Knowlton v. Inhabitants of Swampscott

• Decision Date: 09 July 1932
• Parties: KNOWLTON et al. v. INHABITANTS OF SWAMPSCOTT.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

280 Mass. 69

181 N.E. 849

KNOWLTON et al.

v.INHABITANTS OF SWAMPSCOTT.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Essex.

July 9, 1932.

Appeal from Supreme Judicial Court, Essex County; Wait, Judge.

Bill by Daniel F. Knowlton and others against the Inhabitants of Swampscott. From an interlocutory decree sustaining a demurrer, plaintiffs appeal, and the case is reported to the Supreme Judicial Court.

Affirmed.Starr Parsons, Arthur G. Wadleith, and Patrick F. Crowley, all of Lynn, for plaintiffs.

Harry D. Linscott, Town Counsel, of Lynn, for defendants.

RUGG, C. J.

This case comes before us on a report after appeal from an interlocutory decree sustaining grounds 3 and 5 and overruling other grounds set forth in the demurrer to the bill. The allegations of the bill in substance are these: The plaintiffs are the owners of a tract of land in the defendant town bounded on the south and west by the Atlantic Ocean, of great value for business uses. It has a special value for hotel purposes, to which it has been devoted for many years. It is of greatly diminished value for residential purposes and there is little or no demand for dwelling houses in the location and the land is unsalable for that use. In 1924, the defendant adopted a zoning by-law whereby the land of the plaintiffs was placed in a general residence district. The land is unsalable and has no valuable use as zoned, but is salable at a large price if available for new structures to be devoted to hotel purposes. Land across the street from the land of the plaintiffs is zoned and occupied for business. Inclusion of the plaintiffs' land in the general residence district does not promote the health, safety, convenience and general welfare of the inhabitants in the vicinity, or of the town as a whole, and is not indispensible to the general plan of zoning. The result of the zoning, if allowed to stand, is that the plaintiffs will be deprived of their property in violation of their constitutional rights.

1. The demurrer to this part of the bill is that the plaintiffs have a plain, adequate, and complete remedy at law.

It is manifest that there have been no interferences with the uses of the land and the several buildings thereon for the purposes to which they were devoted when the zoning ordinance was adopted. There are no allegations of that nature. Such interference is not permissible under the statute enabling municipalities to adopt zoning by-laws, G. L. c. 40, § 29, as amended by St. 1925, c. 116, § 3. The complaint of the plaintiffs is that, as zoned, they cannot sell their land for the construction of new buildings for hotel purposes, and that, if that were permitted, they believe that they could sell it for a much higher price.

The General Court has covered the filed of zoning by towns by a comprehensive scheme of legislation. G. L. c. 40, §§ 25-32, both inclusive, as amended. It is provided by section 27A, added by St. 1924, c. 133, that a board of appeals created by the statute may vary the application of a zoning by-law ‘in specific cases wherein its enforcement would involve practical difficulty or unnecessary hardship and wherein desirable relief may be granted without substantially derogating from the intent and purpose of such by-law. * * * Any person aggrieved by a decision of the board of appeals * * * may * * * bring a petition in the supreme judicial court for a writ of certiorari to correct errors of law therein.’ Any party suffering injury to his property through the operation of a zoning by-law is thus given opportunity to present his complaint to a tribunal provided by law, familiar with the local conditions, and to secure the relief to which he is entitled if any. This statutory remedy is not illusory or inadequate as matter of law. Experience has demonstrated its practical utility. Relief has not infrequently been afforded by boards of appeal; and their errors of law have been corrected by certiorari. Bradley v. Board of Zoning Adjustment, 255 Mass. 160, 150 N. E. 892;Norcross v. Board of Appeal, 255 Mass. 177, 150 N. E. 887;Hammond v. Board of Appeal, 257 Mass. 446, 154 N. E. 82;Kane v. Board of Appeals, 273 Mass. 97, 173 N. E. 1;Roman Catholic Archbishop of Boston v. Board of Appeal, 268 Mass. 416, 167 N. E. 672;Prusik v. Board of Appeal, 262 Mass. 451, 160 N. E. 312.

It is a general principle that, where a statute covers the whole subject to which it relates, including means for redress for wrongs arising in connection with it, other provisions of law are superseded. School Committee of City of Lowell v. Mayor of Lowell, 265 Mass. 353, 356, 357, 164 N. E. 91, and cases collected; A. L. Smith Lron Works v. Maryland Casualty Co., 275 Mass. 74, 175 N. E. 82;Paquette v. Fall River, 278 Mass. 172, 179 N. E. 588;Shriver v. Woodbine Savings Bank, 285 U. S.467, 52 S. Ct. 430, 76 L. Ed.884. The subject of zoning in this Commonwealth is the creation of statute under art. 60 of Amendments to the Constitution. Kilgour v. Gratto, 224 Mass. 78, 112 N. E. 489;Opinion of the Justices, 234 Mass. 597, 127 N. E. 525;Inspector of Buildings of Lowell v. Stoklosa, 250 Mass. 52, 145 N. E. 262. In appropriate instances, the proper public officer, improperly refusing to issue a building permit under zoning by-laws, ordinances or statutes, may be compelled to do so by mandamus. Spector v. Building Inspector of Milton, 250 Mass. 63, 145 N. E. 265;Bancroft v. Building Commissioner of City of Boston, 257 Mass. 82, 153 N. E. 319.

A party cannot come into equity to secure relief open to him at law. Where...