Koehring v. Ohio Dept. of Rehab. & Corr., 2007 Ohio 2652 (Ohio App. 5/31/2007)

• Decision Date: 31 May 2007
• Docket Number: No. 06AP-396.,06AP-396.
• Citation: 2007 Ohio 2652
• Parties: Shawn Koehring, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Ohio State Department of Rehabilitation and Correction,
• Court: Ohio Court of Appeals

Page 1

2007 Ohio 2652

Shawn Koehring, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Ohio State Department of Rehabilitation and Correction,

No. 06AP-396.

Court of Appeals of Ohio, Tenth District, Franklin County.

Rendered on May 31, 2007.

APPEAL from the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas, C.P.C. No. 05CVC-09-10361.

Stein Chapin Gildee LLC, Lance Chapin and Laura A. Reinstein, for appellant.

Marc Dann, Attorney General, Monica L. Rausch and Timothy A. Lecklider, for appellee.

OPINION

PETREE, J.

{¶1} Plaintiff-appellant, Shawn Koehring, appeals from a judgment of the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas granting the motion of defendant-appellee, the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction ("ODRC"), to dismiss plaintiff's motion Defendant-Appellee to vacate an adverse arbitrator's award. For the following reasons, we affirm the common pleas court's judgment.

{¶2} After plaintiff, a corrections officer and employee of ODRC, was denied a promotion to the rank of Sergeant, he filed a grievance under the terms of a collective bargaining agreement between ODRC and plaintiff's union, Ohio Civil Service Employees Association, AFSCME Local 11, AFL-CIO ("union"). Plaintiff's grievance ultimately was submitted to arbitration where an arbitrator determined that his grievance was untimely filed. Plaintiff then filed a motion in the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas seeking to vacate the adverse arbitration award pursuant to R.C. 2711.10(D).¹ While plaintiff's motion was before the common pleas court, ODRC moved the court to dismiss plaintiff's motion for lack of standing. The common pleas court granted ODRC's motion.

{¶3} From this judgment, plaintiff now appeals. See, generally, R.C. 2711.15 (providing that "[a]n appeal may be taken from an order confirming, modifying, correcting or vacating an award made in an arbitration proceeding or from judgment entered upon an award").

{¶4} Plaintiff assigns a single error for our consideration:

THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN GRANTING THE MOTION TO DISMISS WHEN IT IMPROPERLY FOUND THAT APPELLANT SHAWN KOEHRING WAS NOT THE PROPER PARTY TO MOVE TO VACATE THE ARBITRATOR'S DECISION PURSUANT TO R.C. 2711.10.

{¶5} Although the parties have not raised whether subject-matter jurisdiction properly lies, on our own motion we begin our examination of defendant's appeal by considering whether the common pleas court's judgment is a final appealable order and whether this court properly has subject-matter jurisdiction of the instant appeal.

{¶6} "Because subject-matter jurisdiction goes to the power of the court to adjudicate the merits of a case, it can never be waived and may be challenged at any time." Pratts v. Hurley, 102 Ohio St.3d 81, 2004-Ohio-1980, at ¶11, citing United States v. Cotton (2002), 535 U.S. 625, 630, 122 S.Ct. 1781; State ex rel. Tubbs Jones v. Suster (1998), 84 Ohio St.3d 70, 75, reconsideration denied (1999), 84 Ohio St.3d 1475. Accordingly, whether subject matter properly lies may be raised sua sponte by an appellate court. Mogavero v. Lombardo (2001), Franklin App. No. 01AP-98, citing State ex rel. White v. Cuyahoga Metro. Hous. Auth. (1997), 79 Ohio St.3d 543, 544.

{¶7} Here, although the common pleas court's judgment granted ODRC's motion to dismiss plaintiff's motion for lack of standing, the court's judgment did not expressly adjudicate plaintiff's motion to vacate the arbitrator's award. Therefore, because the common pleas court granted ODRC's motion to dismiss plaintiff's motion for lack of standing, we find that this was an implied denial of plaintiff's motion and an implied dismissal with prejudice of plaintiff's motion, which resulted in a complete determination of all matters before the common pleas court. Accordingly, we construe the common pleas court's judgment as a final appealable order and also find that plaintiff's appeal is properly before this court. See General Acc. Ins. Co. v. Ins. Co. of N. Am. (1989), 44 Ohio St.3d 17, 21, citing Wise v. Gursky (1981), 66 Ohio St.2d 241 (stating that "even though all the claims or parties are not expressly adjudicated by the trial court, if the effect of the judgment as to some of the claims is to render moot the remaining claims or parties, then compliance with Civ.R. 54[B] is not required to make the judgment final and appealable").

{¶8} " 'The question of standing is whether a litigant is entitled to have a court determine the merits of the issues presented.' " Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of Commrs. v. State, 112 Ohio St.3d 59, 2006-Ohio-6499, at ¶22, quoting Ohio Contrs. Assn. v. Bicking (1994), 71 Ohio St.3d 318, 320, reconsideration denied (1995), 71 Ohio St.3d 1459. "Whether established facts confer standing to assert a claim is a matter of law." Portage Cty. Bd. of Commrs. v. Akron, 109 Ohio St.3d 106, 2006-Ohio-954, at ¶90, reconsideration denied, 109 Ohio St.3d 1427, 2006-Ohio-1967; see, also, Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of Commrs., at ¶23.

