Koenig v. City of Des Moines
| Decision Date | 19 July 2004 |
| Docket Number | No. 49693-0-I, No. 49656-5-I, No. 51918-2-I.[1] |
| Citation | 95 P.3d 777,123 Wash. App. 285 |
| Parties | David KOENIG, Respondent, v. CITY OF DES MOINES and Des Moines Police Department, Appellants. David Koenig, Appellant, v. City of Des Moines and Des Moines Police Department, Respondents. |
| Court | Washington Court of Appeals |
Michael John Killeen, Eric B. Martin, Seattle, WA, for Amicus Curiae — Allied Daily Newspaper and Washington Newspapers Publishers.
Sara Lyle Ainsworth, Northwest Women's Law Center, Seattle, WA, for Amicus Curiae — Northwest Women's Law Center.
Douglas B. Klunder, Attorney at Law, Seattle, WA, for Amicus Curiae — American Civil Liberties.
William Berggren Collins, Olympia, WA, for Amicus Curiae — Office of the WA St. Atty. Gen.
Pamela Beth Loginsky, Wash. Assoc. Pros. Atty., Olympia, WA, for Amicus Curiae — Washington Assoc. Pros. Atty.
Catherine Carroll, Attorney at Law, Olympia, WA, for Amicus Curiae — Washington State Coalition of Sexual Assault Programs.
Linda Anne Marousek, City of Des Moines, Des Moines, WA, for Appellants City of Des Moines and Des Moines Police Dept.
Owen Sherman Limstrom, Attorney at Law, Tacoma, WA, William John Crittenden, Attorney at Law, Seattle, WA, for Respondent David Koenig.
Highly offensive information that, if disclosed, would harm the efficient administration of government more than it would benefit the public interest is not of legitimate concern to the public. Where such information is contained in police investigative records, it must be redacted before the records are disclosed under the public records provisions of the public disclosure act, the Fair Campaign Practices Act.
David Koenig is the father of "Jane," a child victim of sexual assault. In October 1996, Koenig requested all records from the City of Des Moines and its police department (collectively, the city) related to Jane's case under RCW 42.17.250 through.348 (the public records act, or the Act). The city denied Koenig's request, broadly identifying RCW 42.17.310 as the statutory authority for nondisclosure. Between 1997 and 1999, Koenig made several more written requests for the records, identifying Jane by name in each request. The city continued to refuse these requests, citing provisions in the Act that exempt from disclosure certain investigative records and identifying information.
On December 15, 1999, Koenig sued the city to compel disclosure of the records. The city obtained an injunction prohibiting disclosure of the records while Koenig's case was pending. Following trial and an in camera review of the records, the trial court issued a memorandum opinion and order to disclose redacted records to Koenig. The redacted content included Jane's name, address, and her relationship with the assailant. But the details about the sexual assaults against Jane, including where on her body she was touched and the manner in which she was touched, were not redacted from the records. In addition to awarding access to the records, the trial court also awarded attorney fees and costs to Koenig, although it denied Koenig's request for statutory penalties against the city.
Koenig later moved to vacate the judgment based on fraud, namely the city's purported failure to disclose a witness statement. Koenig also moved the trial court to recuse itself for communicating ex parte with the city. The trial court denied both motions.
The city appeals both the order releasing the redacted records, and the order awarding Koenig attorney fees. Koenig cross-appeals the trial court's denial of statutory penalties against the city. Furthermore, Koenig has moved to dismiss the city's appeal as moot. In a linked case, Koenig appeals the trial court's denial of his CR 60 motion and his motion to recuse.
Preliminarily, we address Koenig's motion to dismiss the city's appeal as moot, which he bases on the fact that the city released the requested records to him over two years ago, and his assertion that the city's appeal only seeks to prevent the disclosure of those records.
A case is moot only when a court cannot provide meaningful relief.2 This case is not moot because we can provide the city with meaningful relief from both of the errors it claims. First, a decision in the city's favor on the records disclosure issue would require that we reverse Koenig's attorney fee award. Second, a decision in the city's favor on the issue of attorney fee calculation would require that we remand the matter to the trial court. Consequently, the city's appeal is not moot and we deny Koenig's motion to dismiss.
The city claims that the trial court erred by misconstruing the public records act to require disclosure of the redacted records. It also claims that the trial court awarded an excessive amount of attorney fees to Koenig.
