Kobza v. Tripp
| Decision Date | 27 February 2001 |
| Docket Number | No. 18988-1-III.,18988-1-III. |
| Citation | 18 P.3d 621,105 Wash.App. 90 |
| Parties | John E. KOBZA, Jay E. Kobza, and Mary A. Fish, Respondents, v. Larry T. TRIPP and Alma M. Tripp, husband and wife, Appellants. |
| Court | Washington Court of Appeals |
Pamela H. Rohr, Spokane, for Appellants.
Jerry L. Kagele, Spokane, for Respondents.
A quiet title action is an equitable action. It allows a party in peaceable possession of real property to compel others who assert a hostile right to assert that right and submit it to judicial determination. Because it is an equitable action, damages are not ordinarily allowed in a quiet title action. 17 WILLIAM B. STOEBUCK, WASHINGTON PRACTICE, REAL ESTATE: PROPERTY LAW § 10.11, at 630 (1995). Here, John Kobza, Jay Kobza, and Mary Fish (the Kobzas) sued to quiet title to an easement because Larry and Alna Tripp1 claimed that the easement had reverted by abandonment and adverse possession. The Kobzas' sale of the property for $35,000 fell through because of the Tripps' assertion. The court quieted title in the Kobzas and then awarded them $35,000 for the loss of the sale.
The question before us is whether the Kobzas' "Complaint to Quiet Title and for Injunction" alleges, and whether the court's findings of fact and conclusions of law support, a cognizable legal theory for the recovery of damages. We conclude that the complaint does not state a cause of action for damages, nor do the court's findings and conclusions support any legally cognizable cause of action for the recovery of damages. We therefore reverse the award of damages.
The Kobzas' parents, the Tripps, and a third family jointly owned several tracts of property in Spokane County. The property was divided in the early 1970s. The parents and the Tripps exchanged quitclaim deeds for four of the tracts. The parents retained an easement over the Tripps' lots. They also filed notice of the easement in the quitclaim deed to the Tripps. In 1972, the Kobzas' parents permitted the Tripps to construct a fence that blocked the easement.
The Kobzas' parents divorced in the mid-1980s. And they quitclaimed their interests in tracts 1 and 2 to their three children, John E. and Jay Kobza and Mary Fish. In 1994, the Kobzas agreed to sell the property for $35,000. The Kobzas promised the buyers a useable easement to the property and a closing date of January 31, 1995. But before the closing date, the Tripps told the buyers that the easement was null and void. The buyers backed out of the sale.
The Kobzas then sued the Tripps to quiet title, for an injunction, and for damages. The trial judge found the easement valid and quieted title in the Kobzas. She also found that the wrongful denial of the easement caused the Kobzas to lose the sale. And based on that finding the court awarded the Kobzas the full sale price, $35,000, along with statutory attorney fees and costs, and interest.
The Tripps moved for reconsideration of the damage award. They argued that the land was not without value just because the sale fell through. The Kobzas responded that the Tripps had the burden to limit their damages. And by failing to present a defense limiting damages, the Tripps waived the defense. The trial court denied the Tripps' motion for reconsideration.
Both parties argue only the propriety of the court's damage award. But in order to reach that question, we must first decide the cause of action upon which any damage award would be predicated. Both parties here apparently assume the element of a valid cause of action for damages and, therefore, dispute only the measure of damages.
But the complaint alleges no cause of action upon which the court could base a damage award. Paragraph 7 simply complains about the defendants' interference with the easement:
Defendants have refused to allow Plaintiffs the use of said easement and are claiming that said easement has reverted to Defendants by abandonment and adverse possession. As a result of Defendants' actions, Plaintiffs have been unable to sell their property and have been damaged by Defendants' actions in sums to be proven at the time of trial of this matter.
Clerk's Papers (CP) at 4. The troubling questions here are first whether the "defendants' actions" provide a legally cognizable basis for a damage award. Berge v. Gorton, 88 Wash.2d 756, 762-63, 567 P.2d 187 (1977) (). And second, whether we can construe the court's findings of fact in a way that would support any conclusion of law for a legally cognizable cause of action for damages. Price v. Kitsap Transit, 125 Wash.2d 456, 465-66, 886 P.2d 556 (1994) (). In pertinent part the court's findings read:
19. Defendants have refused to allow plaintiffs the use of said easement and, as a result, plaintiffs lost the real estate sale.
CP at 98. What is missing are any findings which would support a legal cause of action for damages. The complaint accordingly does not allege, nor do the findings support, any cause of action for damages.
Standard of Review. The question of damages is usually discretionary and therefore for the trier of fact, so long as it falls within the range of relevant evidence. Rorvig v. Douglas, 123 Wash.2d 854, 861, 873 P.2d 492 (1994); Shields v. Garrison, 91 Wash.App. 381, 386, 957 P.2d 805 (1998). But the appropriate measure of damages for a given cause of action is a question of law, which we review de novo. Fisher Properties, Inc. v. Arden-Mayfair, Inc., 106 Wash.2d 826, 843, 726 P.2d 8 (1986).
Quiet Title Action. An action to quiet title is equitable and designed to resolve competing claims of ownership. In Washington, such actions are governed by RCW 7.28.010.2 An action to quiet title allows a person in peaceable possession or claiming the right to possession of real property to compel others who assert a hostile right or claim to come forward and assert their right or claim and submit it to judicial determination. Even if the claim asserted (here the absence of an easement) is absolutely invalid, the parties are still entitled to a decree saying so. McGuinness v. Hargiss, 56 Wash. 162, 164, 105 P. 233 (1909), overruled on other grounds by Rorvig, 123 Wash.2d 854,873 P.2d 492 (1994). Another and more colorful way of stating the same proposition is that " McGuinness, 56 Wash. at 164, 105 P. 233 (quoting Castro v. Barry, 79...
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