Knox v. City of Monroe

• Decision Date: 12 March 2008
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. 07-606.
• Citation: 551 F.Supp.2d 504
• Parties: Peggy Sue KNOX v. CITY OF MONROE and Don Hopkins.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of Louisiana

Page 504

551 F.Supp.2d 504

Peggy Sue KNOX v. CITY OF MONROE and Don Hopkins.

Civil Action No. 07-606.

United States District Court, W.D. Louisiana, Monroe Division.

March 12, 2008.

Nelson Welch Cameron, Shreveport, LA, for Peggy Sue Knox.

Michael J. O'Shee, Steven M. Oxenhandler, Trevor S. Fry, Gold Weems et al., Alexandria, LA, for City of Monroe and Don Hopkins.

RULING

ROBERT G. JAMES, District Judge.

This is an employment discrimination action brought by Plaintiff Peggy Sue Knox ("Knox") against her former employer, City of Monroe ("the City"), and her former supervisor, Don Hopkins ("Hopkins"). Knox alleges that she was terminated because of her race (white), in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq. ("Title VII"), 42 U.S.C. § 1981, and the Louisiana Employment Discrimination Law ("LEDL"), La.Rev.Stat. 23:301, et seq.¹ She also asserts state law claims of negligent or intentional infliction of emotional distress.

Defendants have filed a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment [Doc. No. 16], which is opposed in part by Knox. For the following reasons, Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.

I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HITORY

On November 9, 1998, Knox was hired by the City as a truck driver.

After she sustained an eye injury, Knox could no longer work in the sun and was reassigned to a clerical position with the City.

In April 2004, Hopkins, who is black, became the Public Works Superintendent and Knox's supervisor. Knox claims that, at that time, he made statements "to the effect of replacing white clerical personnel with blacks." [Doc. No. 26, ¶ 6].

In July 2004, Knox was moved from the "front office" to a rear dock. A black female employee was allegedly moved to the front office position.

In October 2004, Knox was allegedly one of approximately 80 employees who received written warnings on excessive absenteeism.

On January 26, 2005, Hopkins fired Knox for the stated reason of her excessive absenteeism. Knox contends that the stated reason was a pretext for discrimination.

On April 3, 2007, Knox filed a Complaint in this matter. On June 26, 2007, Defendants timely filed an Answer, raising the defense of prescription, among others.

On October 17, 2007, Defendants obtained leave of Court to file an Amended Answer. In that Amended Answer, Defendants again raised the defense of prescription and also that Knox failed to state a claim.

On January 29, 2008, Knox obtained leave of Court to amend her complaint to add an claim under the Family and Medical Leave Act. On February 6, 2008, Defendants filed a second Amended Answer reasserting its previous defenses and again specifically asserting a statute of limitations/prescription defense.

II. LAW AND ANALYSIS

A. Standard of Review

Knox takes issue with Defendants' styling of the pending motion as a motion for summary judgment. Knox contends that this motion is in actuality an untimely motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).

As Defendants properly point out, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 provides that "[a] party against whom relief is sought may move at any time, with or without supporting affidavits, for summary judgment on all or part of the claim." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(b) (emphasis added).²

Further, to the extent that Knox contends that Defendants have raised an untimely defense to her § 1981 claim, the Court disagrees. Defendants timely raised the defenses of failure to state a claim and prescription in their pleadings.

Having determined that Defendants have properly filed a motion for partial summary judgment, the Court now sets forth the applicable standard of review. Summary judgment is appropriate only when the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, together with any affidavits, show that there are no, genuine issues as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). The moving party bears the initial burden of informing the court of the basis for its motion by identifying portions of the record which highlight the absence of genuine issues of material fact. Topalian v. Ehrman, 954 F.2d 1125, 1132 (5th Cir.1992). If the moving party can meet the initial burden, the burden then shifts to the nonmoving party to establish the existence of a genuine issue of material fact for trial. Norman v. Apache Corp., 19 F.3d 1017, 1023 (5th Cir.1994). The nonmoving party must show more than "some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986).

B. Title VII Claim Against Hopkins

Knox originally asserted a Title VII claim against her former supervisor, Hopkins. Defendants contend that she has failed to state a claim as a matter of law, and Hopkins is entitled to summary judgment.

