Steele disclosed that Steele went to the home of Corley, who was employed as a day laborer by the owner of a stock farm, and arranged with Corley and Padgett to haul the cattle to the home of Steele after Steele had actually selected the ones that he wanted delivered to him. Steele was convicted of receiving stolen property and his conviction was affirmed. The Court commented that the testimony of the state warranted either a charge of grand larceny or receiving stolen property.
The prevailing rule pertaining to accessories to larceny being charged with receiving stolen property agrees with our conclusion in Steele,supra, and is stated in 76 C.J.S. Receiving Stolen Goods § 14c at 20 (1952) as follows:
An apparent exception to the rule that one who steals property cannot be convicted of receiving it, as discussed supra subdivision b of this section, is that one who was an accessory before or after the fact but was not present at the actual caption and asportation of the goods or took no part therein, but who received the goods after the theft, may be convicted of receiving stolen goods, and this is true, although statutes provide, or the rule is applied that a person who has been an accessory to a theft may be convicted as principal thief.
To the same effect is the holding of the Supreme Court of Nevada in State v. Sheeley 63 Nev. 88, 162 P.2d 96 (1945) where the Nevada Court stated Thus, it has been said that the reason for the general rule, that is, that the thief may not receive the stolen property from himself, disappears where the receiving of the stolen property is not embraced in the caption and asportation, or where the person prosecuted for the receiving is not the principal thief or guilty of the actual taking and carrying away, although guilty of assisting in the larceny or as accessory before or after the fact. Accordingly, the prevailing American rule appears to be that an accused may be convicted of criminally receiving stolen property, even though he was a guilty participant in the stealing of it, where he took no part in the actual caption and asportation but participated only as an accessory before or after the fact, or in a manner not involving his presence at the taking, even though made a principal in the larceny artificially, by statute. (162 P.2d at 99).
We are of the opinion that the better rule is that one who is an accessory before the fact to larceny, but not present at the actual caption and asportation, but received the goods after the theft may be indicted either for larceny or for receiving stolen goods. Larceny and knowingly receiving stolen property are separate and distinct crimes under out statutes. The state, of course, must elect by its indictment which charge it will proceed on and may not try a person for both larceny and knowingly receiving stolen property where the same property is involved. Manning v. State, supra. We overrule that part of Anderson v. State, 232 So.2d 364 (Miss.1970) holding that an accessory before the fact to larceny who is not present at the actual caption and asportation of the stolen goods may not be convicted of knowingly receiving stolen property.
The second error urged by defendant is that the trial court erred when it refused to require the state...
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...Williams may have been accessory before the fact of the theft, but this is no obstacle to the present prosecution. Knowles v. State, 341 So.2d 913, 915-16 (Miss.1977). Given the legal definition of the offense, coupled with established limits upon our scope of review of jury verdicts in cri......
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