{¶9} Here, plaintiff's sole assignment of error challenges the common pleas court's determination that the facts of this case failed to confer standing upon plaintiff; accordingly, it presents us with a question of law. See Portage Cty. Bd. of Commrs., at ¶90; Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of Commrs., at ¶23. Thus, our standard of judicial review is de novo. Portage Cty. Bd. of Commrs., at ¶90, citing Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 95 Ohio St.3d 512, 2002-Ohio-2842, at ¶4, reconsideration denied, 96 Ohio St.3d 1489, 2002-Ohio-4478; Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of Commrs., at ¶23. Cf. Creatore v. Robert W. Baird & Co., 154 Ohio App.3d 316, 2003-Ohio-5009, at ¶8, citing Union Twp. Bd. of Trustees v. Fraternal Order of Police, Ohio Valley Lodge No. 112, 2001-Ohio-8674, at ¶6 (stating that an appellate court "must confine [its] review of arbitration proceedings to an evaluation of the order issued by the common pleas court and determine whether the trial court erred as a matter of law").

{¶10} "[D]e novo appellate review means that the court of appeals independently reviews the record and affords no deference to the trial court's decision." BP Communications Alaska, Inc. v. Cent. Collection Agency (2000), 136 Ohio App.3d 807, 812, dismissed, appeal not allowed, 89 Ohio St.3d 1464, citing Hall v. Ft. Frye Loc. School Dist. Bd. of Edn. (1996), 111 Ohio App.3d 690, 694; see, also, Hicks v. Leffler (1997), 119 Ohio App.3d 424, 427 (stating that de novo review requires an appellate court to review a judgment independently).

{¶11} Accordingly, applying a de novo standard of judicial review, we shall independently and non-deferentially examine the common pleas court's legal conclusion that plaintiff lacked standing to move to vacate the arbitrator's decision under R.C. 2711.10.

{¶12} Relying upon Leon v. Boardman Twp., 100 Ohio St.3d 335, 2003-Ohio-6466, the common pleas court found that, although the plaintiff appeared to have a meritorious argument for vacating the arbitrator's decision, he was not the proper party to pursue the matter in the common pleas court. As a consequence, the common pleas court granted ODRC's motion to dismiss the plaintiff's motion for lack of standing.

{¶13} In Leon, Andre Leon, a patrolman for Boardman Township, was discharged for a violation of the township's residency requirements for its civil-service employees. Id. at ¶1. Leon's discharge was arbitrated on his behalf by his union under the terms of a collective bargaining agreement between the township and the union. Id. An arbitrator reduced Leon's discharge to a suspension and conditionally reinstated Leon; however, the arbitrator declined to award back pay. Id. After Leon's union denied Leon's request for further representation concerning the issue of back pay, Leon moved the trial court to vacate the arbitration award pursuant to R.C. 2711.10. Id. Finding that Leon lacked standing, the trial court dismissed Leon's application, id. at ¶2, and an appellate court affirmed the trial court's judgment. Id. at ¶3.

{¶14} Thereafter, the Supreme Court of Ohio allowed a discretionary appeal to consider whether Leon "was a 'party' to the arbitration regarding his discharge for purposes of R.C. 2711.10." Leon, at ¶5-6. The Leon court observed that to resolve the issue presented for review the court was required to "decide whether and under what circumstances an employee has standing to challenge an arbitration award rendered pursuant to the terms of a collective bargaining agreement between the employee's union and employer." Id. at ¶6.

{¶15} In support of his claim that he was a "real party in interest," Leon relied upon this court's decision in Barksdale v. Ohio Dept. of Adm. Serv. (1992), 78 Ohio App.3d 325. In Barksdale, this court reasoned: "Where the employee is the real party in interest with respect to the subject matter of a labor arbitration proceeding, the employee is a 'party' under R.C. 2711.10 with standing to challenge an award rendered in such a proceeding." Leon, at ¶8, quoting Barksdale, at 329.

{¶16} Finding that Leon's reliance upon Barksdale was not well-taken, the Leon court stated that Barksdale was "a legal anomaly," and further stated that "the Barksdale test fails to account for the contractual nature of the 'personal' rights to which it refers." Leon, at ¶9, 10. Besides rejecting Barksdale, the Leon court also rejected the township's proposition that " '[a]n individual employee has no standing to move or petition a court to vacate the results of an arbitration between a union and an employer' " because this proposition "[also] established a blanket rule that operates irrespective of the terms of the collective bargaining agreement." Leon, at ¶11.

{¶17} After reviewing Ohio case law and foreign case law, the Leon court proceeded to observe that "the proposition that emerges from these cases is that an aggrieved worker whose employment is governed by a collective bargaining agreement that provides for binding arbitration will generally be deemed to have...