Koehler v. Dubose
Citation | 200 S.W. 238 |
Decision Date | 02 January 1918 |
Docket Number | (No. 5937.) |
Parties | KOEHLER v. DUBOSE et al. |
Court | Court of Appeals of Texas |
Appeal from District Court, Medina County; R. H. Burney, Judge.
Action by Walter Koehler against W. L Dubose and others. From a judgment for defendants, plaintiff appeals. Reversed and remanded.
Davis & Long and Ward & Bickett, all of San Antonio, and V. H. Blocker, of Hondo, for appellant. Hertzberg & Kercheville and C. C. Harris, all of San Antonio, Mack Kercheville, of Devine, De Montel & Fly, of Hondo, and John T. Briscoe and R. L. Marshall, both of Devine, for appellees.
This is a suit for damages instituted by appellant against W. L. Dubose and 66 others. It was alleged that the damages arose from the publication and circulation of two written instruments. A general demurrer and special exception were sustained to the petition.
The first instrument was signed by appellees, and the other was not signed. The signed document is as follows:
Signed by W. L. Dubose and 66 other defendants.
The unsigned instrument is as follows:
The two instruments were copied into the petition, and libel was declared upon them. If the instruments, or either of them, contain libelous matter, the general demurrer should not have been sustained, for the petition contains every allegation necessary to establish the cause of action, employing some pertinent innuendoes stated as arising from the publications of the papers.
In 1901 the Twenty-Seventh Legislature passed the first civil libel law ever enacted in Texas; prior to that time the common law being the only guide in libel cases, except in so far as certain publications had been penalized by the Legislature, such as the imputation of a want of chastity to a female. Hatcher v. Range, 98 Tex. 85, 81 S. W. 289; Guisti v. Galveston Tribune, 105 Tex. 497, 150 S. W. 874, 152 S. W. 167. It has been held, and we think properly so, that the law of 1901 was enacted to comprehend and embrace the entire subject of libel in civil causes, without reference to rules or precedents in this or other states. Not only does the statute cover all actionable cases of libel in this state, but it has given rights to those who are the subjects of libel, not accorded to them under the common law. The law, as enacted in 1901 (Acts 27th Leg. c. 26), is as follows, omitting the emergency clause:
In section 4 of that law, it is distinctly and clearly provided that certain existing matters and things shall not be affected by the act, each matter being specified. The first is penal laws as to libel, the second, defenses to civil actions for libel, and the third, as to cases arising before the law was enacted. If the provision is clear as to penal statutes, it is equally clear as to defenses in civil cases. No one has ever questioned the fact that the law did not affect penal laws, and there can be no doubt that defenses existing theretofore in civil actions for libel are no more affected than are the penal laws of Texas. It would seem that no other reasonable construction could be placed upon the statute of 1901, and while setting aside all other definitions of libel, the Legislature retained the common-law defenses as well for all citizens as for the publishers of newspapers or periodicals. We cannot imagine that the right of pleading and proving that an alleged libel is a privileged matter has been taken away from all citizens except newspaper and periodical publishers, and no authority has been produced which holds that such is the case. Such an authority would be directly in the face of the statute. It is clear that no such holding was made either in Walker v. Light Pub. Co., 30 Tex. Civ. App. 165, 70 S. W. 555, or in Guisti v. Galveston Tribune, 105 Tex. 497, 150 S. W. 874, 152 S. W. 167. In each of those cases the courts were considering the question from the standpoint of the plaintiff, and not from that of the defendant. They were defining the rights of plaintiffs under the law and not the defenses guaranteed by the law. In the Walker Case the court was passing upon the propriety of the action of the trial court in sustaining a general demurrer to the petition, and it was held that the statute gave the only definition...
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...and Libel (4th Ed.), sec. 357; Townsend, Libel and Slander (4th Ed.), sec. 211; Kelly v. Great Northern R. Co., 156 Wis. 181; Koehler v. DuBose, 200 S.W. 238: v. McKee, 150 Iowa 409; Hassett v. Carroll, 85 Conn. 23. (2) Even though the allegations be untrue and were known to be untrue when ......
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