Koch v. Mayor, Etc., of City of New York

• Decision Date: 02 March 1897
• Citation: 152 N.Y. 72,46 N.E. 170
• Parties: KOCH v. MAYOR, ETC., OF CITY OF NEW YORK.
• Court: New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

152 N.Y. 72

46 N.E. 170

KOCH

v.MAYOR, ETC., OF CITY OF NEW YORK.

Court of Appeals of New York.

March 2, 1897.

Appeal from supreme court, appellate division, First department.

Action by Joseph Koch against the mayor and commonalty of the city of New York. A judgment for defendant entered on demurrer to the complaint having been affirmed by the appellate division of the supreme court (39 N. Y. Supp. 164), plaintiff appeals. Affirmed.

The plaintiff alleged in his complaint that on the 4th of January, 1893, he was duly appointed a police justice of the city of New York by the mayor of that city for the term of 10 years, at an annual salary of $8,000, payable quarterly; that he duly qualified and entered upon the discharge of the duties of said office, and has always been ready and willing to perform the duties thereof as required by law; that on May 10, 1895, an act was passed by the legislature of the state of New York entitled ‘An act in relation to the inferior courts of criminal jurisdiction of the city and county of New York,’ which is referred to as a part of the complaint, and that under such act the mayor of said city assumed to appoint nine city magistrates in the city and county of New York, and five justices of the court of special sessions of said city and county. Notwithstanding the passage of this act, as the plaintiff further alleged, under and pursuant to sections 17 and 22 of article 6 of the constitution of this state, he is entitled to hold office until the expiration of his term on the 3d of January, 1903, and that on the 1st of October, 1895, there was due and payable to him, under and by virtue of the said appointment as police justice, the sum of $2,000, which had been duly demanded, and a claim therefor presented to the comptroller of said city for adjustment, but the same had neither been paid nor adjusted, although more than 30 days had elapsed since the presentation of such claim. The defendant demurred to the complaint upon the ground that the facts set forth do not constitute a cause of action. By the usual course of procedure the demurrer was sustained, the complaint dismissed, and a final judgment entered accordingly, which upon appeal to the appellate division was duly affirmed. From the judgment of affirmance the plaintiff appeals to this court.

George Hoadly, Matthew Hale, and A. J. Dittenhoefer, for appellant.

Lewis L. Delafield, for respondent.

VANN, J. (after stating the facts).

On the 10th of May, 1895, the legislature of this state enacted that ‘from and after midnight of the thirtieth day of June, 1895, the office of police justice in the city and county of New York is abolished, and all power, authority, duties and jurisdiction then vested in the police justices in the said city and county of New York, and in the courts held by them, including the court of special sessions, and in the board of police justices, and in the clerks, deputy clerks, police clerks and police clerks' assistants, and in all other officers or employees of said justices or courts, or of the board of police justices, shall cease and determine.’ Laws 1895, c. 601, § 1.

The main question presented for decision by this appeal is whether that section is in violation of the constitution of the state. The legislature has all the power of legislation that the people of the state can grant, except as it is restrained, expressly or impliedly, from the exercise of particular powers by the constitution. Const. art. 3, § 1; Bank of Chenango v. Brown, 26 N. Y. 467;People v. Flagg, 46 N. Y. 401. Since power to legislate is the rule, and restraint upon that power the exception, as was said by this court in an important case, ‘in inquiring whether a given statute is unconstitutional, it is for those who question its validity to show that it is forbidden.’ People v. Draper, 15 N. Y. 532, 543. Subject only to the restrictions of the constitution, the legislature may do what it thinks best with a public office or a public officer, by abolishing the office, shortening or lengthening the term thereof, increasing or diminishing the salary, and the like. Nichols v. MacLean, 101 N. Y. 526, 533,5 N. E. 347. We need not look, therefore, at the grant of power, but simply at the restraints upon the grant, in order to determine whether legislation is constitutional. The main restraints, found in the first article, and which are essential to constitutional government, are not invoked by the appellant. The provision that he relies upon to nullify the legislation in question is section 22 of article 6, which is as follows: ‘Justices of the peace, and other local judicial officers, provided for in sections seventeen and eighteen, in office when this article takes effect, shall hold their offices until the expiration of their respective terms.’ Sections 17 and 18, thus referred to in order to define what is meant by ‘other local judicial officers,’ are in these words:

