Knowlton v. McMahon

• Decision Date: 01 January 1868
• Citation: 13 Minn. 358
• Parties: BARNARD K. KNOWLTON v. HENRY McMAHON.
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

13 Minn. 358

BARNARD K. KNOWLTON

v. HENRY McMAHON.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

Appeal by defendant from an order of the district court, Benton county, denying a new trial.

Plaintiff had a verdict and defendant moved for a new trial for misconduct of the jury, and of the officer in charge of them, and on the hearing offered to read the affidavits of two of the jurors to show that the officer conversed with, and sought to, and did, influence the verdict. On objection these affidavits were excluded. The motion was denied.

Moore & Kerr, for appellant.

Gordon & Collins, for respondent.

WILSON, C. J.

The rule seems to be settled by the modern authorities, that on a motion for a new trial the affidavit of a juror will not be received to impeach the verdict. St. Martin v. Desnoyer, 1 Minn. 159, (Gil. 131;) Chadbourn v. Franklin, 5 Gray, 415; Doran v. Shaw, 3 Monroe, 416; Johnson v. Davenport, 3 J. J. Marsh. 390; Little v. Larrabee, 2 Greenl. 37, and notes; Graham & Wat. New Trials.

The appellant's position that the case at bar is an exception to the general rule, is not supported by the authorities.

The decision of the courts in Tennessee are not followed in the other states. Thomas v. Chapman, 45 Barb. 98, rests on the authority of Reynolds v. Champlain Trans. Co. (9 How. Pr. 7,) which does not support it. The other cases cited by him to which I have had access are not in point.

Doran v. Shaw is an authority against him. In that case the affidavit of jurors were offered to show the improper acts of the deputy sheriff in the jury room, and they were held inadmissible. The court said:

"It is, however, said that this case is different from those decided, and forms an exception to the general rule; that here the jurors are called to prove improper conduct in the attending sheriff, and not in themselves. If this was a prosecution against the sheriff for this breach of duty, we should have no doubt that the jurors were competent witnesses. But this is not the object of the proof. They took from the sheriff his instructions and assertions, and some depose that they conceived at the time that he had a right to give them, and that trusting to his assertions, they changed their opinions, and absolutely agreed to the verdict rendered. The motives or reasons which influenced their determination to change, and their wrongful admission of that influence, is the very essence of their testimony in favor of the complainant. And it is to prohibit an inquiry into these motives, and these influences resorted to in the jury-room, that they are excluded. It is because that parties, by subsequent tampering and reasoning with the jurors, might sap many verdicts by using them as witnesses to prove the grounds of their findings; and this is the very matter inquired into in this cause."

See, also, People v. Carnal, 1 Parker, Cr. R. 256.

The general rule has its foundation in public policy, and I am not willing to go so far as to say that it is inflexible, and without exceptions.

Perhaps, as said by Mr. Chief Justice Taney, in United States v. Reid, 12 How....