The city argues that one or more provisions in the Act exempted the entire contents of the records from disclosure, and therefore the trial court erred when it ordered disclosure of redacted records. This assignment of error requires that we consider three specific provisions in the Act, each of which exempts certain kinds of information from disclosure: RCW 42.17.31901, which exempts information revealing the identity of child victims of sexual assault; RCW 42.17.310(1)(e), which exempts information revealing the identity of crime victims, witnesses, or complainants if disclosure would endanger any person's life, physical safety, or property, or if the victim, witness or complainant requests nondisclosure; and RCW 42.17.310(1)(d), which exempts police investigative records, the nondisclosure of which is essential to effective law enforcement or for the protection of any persons' right to privacy.
But before we examine these provisions and the city's related arguments, we briefly review the public policy of the public records act, for it is this policy, as expressed in the text of the Act and the case law interpreting it, that must guide our review.3
More than thirty years ago, the sovereign people of Washington declared it to be the public policy of our state:
That, mindful of the right of individuals to privacy and of the desirability of the efficient administration of government, full access to information concerning the conduct of government on every level must be assured as a fundamental and necessary precondition to the sound governance of a free society.4
To implement this policy, the Act's paramount provision mandates that each agency "make available for public inspection and copying all public records, unless the record falls within the specific exemptions of subsection (6) of this section, RCW 42.17.310, 42.17.315, or other statute which exempts or prohibits disclosure of specific information or records."5
Washington courts have consistently observed that "the Act is a `strongly worded mandate for broad disclosure of public records.'"6 Further, "[t]he provisions of the Act are to be liberally construed to promote full access to public records so as to assure continuing public confidence in governmental processes, and to assure that the public interest will be fully protected."7 To emphasize this policy, in 1992 our legislature amended the Act to declare:
The people of this state do not yield their sovereignty to the agencies that serve them. The people, in delegating authority, do not give their public servants the right to decide what is good for the people to know and what is not good for them to know. The people insist on remaining informed so that they may maintain control over the instruments that they have created. The public records subdivision of this chapter shall be liberally construed and its exemptions narrowly construed to promote this public policy.8
The Act recognizes that the publics interest in open public records can and often does conflict with its interests in protecting personal privacy and the efficient administration of government.9 Thus, a number of provisions in the Act exempt certain information and even entire records from disclosure.10 Nevertheless, these exemptions "are inapplicable to the extent that information, the disclosure of which would violate personal privacy or vital governmental interests, can be deleted from the specific records sought."11
With this policy background in mind, we turn to the controversy presented here. On appeal, the city argues that it met its statutory burden to show that the records Koenig requested were exempt from disclosure by RCW 42.17.31901, RCW 42.17.310(1)(d), RCW 42.17.310(1)(e), or some combination of these provisions. We discuss each in turn.
RCW 42.17.31901 provides:
Information revealing the identity of child victims of sexual assault who are under age eighteen is confidential and not subject to public disclosure. Identifying information means the child victim's name, address, location, photograph, and in cases in which the child victim is a relative or stepchild of the alleged perpetrator, identification of the relationship between the child and the alleged perpetrator.
The city argues that RCW 42.17.31901 prohibits disclosure of the requested records because Koenig identified Jane by name in his requests. The city reasons that if redacted records are disclosed in response to a request that names a specific child, the act of disclosure itself would identify the child as certainly as if the records contained the child's identifying information. Thus, the city argues, courts should construe RCW 42.17.31901 to exempt from disclosure all records related to a specifically-named child, and not just the identifying information listed in the statute.
Although the logic of the city's argument is persuasive, we cannot construe RCW 42.17.31901 in the manner the city advocates. Neither the...
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...42.17.310(1)(j)); Hearst Corp. v. Hoppe, 90 Wash.2d 123, 580 P.2d 246 (1978) (discussing RCW 42.17.310(1)(i)); Koenig v. City of Des Moines, 123 Wash.App. 285, 95 P.3d 777 (2004) (discussing RCW 42.17.310(1)(e)), review granted, 153 Wash.2d 1023, 110 P.3d 755 (2005); King County v. Sheehan,......
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Koenig v. City of Des Moines
...a specific child," and declined to "rewrite the statute or construe it in a manner contrary to its unambiguous text." Koenig, 123 Wash.App. at 294, 295, 95 P.3d 777. ¶ 11 When interpreting any statute our primary objective is to "ascertain and give effect to the intent of the Legislature." ......