Koerner v. State

• Decision Date: 29 June 1984
• Parties: , 467 N.E.2d 232 Ronald KOERNER, Appellant, v. STATE of New York, Pilgrim Psychiatric Center et al., Respondents.
• Court: New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

Page 584

478 N.Y.S.2d 584

62 N.Y.2d 442, 467 N.E.2d 232

Ronald KOERNER, Appellant, v. STATE of New York, Pilgrim Psychiatric Center et al., Respondents.

Court of Appeals of New York.

June 29, 1984.

Alan J. Azzara, and David Baram, Mineola, for appellant

Robert Abrams, Atty. Gen., (John Q. Driscoll and Peter H. Schiff, Asst. Attys. Gen., Albany, of counsel), for respondents.

Roberto Albertorio and Ann Thacher Anderson, New York City, for State Division of Human Rights, amicus curiae.

OPINION OF THE COURT

WACHTLER, Judge.

This appeal concerns the nature of the procedural limitations applicable to civil actions brought against the State pursuant to the Human Rights Law (Executive Law, art. 15). Specifically, we are asked to determine what Statute of Limitations is applicable to such claims, and whether the plaintiff in such actions must pursue a claim for monetary relief in the Court of Claims.

Plaintiff applied for a position as a food service worker at the Pilgrim State Psychiatric Center, a facility under the jurisdiction of the New York State Department of Mental Hygiene. He alleges that he was hired in that capacity in April of 1981, but that his employment was immediately terminated as a result of a medical examination which he failed because of his poor vision. Claiming that his medical condition would not impair his ability to work, plaintiff commenced this action by service of a summons and complaint in February of 1982 seeking reinstatement, back pay, and damages for embarrassment, humiliation and mental and emotional distress. The complaint alleges that defendants improperly terminated plaintiff on the basis of his physical disability, in violation of the Human Rights Law (Executive Law, § 296).

Defendants moved to dismiss the complaint on the grounds that the four-month Statute of Limitations (CPLR 217) applicable to plaintiff's action had expired, and that the court was without subject matter jurisdiction over a claim for monetary relief against the State which can only be sued for in the Court of Claims. Special Term granted the motion, holding that the four-month Statute of Limitations is applicable, inasmuch as the determination challenged by plaintiff is reviewable in an article 78 proceeding, and that plaintiff's action was thus time barred. The court also concluded that plaintiff's claim for money damages could only be pursued in the Court of Claims, because the State had not consented to suit elsewhere. The Appellate Division, 97 A.D.2d 686, 467 N.Y.S.2d 107, affirmed, without opinion. The appeal is before us by leave of this court.

The State Division of Human Rights (Division), created by section 293 of the Executive Law, is empowered to receive, investigate, and pass upon complaints alleging violations of the Human Rights Law (Executive Law, § 295, subd. 6). The procedure governing the administrative handling of such complaints expressly provides that filing must take place "within one year after the alleged unlawful discriminatory practice" (Executive Law, § 297, subd. 5). In addition to establishing an administrative forum to redress unlawful discriminatory practices, the Legislature provided the aggrieved person with a cause of action "in any court of appropriate jurisdiction for damages and such other remedies as may be appropriate" (Executive Law, § 297, subd. 9). Although the statute specifies no time frame within which such a cause of action must be commenced, we recently addressed that very question in (Murphy v. American Home Prods. Corp., 58 N.Y.2d 293, 461 N.Y.S.2d 232, 448 N.E.2d 86). We held that the institution of a civil action to recover damages pursuant to the Human Rights Law for discriminatory discharge by a private employer is governed by the three-year Statute of Limitations contained in CPLR 214 (subd. 2), inasmuch as the action was one to recover upon a liability created by statute (id., at p. 307, 461 N.Y.S.2d 232, 448 N.E.2d 86).

The State defendants contend that our decision in Murphy does not state the appropriate Statute of Limitations for an unlawful discrimination action against the State. Fully conceding the applicability of the Human Rights Law to it (Matter of State Dept. of Correctional Servs. v. State Div. of Human Rights, 88 A.D.2d 1061, 452 N.Y.S.2d 746; State Div. of Human Rights v. State Dept. of Mental Hygiene, 85 A.D.2d 915, 446 N.Y.S.2d 784; see City of Schenectady v. State Div. of Human Rights, 37 N.Y.2d 421, 373 N.Y.S.2d 59, 335 N.E.2d 290 Board of Educ. v. State Div. of Human Rights, 42 A.D.2d 49, 345 N.Y.S.2d 93, affd. on opn. below 35 N.Y.2d 673, 360 N.Y.S.2d 887, 319 N.E.2d 202 ), the State nevertheless asserts that the Legislature never intended to place the State as an employer upon the same footing as private employers for purposes of litigation under the Human Rights Law. Relying on the cases of (Solnick v. Whalen, 49 N.Y.2d 224, 425 N.Y.S.2d 68, 401 N.E.2d 190) and Press v. County of Monroe, 50 N.Y.2d 695, 431 N.Y.S.2d 394, 409 N.E.2d 870, the State urges that the four-month Statute of Limitations applicable to a proceeding against a body or officer (CPLR 217) must be applied to the present action.

The cases cited, however, do not support the theory propounded by the State. Both cases involved efforts to have reviewed, by way of declaratory judgment action, determinations of governmental entities. As there is no specific Statute of Limitations for a declaratory judgment action, plaintiffs sought to obtain the benefit of the six-year period of CPLR 213 (subd. 1) (action for which no limitation is specifically prescribed by law). The rule announced in those cases is that the limitations period applicable to a declaratory judgment action is that applicable to the alternative form of proceeding, if any, available for resolution of the rights sought to be adjudicated in the action. Thus, where the declaratory judgment action was brought to challenge the Commissioner of Health's retroactive adjustment of Medicaid reimbursement rates (Solnick v. Whalen, 49 N.Y.2d 224, 425 N.Y.S.2d 68, 401 N.E.2d 190, supra ), or the county legislature's adoption of the assessment rolls of a sewer district (Press v. County of Monroe, 50 N.Y.2d 695, 431 N.Y.S.2d 394, 409 N.E.2d 870, supra ), the determinations sought to be reviewed were capable of resolution by way of article 78 proceeding, and the four-month limitations period was applicable. Because such a time limitation was prescribed, plaintiffs could not avail themselves of the six-year period provided by CPLR 213 (subd. 1), which is applicable only when no other period is specifically provided.

The rule set forth in Solnick and Press does not require, as the State seems to argue, that all proceedings challenging State actions be commenced within four months....