‘Sec. 17. The electors of the several towns shall, at their annual town meetings, or at such other time and in such manner as the legislature may direct, elect justices of the peace, whose term of office shall be four years. In case of an election to fill a vacancy occurring before the expiration of a full term, they shall hold for the residue of the unexpired term. Their number and classification may be regulated by law. Justices of the peace and judges or justices of inferior courts not of record, and their clerks, may be removed for cause, after due notice and an opportunity of being heard, by such courts as are or may be prescribed by law. Justices of the peace and district court justices may be elected in the different cities of this state in such manner, and with such powers, and for such terms, respectively, as are or shall be prescribed by law; all other judicial officers in cities, whose election or appointment is not otherwise provided for in this article, shall be chosen by the electors of such cities, or appointed by some local authorities thereof.

‘Sec. 18. Inferior local courts of civil and criminal jurisdiction may be established by the legislature, but no inferior local court hereafter created shall be a court of record. The legislature shall not hereafter confer upon any inferior or local court of its creation any equity jurisdiction or any greater jurisdiction in other respects than is conferred upon county courts by or under this article. Except as herein otherwise provided, all judicial officers shall be elected or appointed at such times and in such manner as the legislature may direct.’

By an analysis of the judiciary article we may discover its broad purpose and general scope, in the light of which we may see clearly the meaning of the particular sections under consideration. Section 1 to 4, inclusive, are devoted to the supreme court, the great court of original jurisdiction, with important and in many instances final appellate power, by which the bulk of the judicial business of the state is transacted. That court, by those sections, is in terms ‘continued,’ its jurisdiction defined, the terms of the judges in office and their successors fixed, as well as those of others added by transfer from abolished courts and additional justices to be elected, and their successors. Provision is made for the division of the state into judicial districts and departments, an appellate division is created, and its powers and jurisdiction defined, the method of filling vacancies prescribed, and other details determined. By the fifth and sixth sections the superior city courts of New York, Brooklyn, and Buffalo, the venerable circuit court and court of oyer and terminer, were expressly abolished, their jurisdiction vested in the supreme court, and all actions and proceedings then pending therein transferred to that court for hearing and determination. By the seventh, eighth, and ninth sections the court of appeals is expressly ‘continued,’ the terms of the judges in office and their successors fixed, its jurisdiction, subject to further restriction by the legislature, determined, provision made for the filling of vacancies, and the like. By sections 10 to 13, inclusive, the conduct of the judges of both of the courts thus continued is in some respects regulated, and provision made for their compensation and for their removal by impeachment or otherwise. By sections 14 and 15 the existing county courts and surrogates' courts are ‘continued’ by express language, the terms of the judges in office and of their successors settled, their powers and jurisdiction established, and other details arranged. Courts of sessions, except in the county of New York, were abolished, and the jurisdiction thereof, as well as all actions and proceedings pending therein, transferred to the county courts.

Thus we find that by the first 15 sections of the judiciary article four great courts were continued; the tenure of the judges in office when the constitution took effect, as well as that of their successors, expressly prescribed; seven other important courts, theretofore existing, abolished, and their powers merged in the supreme court. The courts thus continued were evidently regarded as essential to the judicial system of the state, and hence were expressly placed beyond disturbance by the legislature. The utmost care was taken by clear and expressive words to make those courts permanent, and to place the judges thereof, present and future, beyond the danger of displacement or interference by the lawmaking power. The theory was to simplify the judicial system by reducing the number of high courts, and to imbed those retained so thoroughly in the fundamental law that they could not be changed or abolished without amending the constitution. One of those courts, that of the surrogate, until then dependent upon statute, was made a constitutional court for the first time. After thus providing for the superior courts of the state, the rest of the judiciary article is...