Knubbe v. Sparrow

• Decision Date: 14 December 1992
• Docket Number: No. 91-CV-77152-DT.,91-CV-77152-DT.
• Citation: 808 F. Supp. 1295
• Parties: Sheila KNUBBE and David Aslani, Plaintiffs, v. David J. SPARROW, Gerald J. Rowin, Walter R. Reynolds, Charles Eberly, State Mutual Assurance Company of America, Management Corporation of America, a Michigan corporation, John P. Stocking, a Property Manager for Management Corporation of Michigan, Individually, Bill MacMillan, Glenda MacMillan, Resident Managers of North Shore Apartments, Individually, and All Named Defendants, Jointly and/or Severally, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of Michigan

808 F. Supp. 1295

Sheila KNUBBE and David Aslani, Plaintiffs, v. David J. SPARROW, Gerald J. Rowin, Walter R. Reynolds, Charles Eberly, State Mutual Assurance Company of America, Management Corporation of America, a Michigan corporation, John P. Stocking, a Property Manager for Management Corporation of Michigan, Individually, Bill MacMillan, Glenda MacMillan, Resident Managers of North Shore Apartments, Individually, and All Named Defendants, Jointly and/or Severally, Defendants.

No. 91-CV-77152-DT.

United States District Court, E.D. Michigan, S.D.

December 14, 1992.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Rudolph A. Wartella, East Pointe, MI, for plaintiffs.

Thomas M. Jinks, Troy, MI, for defendants.

ORDER

JULIAN ABELE COOK, JR., Chief Judge.

On December 30, 1991, the Plaintiffs¹ filed a lawsuit with this court on the basis of 42 U.S.C. § 1985, contending, in essence, that their eviction from an apartment development had been executed by the Defendants² in violation of their rights under, inter alia, the First, Seventh and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and 42 U.S.C. § 1985. During the following month, the Plaintiffs amended their Complaint to include a second count which charged each of the Defendants with violating their rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. On September 2, 1992, the Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment³ and a motion to terminate harassing depositions.⁴

For the reasons stated below, the Defendants' motion must be granted.⁵

I

On or about December 30, 1987, the Plaintiffs signed a one year agreement⁶ with the North Shore Apartments Company to lease an apartment in St. Clair Shores, Michigan⁷. Shortly after moving into their apartment, they experienced a variety of problems with the utilities, appliances, plumbing, electrical and sanitary conditions that were not corrected by the Defendants to their satisfaction. On June 10, 1988, the Defendants initiated legal proceedings in an effort to evict the Plaintiffs from their apartment for non-payment of rent.

On September 9, 1988, the 40th District Court of Michigan entered a judgment in favor of the Defendants after determining that they had a right to the possession of the apartment and to the entry of a judgment for money damages.⁸ The Plaintiffs' appeal to the Macomb County Circuit Court was unsuccessful.

Following a rejection of the Plaintiffs' appeal by the Macomb County Circuit Court, the 40th District Court entered a judgment in favor of the Defendants on January 26, 1989, in which it authorized the immediate eviction of the Plaintiffs from the apartment. Acting on the authority of a court order, several officers entered the Plaintiffs' apartment on the following day and forcibly removed them, as well as their property.⁹

II

It is the Defendants' position that the entry of a summary judgment is warranted in this cause because (1) the doctrine of res judicata precludes the commencement of any further litigation between the parties over the same issues that have been identified in the First Amended Complaint and (2) the Plaintiffs have failed to identify any public official who deprived them of their constitutional rights directly or by conspiracy under their § 1983 and § 1985 theories.

The Plaintiffs reject the assertion that the doctrine of res judicata is a bar to the present action because (1) the state courts were unable and unwilling to protect their federal rights and (2) the state laws did not afford them a fair procedure in which to assert their constitutional claims.¹⁰

Moreover, they maintain that the Defendants discriminated against them on the basis of Aslani's ethnic origin and fraudulently influenced the state court to enforce an "unconstitutional state law". To them, their unlawful eviction by the Defendants can be characterized as an act under the color of state law which, in turn, deprived them of their constitutional rights.