Title VII prohibits an employer from "discriminat[ing] against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1).

Under Title VII, "relief ... is available only against an employer, not an individual supervisor or fellow employee." Foley v. University of Houston Sys., 355 F.3d 333, 340, n. 8 (5th Cir.2003); see also 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (definition of "employer"); Grant v. Lone Star Co., 21 F.3d 649, 651-53 (5th Cir.1994) (individual not liable under Title VII unless he meets definition of "employer").

In Opposition to Defendants' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, Knox agrees that she has no Title VII cause of action against Hopkins individually. In her subsequently filed Amended Complaint, Knox asserts a Title VII claim against the City, but not against Hopkins. [Doc. No. 26]. Accordingly, to the extent that Knox still asserts a Title VII claim against Hopkins, Defendants' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment is GRANTED, and this claim is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

C. State Law Claims Against Hopkins and the City

Knox originally asserted state law claims of negligent or intentional infliction of emotional distress and of race discrimination under the LEDL against both Defendants. Defendants have moved for summary judgment on the basis that these claims have all prescribed. Knox agrees that the claims are prescribed and does not assert any state law claims in her Amended Complaint. [Doc. No. 26]. Accordingly, Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment on Knox's state law claims is GRANTED, and these claims are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

D. Section 1981 Claim Against Hopkins in his Individual Capacity

Knox also asserts claims against Hopkins individually pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1981.³

Section 1981 provides that "[a]ll persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same right in every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts ... as is enjoyed by white⁴ citizens." 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a). Section 1981's protections against race discrimination "include[] the making, performance, modification, and termination of contracts, and the enjoyment of all benefits, privileges, terms, and conditions of the contractual relationship." 42 U.S.C. § 1981(b); see Felton v. Pollen, 315 F.3d 470, 483 (5th Cir.2002) (citing § 1981) (other citations omitted), abrogated on other grounds by Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 126 S.Ct. 2405, 165 L.Ed.2d 345 (2006).

Defendants argue that, based on Fifth Circuit precedent, Knox has no cause of action against Hopkins in his individual capacity. In the alternative, Defendants argue that Knox was required to assert her § 1981 claim through 42 U.S.C. § 1983 because Hopkins is a municipal actor, and that she failed to do so. Finally, Defendants contend that Knox cannot now amend her complaint to properly assert a § 1983 claim because the amendment will not relate back to her original Complaint, and the statute of limitations has run.

Defendants rely on Oden v. Oktibbeha County, Miss., 246 F.3d 458 (5th Cir.2001), for their contention that Knox is precluded from suing Hopkins in his individual capacity. In Oden, a deputy brought suit against a county sheriff and the county for failure to promote under Title VII and § 1981. Under § 1981, Oden asserted both official and individual capacity claims against the sheriff. Addressing the individual capacity claim, the Fifth Circuit explained that the Supreme Court "has not imposed personal liability on elected officials for discrimination in the terms and conditions of local government employment contracts." Id. at 464 (emphasis added). Relying on Title VII case law,⁵ the Fifth Circuit concluded that "when a plaintiff asserts a cause of action under § 1981 for discrimination in the terms and conditions of a municipal employment contract, the proper defendant is the government employer in his official capacity. Because Sheriff Bryan's choice to promote [someone other than the plaintiff] to chief deputy was an official decision, he is not personally liable under § 1981."⁶ Id.

In both earlier and more recent cases, the Fifth Circuit has recognized a cause of action against an unelected government employee in his individual capacity. The first case to address this issue was Faraca v. Clements, 506 F.2d 956 (5th Cir.1975). The Faracas, a racially mixed couple, were denied employment at a Georgia mental retardation center and brought suit under § 1981 against the director who made the decision. "Technically, the State of Georgia was the prospective employer and only it would be in a position to refuse to enter into a contract." Id. at 959. Therefore, the Faraca Court explained that the director's liability "must be assessable for interfering with the right to contract." Id. Relying on Supreme Court decisions interpreting 42 U.S.C. § 1982, the Faraca Court determined that § 1981 should be interpreted broadly to prohibit the director's conduct...