III

Rule 12(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure¹¹ permits a party to raise several defenses including the absence of subject matter jurisdiction and the failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. "In order for a complaint to be dismissed for failure to state a claim, a court must conclude `beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.'" Carver v. Bunch, 946 F.2d 451, 452 (6th Cir.1991) (quoting Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 521, 92 S.Ct. 594, 596, 30 L.Ed.2d 652 (1972) (per curiam)). Moreover, the court must liberally construe the pleading in favor of the non-moving party and accept all well-pleaded allegations as being true. Dayco Corp. v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 523 F.2d 389 (6th Cir. 1975).¹²

Under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a summary judgment is to be entered if the moving party demonstrates that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact, and if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could find only for the moving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2509-2510, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). In making this determination, the court is authorized to examine any pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions, and affidavits in a light that is most favorable to the non-moving party. Boyd v. Ford Motor Company, 948 F.2d 283, 285 (6th Cir.1991), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 112 S.Ct. 1481, 117 L.Ed.2d 624 (1992). A party's failure to make a showing that is "sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial ..." will mandate the entry of a summary judgment. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2552-2553, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986).

A

The doctrine of res judicata is intended to conserve judicial resources, prevent inconsistent decisions and relieve the costs that are involved in multiple lawsuits. Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 94, 101 S.Ct. 411, 414, 66 L.Ed.2d 308 (1980). The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals (Sixth Circuit) has stated:

As a general matter, the doctrine of res judicata forecloses relitigation of matters that were determined, or should have been raised, in a prior suit in which a court entered a final judgment on the merits.

Fellowship of Christ Church v. Thorburn, 758 F.2d 1140, 1143 (6th Cir.1985) (with reference to Migra v. Warren City School Dist., 465 U.S. 75, 104 S.Ct. 892, 79 L.Ed.2d 56 (1984)). Under federal common law, three exceptions exist to the application of res judicata. Id. at 1143-1144. Res judicata is inappropriate where (1) the state courts were unable or unwilling to protect federal rights, (2) the claimant has not "freely and without reservation" submitted his federal claims for a decision by the state court or (3) "the party against whom an earlier decision is asserted did not have a full and fair opportunity to litigate the claim or issue decided by the first court." Id. (citations omitted).

When no federal common law exception to the doctrine applies, a district court must give the final order of a state court the preclusive effect that the state court themselves would give that order. Fellowship of Christ Church, 758 F.2d at 1144 (citations omitted).¹³ If the doctrine of res judicata is applicable, the entry of an order of dismissal is appropriate. Id. at 1145 (citing Gose v. Monroe Auto Equipment, 409 Mich. 147, 294 N.W.2d 165 (1980)).

In the present case, the Plaintiffs contend that the state court was unwilling and unable to protect their federal rights. In support of their argument, the Plaintiffs have filed excerpts from the state court proceedings in which the judge opined:

If you the Plaintiffs have, in fact, been discriminated upon on the basis of national origin or race or whatever, there are many remedies provided for you in the law. One of those remedies is not permanent possession of an apartment.... Whether you have another suit, another action, another law suit for the actions on behalf of the Defendants is a matter that will be decided in another court, at another time, but not today and not in this action.

(Transcript January 26, 1989, at 30). The Defendants contend that an eviction, which is held to be lawful by a state court, cannot be determined to be unlawful at the same time.¹⁴ The Defendants are mistaken. An act may be held to be lawful under state law and unlawful under federal law.

Notwithstanding, the Plaintiffs have alleged a federal common law exception to the application of the res judicata doctrine. Therefore, the court will not adopt the doctrine of res judicata, and will now address the merits of each claim.

B

42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides, in part, that: every person, who under color of any statute ... of any State ... subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law....

In order to recover under this statute, a plaintiff must prove that (1) the defendant has deprived him of a right that has been secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States and (2) in depriving him of the constitutional right, the defendant acted "under color of law". Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 535, 101 S.Ct. 1908, 1912, 68 L.Ed.2d 420 (1981); See also Adickes v. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 150, 90 S.Ct. 1598, 1604, 26 L.Ed.2d 142 (1970) (with reference to Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 184, 187, 81 S.Ct. 473, 482, 484, 5 L.Ed.2d 492 (1961) and United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787, 793, 794, 86 S.Ct. 1152, 1156, 16 L.Ed.2d 267 (1966)).¹⁵ The term, "under color of law," requires that the conduct, which allegedly caused the deprivation, be fairly attributable to the state. Lugar v. Edmonson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 937, 102 S.Ct. 2744, 2753, 73 L.Ed.2d 482 (1981)¹⁶; See Flagg Bros., Inc. v....